Opinion
Civil No. 1:19-CV-2114
03-24-2020
RONALD L. FLEMING, JR., Petitioner v. ADAMS COUNTY PRISON, et al., Respondents
(Judge Mannion)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Factual Background
On December 12, 2019, the petitioner in this case, Ronald Fleming, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this court. (Doc. 1). Fleming's petition was largely unintelligible and demanded a great deal of the reader. Nonetheless, acting out of an abundance of caution, we ordered the petition served, and directed a response to that petition. (Docs. 9, 10). In the meanwhile, correspondence addressed to Fleming at the Adams County prison has been returned as undeliverable with the notation that Fleming has been released. (Doc. 11). Thus, it appears that Fleming is no longer in custody, and we lack any means of communicating with the petitioner since he is no longer found at his last known address.
On these facts, for the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that this petition for writ of habeas corpus now be dismissed as moot.
II. Discussion
A. This Petition is Moot and Should Be Dismissed.
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts provides in pertinent part: "If it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner." Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Court. See, e.g., Patton v. Fenton, 491 F. Supp. 156, 158-59 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), a federal court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). A state prisoner must meet exacting substantive standards to obtain habeas corpus relief. As amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 sharply limits the power of a federal court to grant a state prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). A federal court may not grant habeas relief with respect to any claim that has been adjudicated on the merits unless the adjudication in a state proceeding (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is highly deferential and difficult to meet. Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181. It "reflects the view that habeas corpus is a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011).
Further, it is a basic principle of constitutional law that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to decide an issue unless it presents a live case or controversy. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2009). In order to meet this standard, and "[t]o invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Burkey, 556 F.3d at 147 (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). "This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings . . . . The parties must continue to have a 'personal stake in the outcome' of the lawsuit." Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7 (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477-78). Accordingly, "[i]f developments occur during the course of adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff's personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be dismissed as moot." Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996).
There is a necessary corollary to the mootness doctrine that applies in cases such as the instant case, where it appears that a petitioner has completed service of any sentence which he challenged in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In this setting: "After a petitioner's release from custody, we consider his habeas case moot unless he 'can demonstrate he will suffer some collateral consequences if his conviction is allowed to stand.' DeFoy, 393 F.3d at 441-42, 442 n. 3." Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 363 (3d Cir. 2007). See e.g., Kozak v. Commonwealth of Pa., No. 3:14-CV-984, 2017 WL 4413193, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2017) (dismissing petition); Nalls v. Superintendent Sci-Dallas, No. 1:16-CV-0098, 2016 WL 6995517, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2016) (same).
These principles apply here and are fatal to this petition. This petition should now be dismissed as moot since it appears that Fleming is no longer in state custody, and Fleming has not demonstrated that he will suffer some collateral consequences as a result of the matters which led to his confinement.
Likewise, as a pro se litigant, Fleming's failure to maintain an address where he could be reached itself violated the rules of this court; specifically, Local Rule 83.18, which provides that:
LR 83.18 Appearance of Parties Not Represented by Counsel.
Whenever a party by whom or on whose behalf an initial paper is offered for filing is not represented in the action, such party shall maintain on file with the clerk a current address at which all notices and copies of pleadings, motions or papers in the action may be served upon such party.
Under the Local Rules of this Court, the petitioner should also be deemed to have abandoned this lawsuit by failing to provide the court with an address where he can be reached, a direct violation of Local Rule 83.18. Fleming's violation of Local Rule 83.18, permits the court to find that he has abandoned this litigation. In this circumstance, dismissal of this action for failure to abide by the rules of this court, and failure to prosecute, is fully justified. See, e.g., Juaquee v. Pike County Corr. Facility Employees, 3:12-CV-1233, 2013 WL 432611 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2013); Kuhn v. Capitol Pavilion, 1:11-CV-2017, 2012 WL 5197551 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2012); Educ. Mgmt. Services, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 1:10-CV-00441, 2012 WL 2389874 (M.D. Pa. June 25, 2012); Olguin v. Burgerhoff, 1:12-CV-0003, 2012 WL 1580935 (M.D. Pa. May 4, 2012); Nowland v. Lucas, 1:10-CV-1863, 2012 WL 10559 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2012); Binsack v. Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney's Office, 3:08-CV-1166, 2011 WL 5840314 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2011); Washington v. Columbia County Prison, 3:CV-10-45, 2011 WL 98547 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2011).
These basic tenets of fairness apply here. In this case, the petitioner has failed to comply with Local Rule 83.18 by providing an address where we can communicate with this litigant. This failure now compels us to apply the sanction called for under Rule 83.18, and deem the petitioner to have abandoned this litigation. See Nwafor v. Ice/Homeland Sec., No. 1:15-CV-2112, 2015 WL 9487898, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:15-CV-2112, 2015 WL 9480022 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2015).
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this case be DISMISSED as moot, and that a certificate of appealability should not issue, as Fleming has not demonstrated "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see also Buck v. Davis, 137 S.Ct. 773-75 (2017); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before
the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 24th day of March 2020.
/s/ Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge