(Citation omitted.) Fleming v. Lee Engineering c. Co., 184 Ga. App. 275, 275-276 (1) ( 361 SE2d 258) (1987). Here, Mrs. Jones was apparently cited for making an improper lane change in connection with the accident.

Although Bunch contends that Lola Vincent's September 9, 1991 payment to an expert put Charles Vincent on notice as a matter of law concerning any alleged fraud involving the $10,000 check, we disagree. See Fleming v. Lee Engineering c. Co., 184 Ga. App. 275 ( 361 S.E.2d 258) (1987) (whether a cause of action is barred by statute of limitations is generally a mixed question of fact and law). When Lola Vincent wrote the $10,000 check in August, in light of Gary Bunch's representations to the court about the Vincents' indebtedness to the law firm for litigation expenses, a jury could find that Charles Vincent could reasonably have believed that a substantial amount of money remained owed to the law firm even had the $10,000 check been duly credited.

We agree. See generally Fleming v. Lee Engineering c. Co., 184 Ga. App. 275, 276 ( 361 S.E.2d 258) (1987); compare Moore v. Meeks, 225 Ga. App. 287 (2) ( 483 S.E.2d 383) (1997). There was evidence that in February 1990, the Bennetts had their yard excavated and discovered that the pipes were wrapped in cloth.

The cases cited by Moore in support of this claim are inapposite as they all involve the duty of a builder-seller who was a party to the contract. See, e.g., Shipman v. Horizon Corp., 245 Ga. 808, 809 ( 267 S.E.2d 244) (1980); Hahne v. Wylly, 199 Ga. App. 811 ( 406 S.E.2d 94) (1991); Fleming v. Lee Engineering c. Co., 184 Ga. App. 275 ( 361 S.E.2d 258) (1987). 2.

Thus, the burden was on appellant to reveal hidden defects ( Holman, supra), and the statute of limitation was tolled until the discovery of the defect in 1988. Fleming v. Lee Eng. c. Co., 184 Ga. App. 275, 276 ( 361 S.E.2d 258) (1987). Furthermore, appellant's contention that the claim must fail due to a lack of privity between himself and appellee is without merit because the cause of action is in tort which requires no privity. Georgia-CarolinaBrick c. Co. v. Brown, 153 Ga. App. 747 (1) ( 266 S.E.2d 531) (1980).

Here, the evidence presented at trial authorized a finding of actual fraud in appellant's statement assuring appellee that the pool construction would have no effect on her septic system even though he did not know what type of system she had or where the drain field was located and made no attempt to find out, and in his continued assertions that the septic system was unimpaired even after large portions of the piping were removed during the pool excavation. See Fleming v. Lee Engineering c. Co., 184 Ga. App. 275, 276 ( 361 S.E.2d 258) (1987); Spiva v. Union County, 172 Ga. App. 151, 152 (1) ( 322 S.E.2d 351) (1984). Given that the damage was concealed 24 inches below the surface and that appellant stated to appellee that he removed only a three foot segment of piping when there is evidence that much more was removed, and given Gay's testimony that a level field system could continue to operate for a period of time after part of the drain field is removed, we hold the statute of limitation was tolled until February 1988 when appellee first experienced problems with the septic system.

Martin v. Broach, 6 Ga. 21 (5) (1849). Accord Fleming v. LeeEngineering c. Co., 184 Ga. App. 275 ( 361 S.E.2d 258) (1987). "Under OCGA § 9-11-4 (c), where the limitation accrues between the date of filing and the date of service and is more than five days after the filing, whether or not the service relates back is a question for the trial court, which considers the length of the elapsed time and the diligence of the plaintiff."

This two-year statute of limitations is applicable to Plaintiff's state-law claims, i.e. false imprisonment, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent training and hiring, and malicious prosecution. See Reese v. City of Atlanta, 545 S.E.2d 96, 98 (Ga.Ct.App. 2001) (noting false arrest and false imprisonment claims must be filed within the statute of limitations for personal injuries, which is two years (citing § 93-33)); Fleming v. Lee Eng'g & Const. Co., 361 S.E.2d 258, 260 (Ga.Ct.App. 1987) (applying two-year statute of limitations to intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (citing § 9-333)); Doe v. Saint Joseph's Cath. Church, 870 S.E.2d 365, 369 (Ga. 2022) (applying two-year statute of limitations to negligent training, hiring and retention claims (citing § 9-3-33)); Daniel v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Tr. Co., 334 S.E.2d 659, 661 (Ga. 1985) (applying two-year statute of limitations to malicious prosecution claim (citing § 9-3-33)).

The two-year statute of limitations includes actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Fleming v. Lee Engineering Construction Co., 184 Ga. App. 275, 276, 361 S.E.2d 258 (1987). The Georgia Court of Appeals discussed the application of this limitations provision to claims for harassment and abuse in Adams v. Emory University Clinic, 179 Ga. App. 620, 347 S.E.2d 670 (1986).