A valid "hypothecation agreement," like a guarantee, "create[s] an obligation . . . sufficient to permit the operation of a dragnet clause in the deed to secure debt," so long as the parties to the hypothecation agreement were the original parties to the security instrument. Fleming v. First Am. Bank & Trust Co., 171 Ga.App. 295 (Ga.App. 1984); see also Citizens & S. DeKalb Bank v. Hicks, 232 Ga. 244, 245 (Ga. 1974) ("[T]he guarantee itself was a personal obligation . . . between the original grantor and grantee in the deeds to secure debt. Such personal guarantee created a debt or obligation which could be tacked onto the original deed [by operation of an] open end or dragnet clause[.

Because Debtor in the case before this Court is not a co-borrower on the HLD Note, it is not a co-maker like in Johnson , so that case is distinguishable from the facts of this case and not applicable. Contrast those two cases to Fleming v. First American Bank , 171 Ga.App. 295, 319 S.E.2d 119 (1984). In Fleming , a husband and wife gave a deed to their house to the Bank to secure a loan to a corporation in which the husband had an interest.

Even if appellee were in some way obligated to use the money received from appellants as payment only on the loan Timber Harvesters received at the time the security deed was given, the dragnet clauses in the security deed and the hypothecation agreement permitted appellee to continue to hold an interest in the pledged real property. Fleming v. First American Bank c. Co., 171 Ga. App. 295 ( 319 S.E.2d 119) (1984). The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to appellee on appellants' claim to have the security deed cancelled.

; J.J. Fowler, Inc. v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 145 Ga. App. 220, 220, 243 S.E.2d 642, 643 (1978) (A note was executed as well as "a security agreement hypothecating and assigning to the bank" equipment.). Georgia cases have used the term "hypothecation" with reference to a security agreement rather than a sale. See, e.g., Reeves v. Habersham Bank, 254 Ga. 615, 331 S.E.2d 589 (1985); Rainer v. Security Bank Trust Co., 182 Ga. App. 171, 354 S.E.2d 882 (1987); Breitzman v. Heritage Bank, 180 Ga. App. 171, 348 S.E.2d 713 (1986); Fleming v. First American Bank Trust Co., 171 Ga. App. 295, 319 S.E.2d 119 (1984); Whitmire v. Canal Ins. Co., 102 Ga. App. 611, 117 S.E.2d 348 (1960); see also Carbine v. Commissioner, 777 F.2d 662, 663 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (In Georgia cases, this court has used "hypothecate" to reference security for loans.). "A sale is distinguishable from a pledge or a pawn in that a sale passes title while in a pawn, possession passes, but not title. . . . The pledge creates a lien upon property but not title to it."

Royal Equipment Company owes First Bulloch several hundred thousand dollars and Charles Royal has personally guaranteed that debt. Whether Royal Equipment Company debt, under these facts, is a debt of "the undersigned" when both Mr. and Mrs. Royal were "the undersigned" is very much in doubt in my mind. O.C.G.A. 44-14-1(b); See Willis v. Rabun County Bank 249 Ga. 493, 291 S.E.2d 715 (1982) and cases cited therein. Contra, Fleming v. First American Bank Trust Co., 171 Ga. App. 295, 319 S.E.2d 119 (1984). Under existing authority in Georgia if the term "party of the first part" or "grantor" appeared where "the undersigned" appears, First Bulloch's contentions would be on shaky footing.