The issue on which Bates attempted to impeach the witness, who was the store security guard who saw him take two watches from the jewelry department and place them on his wrist, was a completely collateral issue about whether he had seen Bates' cohort Kelley in the store or not. While, as the State concedes, the court's statement was "inartful and a sign that the judge was frustrated with [Bates'] failure to properly conduct his cross-examination," it was not an opinion as to what had been proven or whether Bates was guilty. "Thus the comments were not directed toward a material issue or relevant evidence in the case," and the trial court did not violate OCGA § 17-8-57. Flantroy v. State, 231 Ga. App. 744, 746 (3) ( 501 SE2d 10) (1998). Further, the trial court charged the jury:

The statement did not express an opinion about whether the evidence had proven a material issue in the case, whether a witness was credible, or whether the defendant was guilty. See Flantroy v. State, 231 Ga. App. 744, 746 (3) ( 501 SE2d 10) (1998). Moreover, the court's statements were appropriate under the circumstances as they were intended to explain Howard's absence from the second day of trial.

Although the dialog that ensued between the trial judge and Hubert's counsel was discordant, the vast majority of it took place outside of the presence of the jury and therefore was not prejudicial. Cf. McClendon v. State, 287 Ga. App. 238, 242 (5) ( 651 SE2d 165) (2007) (comments not made in the presence of the jury present no basis for reversal); Miller v. State, 243 Ga. App. 764, 768 (15) ( 533 SE2d 787) (2000). None of the judge's comments dealt with Hubert's guilt or innocence. See, e.g., Flantroy v. State, 231 Ga. App. 744, 746 (3) ( 501 SE2d 10) (1998). Moreover, Hubert's counsel testified at the new trial hearing and agreed that the trial judge never indicated that he did not like counsel personally; never indicated that he did not like counsel professionally; and never indicated that he had any ill feelings toward Hubert. Finally, and significantly, the trial court ultimately ceded to Hubert's wishes and allowed him to recall the detective.

" This comment was not directed toward a material issue nor was it an intimation on Wright's guilt or innocence. See Williams v. State, 183 Ga. App. 373, 375 (2) ( 358 SE2d 914) (1987) (court's statement to jury explaining that defendant was absent from court because of his disruptive behavior did not violate OCGA § 17-8-57); see also Flantroy v. State, 231 Ga. App. 744, 746 (3) ( 501 SE2d 10) (1998) (court's comment that he was "holding his temper" did not violate OCGA § 17-8-57). 4. Wright claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.

Nor does a trial court's expression of frustration or exasperation with a defendant amount to an improper comment on the case. Flantroy v. State, 231 Ga. App. 744, 746 (3) ( 501 SE2d 10) (1998) (Trial judge's comment to defendant that "he was holding his temper as best he could" and subsequent exchange regarding whether court was angry at defendant was not error.). Here, the court explained to Anthony that he should initially respond to the questions with "yes" or "no," and then explain his answer, if necessary.

Pretermitting whether Caldwell waived objections to the statements that were made in his presence, we find that none of the challenged statements was an improper comment on the evidence under OCGA § 17-8-57. None of the statements expressed an opinion about whether the evidence had proven a material issue in the case, whether a witness was credible, or whether the defendant was guilty. Flantroy v. State, 231 Ga. App. 744, 746 (3) ( 501 SE2d 10) (1998) (court's comments admonishing defendant did not involve his guilt or innocence or comment on the evidence and, therefore, did not violate OCGA § 17-8-57); cf. Jones v. State, 189 Ga. App. 232, 233 (1) ( 375 SE2d 648) (1988) (reversing conviction after trial court implied that it considered the prosecution's expert witness to be credible and unbiased). Further, we find the court's statements were appropriate under the circumstances, were clearly intended to explain the unusual situation to the jury and ensure that Caldwell received a fair trial, and were necessitated by Caldwell's behavior.

See Merritt v. State, 222 Ga. App. 623, 624 ( 475 SE2d 684) (1996). See Flantroy v. State, 231 Ga. App. 744, 745 (2) ( 501 SE2d 10) (1998). See Battle v. State, 234 Ga. App. 143, 144 (2) ( 505 SE2d 573) (1998).

"Inasmuch as the purpose of OCGA § 17-8-57 is to prevent the jury from being influenced and the jury was not present at the time of these remarks, the statute was not violated. [Cit.]." Flantroy v. State, 231 Ga. App. 744, 746(3) ( 501 S.E.2d 10) (1998). See also Jones v. State, 250 Ga. 498, 499-500(4) ( 299 S.E.2d 549) (1983); Miller v. State, 243 Ga. App. 764, 768 (15) ( 533 S.E.2d 787) (2000); McDonald v. State, 170 Ga. App. 884 (1) ( 318 S.E.2d 749) (1984).

To the extent they approached impropriety, the court's curative instructions dispelled any lingering intimations. See Flantroy v. State, 231 Ga. App. 744, 746(3) ( 501 S.E.2d 10) (1998). Accordingly, Jordan's sole enumeration presents no grounds for reversal.

Therefore, it has not been preserved for appellate review. Flantroy v. State, 231 Ga. App. 744, 745 (2) ( 501 S.E.2d 10) (1998). In any event, the record belies Smiley's assertions. The trial court appointed three attorneys to represent Smiley at trial.