Opinion
08-CV-3074 (ARR).
August 15, 2008
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On July 28, 2008, pro se plaintiff Michael Fleming filed a complaint pursuant to, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a request for an Order to Show Cause why a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order should not be granted, and an affidavit in support of the motion for injunctive relief. By Order dated July 29, 2008, the Honorable Eric N. Vitaliano denied plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order. Plaintiff has paid the requisite filing fee to bring this action. For the reasons discussed below, the complaint is dismissed in part, plaintiff is directed to file an amended complaint as set forth below, and plaintiff's application for a preliminary injunction is denied.
BACKGROUND
Although unclear, it appears that plaintiff's cause of action stems from a child neglect or abuse proceeding brought against him and his wife by the Administration for Children's Services ("ACS"). According to the complaint, defendant Mtonya Flecher, a Child Protective Specialist for ACS, "filed a claim in court . . . without having any firsthand knowledge of any crime." Compl. at 10, ¶ 28. The complaint states that Mr. Fleming challenged the court's jurisdiction, but Judge Paul Grosvenor had Mr. Fleming removed from court by armed men, and the proceeding continued without Mr. Fleming being present. Compl. at 10, ¶¶ 31, 32. The complaint further states that during a proceeding held in Family Court on May 14, 2008, plaintiffs were forced to enter into a contract. Compl. at 11, ¶ 40. It is unclear what "contract" Mr. Fleming is referring to. Mr. Fleming further alleges that on July 16, 2008 and July 17, 2008, police officers and ACS agents demanded access and subsequently searched plaintiff's apartment without a warrant. Compl. at 11-12. Mr. Fleming states that his family fears ACS because in 1999, one of the children was held by ACS for 13 days. Compl. at 12-13, ¶ 53. Mr. Fleming also states that his family's rights have been violated and continue to be violated because they have been told by ACS several times that "their offspring would be taken if they [fail to comply with ACS' demands]." Compl. at 13, ¶ 62. The complaint seeks monetary damages, declaratory relief allowing plaintiff and his family "to practice, follow, religious, covenant and convictions," and injunctive relief staying all decisions and orders issued in the Family Court proceeding. Compl. at 18.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing plaintiff's complaint, the Court is mindful that because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his submission should be held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff is still required to comply with the relevant procedural and substantive rules of law. Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983). Furthermore, regardless of whether a plaintiff has paid the filing fee, a district court has the inherent power to dismiss a case, sua sponte, if it determines that the action is baseless or the Court lacks jurisdiction over the matter. Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-4 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curium); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). To that end, a complaint will be dismissed when it is clear that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Lvndonville Say. Bank Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700-01 (2d Cir. 2000).
DISCUSSION
At the outset, the Court notes that plaintiff, as a non-attorney parent, has no standing to bring this claim on behalf of his children without representation by counsel. See Murphy v. Arlington Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 2002); Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 146 F.3d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the court has a duty to enforce the rule sua sponte where defendants had not raised the issue). The rule is primarily based on protection of the legal interests of the minor and the impropriety of a person who is not a member of the bar representing another person in court proceedings. See Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[I]t is not in the interests of minors or incompetents that they be represented by non-attorneys. Where they have claims that require adjudication, they are entitled to trained legal assistance so their rights may be fully protected."); Ellis v. McDonalds Corp., No. 05 CV 396, 2005 WL 2155547, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 07, 2005). Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff seeks to bring this action on behalf of his children, he may not do so and those claims are dismissed without prejudice.
Younger Abstention
To the extent plaintiff does not seek damages, the Younger abstention doctrine and its progeny prohibits this Court from exercising jurisdiction over this matter, which concerns an ongoing proceeding in Family Court. Younger and its progeny require federal courts to abstain from enjoining pending state judicial proceedings, in order to "allow state courts to resolve pending matters within their jurisdiction." Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982) ("Younger v. Harris and its progeny espouse a strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances."). When Younger applies, abstention is mandatory and its application deprives the federal court of jurisdiction in the matter.Colorado Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 n. 22 (1976); Diamond "D" Const. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002). Thus, where the Younger requirements are met, the appropriate remedy is dismissal of the federal case. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973). Although Younger involved a constitutional challenge to a pending state criminal proceeding, the doctrine has been extended beyond the ambit of state criminal prosecutions to state civil proceedings and administrative proceedings." Washington, 373 F.3d at 318. Younger abstention is mandatory when: (1) there is an ongoing state proceeding; (2) an important state interest is involved; and (3) the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity for judicial review of his constitutional claims during or after the proceeding. Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2003).
Here, each of the three conditions is satisfied. First, the state proceeding is ongoing. Second, disputes concerning custody rights over minors implicate important state interests. Questions of family relations, especially when issues of custody are involved, are traditionally an area of state concern. See Rohling v. State of New York, No. 04 CV 1083, 2004 WL 3623341, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2004) (discussing cases where matters involving the custody over a child were deemed matters of state law). Third, plaintiff has not alleged that state courts could not afford him the opportunity for judicial review of his instant challenge. See Hansel v. Town Court for the Town of Springfield, 56 F.3d 391, 393 (2d Cir. 1995); Cogswell v. Rodriquez, 304 F. Supp, 2d 350, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). Accordingly, this court must abstain from adjudicating plaintiff's claims concerning an ongoing Family Court proceeding.
The Court notes that to the extent plaintiff is challenging any final decisions by the family court, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine further precludes this Court from exercising jurisdiction in this matter. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine-Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) — a United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings, except for constitutional challenges and reviews pursuant to an application for a writ of habeas corpus. In Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005), the Second Circuit set out four requirements of theRooker-Feldman doctrine: (1) "the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court;" (2) "plaintiff must `complain of injuries caused by [a] state-court judgment;'" (3) "plaintiff must `invit[e] district court review and rejection of [that] judgment;'" and (4) the "state-court judgment must have been `rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.'" Id. at 85 (alterations in original) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). See also Phifer v. City of New York, 289 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2002) (plaintiff's claims directly attacking family court's decisions regarding custody, neglect, and visitation are barred byRooker-Feldman).
Judicial Immunity
Leave to Amend
Mireles v. Waco502 U.S. 911Stump v. Sparkman435 U.S. 349356Young v. Selsky41 F.3d 47 50see also Zuckerman421 F.2d at 626 42 U.S.C. § 1983Mireles 502 U.S. at 11104-317110 Stat. 3847Id. 110 Stat. at 385342 U.S.C. § 1983Jones v. Newman1999 WL 493429Montero v. Travis171 F.3d 757760 42 U.S.C. § 1983Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks436 U.S. 149155-57Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co.398 U.S. 144152Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. 316 F.3d 30831218 U.S.C. §§ 241242Leeke v. Timmerman 454 U.S. 8386
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court abstains from intervening in any ongoing Family Court proceeding pursuant to Younger and the complaint is dismissed against Judge Grosvenor. Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-4 (2d Cir. 2000). The claims brought on behalf of plaintiff's children are dismissed without prejudice. In order for plaintiff to proceed with claims on behalf of his children, he must hire an attorney to represent the interests of his children in this case. Plaintiff's application for a preliminary injunction is denied. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days from the entry of this Order against the remaining defendants. The amended complaint must be captioned, "Amended Complaint," and shall bear the same docket number as this Order. All further proceedings shall be stayed for thirty (30) days. The court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).SO ORDERED.