The claim of invalidity is not well-founded. Whether the doctrine of estoppel might be invoked against the raising of such claim on the part of defendants does not call for discussion. It has not been briefed by counsel. In this connection, however, we call attention to Flanigan v. Reo Motors, Inc., 300 Mich. 359. See, also, Mount Vernon Trust Co. v. City of Mount Vernon, 12 N.Y.S.2d 120. The trial judge correctly disposed of the issues raised before him in the case, and the order from which defendants have appealed is affirmed, with costs to plaintiff.
The case is not to be considered authority for the proposition that a nondisabling condition arising out of or due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to a specific employment is compensable merely because it has the effect of isolating the employee from employment due to aversions or objections by employers or fellow employees. In that connection it must be noted that despite language to that effect in a headnote to our opinion in Flanigan v. Reo Motors, Inc., 300 Mich. 359, we did not hold that a nondisabling physical condition was compensable because it led to the employee's discharge due to objections to such condition by fellow employees. On the contrary, we held the plaintiff therein entitled to compensation because his disease, dermatitis venenata, "was such that he might well have claimed he was physically unable" and because "There is ample testimony to support the findings of the department that dermatitis venenata disabled plaintiff from earning full wages in the work at which he was last employed."
There was testimony to support the finding of the commission, and we are in accord with the award. See Flanigan v. Reo Motors, Inc., 300 Mich. 359; Mills v. Detroit Tuberculosis Sanitarium, 323 Mich. 200. REID, NORTH, DETHMERS, BUTZEL, CARR, BUSHNELL, and SHARPE, JJ., concurred.
The facts were radically different from those in the instant case, and we upheld the commission's findings. The instant case follows more nearly Flanigan v. Reo Motors, Inc., 300 Mich. 359; Stewart v. Lakey Foundry Machine Co., 311 Mich. 463; Thomas v. Continental Motors Corp., 315 Mich. 27; and Gerlesits v. Lakey Foundry Machine Co., 319 Mich. 229. The next question raised is whether the commission erred in granting compensation for a dust disease where, defendant contends, plaintiff was only partially disabled.
Under 2 Comp. Laws 1929, ยง 8451, as amended by Act No. 245, Pub. Acts 1943 (Comp. Laws Supp. 1945, ยง 8451, Stat. Ann. 1946 Cum. Supp. ยง 17.186), the findings of fact made by the compensation commission of the department of labor and industry are, in the absence of fraud, conclusive. It has been repeatedly held that under said section this Court may not disturb a finding by the department of labor and industry if there is competent testimony to support it. Flanigan v. Reo Motors, Inc., 300 Mich. 359; Clore v. Swift Co., 301 Mich. 732; Stewart v. Lakey Foundry Machine Co., 311 Mich. 463; Ryder v. Johnson, 313 Mich. 702. Certain witnesses for plaintiff gave testimony indicating that he was dependent on the earnings of his father, at least prior to the time that plaintiff became employed by the Sutherland Paper Mills. The testimony of plaintiff himself was somewhat contradictory.
In construing the language of the section this court has held that the report of the medical commission is to be regarded as final only as to the condition existing at the time of the examination. Smith v. Wilson Foundry Machine Co., 296 Mich. 484; Flanigan v. Reo Motors, Inc., 300 Mich. 359; Nicholas v. St. Johns Table Co., 302 Mich. 503; Walker v. LoSelle Construction Co., 305 Mich. 121. In holding that plaintiff was not entitled to compensation the department obviously had this construction in mind but came to the conclusion on the record before it that plaintiff's ailment, as found by the medical commission at the examination held on January 3, 1945, had not changed during the period of his disability.
The department correctly determined that he was disabled within the definition of disability in part 7, section 1, above quoted. Flanigan v. Reo Motors, Inc., 300 Mich. 359; Brozozowski v. Swedish Crucible Steel Co., 298 Mich. 146. Act No. 10, pt. 7, ยง 1, Pub. Acts 1912 (1st Ex. Sess.), as added by Act No. 61, Pub. Acts 1937, and amended by Act No. 245, Pub. Acts 1943 (Comp.
" See, also, Flanigan v. Reo Motors, Inc., 300 Mich. 359; Nicholas v. St. Johns Table Co., 302 Mich. 503. Under the rule established in Smith v. Wilson Foundry Machine Co., supra, the report of the medical commission in the present case was final and conclusive only as to plaintiff's condition when the commission examined him on July 16, 1941.
Defendants moved to strike the medical commission's report on various constitutional grounds. We disposed of these in Flanigan v. Reo Motors, Inc., 300 Mich. 359, where we held that a nonmunicipal employer who had accepted benefits under the act could not challenge its constitutionality. Though the medical commission's report is not sworn to, the legislative intent that it should serve as evidence is clear.