¶ 25 We review de novo questions of statutory construction, as well as a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Fleckles v. Diamond , 2015 IL App (2d) 141229, ¶ 30, 393 Ill.Dec. 784, 35 N.E.3d 176. ¶ 26 Turning first, for context, to the Hague Convention, we note that it is not intended to settle custody disputes but is designed to ensure that such disputes are presumptively litigated in the child's country of habitual residence.
Smith v. Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 209, 220-21 (1986). When the facts supporting a section 2-1401 petition are challenged by the respondent, a full and fair evidentiary hearing should be held. Warren County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. Walters, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 51. ¶ 15 The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 is to dispose of a case on the basis of issues of law or easily proved issues of fact. Fleckles v. Diamond, 2015 IL App (2d) 141229, ¶ 30. A section 2-619 motion to dismiss admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint, but asserts certain defects, defenses, or other affirmative matters that act to defeat the claim. Id.
The UCCJEA home state analysis" 'was promulgated to end custody jurisdictional disputes between states'" and is undertaken to determine what court has subject matter jurisdiction over a child in dissolution of marriage proceedings when more than one state is involved. Fleckles v. Diamond, 2015 IL App (2d) 141229, ¶ 32 (quoting In re Joseph V.D., 373 Ill.App.3d 559, 561 (2007)). Once a determination regarding subject matter jurisdiction is made under the UCCJEA, that statute gives that court continuing jurisdiction, which is" 'simply a procedural limit on when the court may hear initial custody matters.'"
The UCCJEA home state analysis" 'was promulgated to end custody jurisdictional disputes between states,'" and is undertaken to determine what court has subject matter jurisdiction over a child in dissolution of marriage proceedings when more than one state is involved. Fleckles v. Diamond, 2015 IL App (2d) 141229, ¶ 32 (quoting In re Joseph V.D., 373 Ill.App.3d 559, 561 (2007)). Once a determination regarding subject matter jurisdiction is made under the UCCJEA, that statute gives that court continuing jurisdiction, which is" 'simply a procedural limit on when the court may hear initial custody matters.'"
Fleckles v. Diamond, 2015 IL App (2d) 141229, ¶ 36, 35 N.E.3d 176, 184 (Ill.App.Ct. 2015).
Accordingly, the Winnebago court properly dismissed William's petition to modify custody. See Fleckles v. Diamond, 2015 IL App (2d) 141229, ¶ 30 (our review of a trial court's ruling on a 2-619 motion to dismiss is de novo). ¶ 25 Finally, we reject William's argument that that the Winnebago court erred in not keeping a sufficient record of its conversation with the Utah court on January 12, 2021, when those two courts discussed the proper forum for the proceedings.
¶ 27 Other state courts interpreting these same provisions have concluded that the UCCJEA does not provide a jurisdictional basis to make a child-custody determination concerning an unborn child or a child who has never resided in the state. See Gray v. Gray , 139 So. 3d 802, 806 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013) ; Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Cox , 349 Ark. 205, 82 S.W.3d 806, 813 (2002) ; Fleckles v. Diamond , 393 Ill.Dec. 784, 35 N.E.3d 176, 184 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) ; Sara Ashton McK. v. Samuel Bode M. , 111 A.D.3d 474, 974 N.Y.S.2d 434, 435 (App. Div. 2013) ; Mireles v. Veronie , 154 N.E.3d 727 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020) ; Waltenburg v. Waltenburg , 270 S.W.3d 308, 316 (Tex. App. 2008) ; In re Custody of Kalbes , 302 Wis.2d 215, 733 N.W.2d 648, 650 (2007).
{¶11} Because jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to make an initial determination of custody, as under R.C. 3127.15(A)(1), focuses on the date that the proceeding is commenced, courts that have considered similar questions have begun their analysis by considering whether the UCCJEA purports to grant courts jurisdiction over unborn children. See , e.g. , Fleckles v. Diamond , 2015 Il App (2d) 141229, ¶ 52, 393 Ill.Dec. 784, 35 N.E.3d 176, 188-189 (2015) ; Gray v. Gray , 139 So.3d 802, 807 (Ala. App. 2013) ; Arnold v. Price , 365 S.W.3d 455, 460-461 (Tex. App. 2011) ; Waltenburg v. Waltenburg , 270 S.W.3d 308, 316 (Tex. App. 2008) ; In re Marriage of Tonnessen , 189 Ariz. 225, 941 P.2d 237, 239 (Ariz. App. 1997). See alsoSara Ashton McK. v. Samuel Bode M. , 111 A.D.3d 474, 475, 974 N.Y.S.2d 434 (N.Y. App. 2013) ; Arkansas Dept. of Human Servs. v. Cox , 349 Ark. 205, 82 S.W.3d 806, 812-813 (Ark. 2002).
See, e.g. , Meyeres v. Meyeres , 196 P.3d 604, 607 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) (determining Utah was home state of a child who was born in Utah but moved to Kansas at six weeks of age); Baker v. Tunney , 201 So.3d 1235, 1236–39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (Florida was the home state, pursuant to "the plain language of the statute," because a child born in Florida lived in Florida with both parents "until the mother relocated to New York when the child was less than two weeks old"); Fleckles v. Diamond , 393 Ill.Dec. 784, 35 N.E.3d 176, 188, ¶ 52 (2015) (Colorado, not Illinois, was the child's home state upon birth, because the UCCJEA's "home state" is the birth state for a child less than six months old); Gray v. Gray, 139 So.3d 802, 806 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013) (Alabama had jurisdiction regarding the divorce but not custody issues as Michigan, not Alabama, was child's "home state" because child was born in Michigan and had never lived in Alabama.). Texas has adopted the UCCJEA.
Therefore, the court concluded, "[o]nce a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a matter, its judgment will not be rendered void nor will it lose jurisdiction merely because of an error or impropriety in its determination of the facts or application of the law." Id. at ¶ 28; see also, generally, Gorup v. Brady, 2015 IL App (5th) 150078, ¶¶ 19-20; Fleckles v. Diamond, 2015 IL App (2d) 141229, ¶ 41. ¶ 15 Here, respondent essentially argues that McCormick should be distinguished because the UCCJEA provisions establish that Indiana had original and continuing jurisdiction concerning T.K.J.'s custody. We disagree.