Summary
holding that "[t]he six-year contract statute of limitations applies to the present case [for unjust enrichment,]" as unjust enrichment is a form of contract action
Summary of this case from Lyle v. JamesOpinion
No. CV05-4004400S
February 2, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT #109 AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #107
The plaintiff, Kerry L. Flaherty, has filed a one-count complaint against the Borough of Naugatuck and the Borough of Naugatuck Firemens' Pension Plan alleging breach of contract by the defendants resulting from the defendants' calculation of his pension benefits. Before the court are the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and the plaintiff's Request for Leave to Amend this complaint.
The following facts are undisputed. The plaintiff was hired as a firefighter by the Borough of Naugatuck in 1976 and continued his employment as a union firefighter for twenty years. As a union firefighter, the plaintiff accrued sick time based on a twelve-hour day. On February 15, 1996, the plaintiff was promoted to a non-union position as Chief of the Naugatuck Fire Department. When the plaintiff retired on March 9, 2002, the Borough calculated the plaintiff's retirement benefits giving credit for accrued sick time based on a seven-hour day, which was the rate at which all non-union managerial employees received credit.
The plaintiff claims that at the time that he accepted the position of Fire Chief, the Borough had agreed to continue to provide him with the same employee benefits that he was receiving as a union employee which would have included sick time accrual based on a twelve-hour day. It is agreed that the plaintiff received all other benefits that would be due the plaintiff as a union firefighter except the calculation of sick time accrual which is the subject of this dispute. There was no written employment agreement between the plaintiff and the Borough which would have clarified the terms of the plaintiff's employment and eliminated the need for this action. Moreover, the details surrounding the process for the plaintiff's selection and employment as Fire Chief are not clear. At his deposition, the plaintiff testified that he was interviewed by the Board of Fire Commissioners, individually and as a full body and also had discussions with the mayor about his willingness to accept the position. The mayor is now deceased. The plaintiff testified that he also had discussions with the mayor after assuming his duties as Fire Chief concerning the plaintiff's desire to have a written employment agreement as well as other matters relating to his employment. The defendants assert that any claim by the plaintiff that he was promised the twelve-hour benefit cannot be sustained against the defendants as a matter of law because any purported agreement would lack "bargained for" consideration and if the mayor made any such promise or agreement, the mayor was not authorized or empowered to bind the defendants under the provisions of the Borough's charter.
Practice Book § 10-59 permits a plaintiff to amend a complaint within the first thirty days after the return day. After thirty days, a plaintiff may amend a complaint by filing a request for leave to amend. Practice Book § 10-60. Whether to allow an amendment is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dow Condon, Inc. v. Brookfield Development Corp., 266 Conn. 572, 583, 833 A.2d 908 (2003).
"In exercising its discretion with reference to a motion for leave to amend, a court should ordinarily be guided by its determination of the question whether the greater injustice will be done to the mover by denying him his day in court on the subject matter of the proposed amendment, or to his adversary by granting the motion, with the resultant delay." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grigerik v. Sharpe, 56 Conn.App. 314, 320, 742 A.2d 434, cert. denied 252 Conn. 936, 747 A.2d 2 (2000).
I
The defendants first argue that the proposed amendment is untimely and is designed to circumvent the pending motion for summary judgment. The defendants' cite Conference Center, Ltd. v. TRC, 189 Conn. 212, 455 A.2d 857 (1983) and Citizens Nation Bank v. Hubney, 182 Conn. 310, 438 A.2d 430 (1980) for the proposition that the Supreme Court has upheld denial of a request to amend where the request was filed after a motion for summary judgment. In both cases cited, the Court did not analyze the trial court's decision to deny the motion to amend, but simply confirmed that the trial court has discretion in granting or denying such motions and will be reversed only when there is clear evidence of abuse of discretion.
Here, it is necessary for the court to determine whether a greater injustice will be done to the plaintiff by denying him the opportunity to pursue the two additional counts, or to the defendants by granting the plaintiff's request, thereby possibly causing undue delay or prejudice to the defendants.
When deciding whether to permit an amendment "[u]ndue delay in the proceedings is often a controlling consideration. Freccia v. Martin, 163 Conn. 160, 164, 302 A.2d 280 (1972). In McLaughlin v. Charette, 7 Conn.App. 570, 509 A.2d 1068 (1986) the appellate court allowed the plaintiff to amend his complaint ten months after the pleadings were closed. In McLaughlin the court determined that the amendment would merely be an annoyance and inconvenience to the defendant, but did not rise to the level of prejudice. In the present case, the plaintiff moved to amend thirteen months after the pleadings closed. The defendants claim that the proposed amendment would interfere with the orderly progression of the case. Since the case is not scheduled for trial and the core facts alleged in the amended complaint are not substantively dissimilar, permitting the plaintiff to amend his complaint would not result in any significant or undue delay. As in McLaughlin, allowing the plaintiff to amend his complaint would, at most, be an inconvenience or annoyance to the defendants. Accordingly, undue delay is not a valid reason to deny the plaintiff's request.
The fact that the plaintiff filed the leave to amend after the defendants' motion for summary judgment is not fatal. "[A]n amended complaint in response to a motion for summary judgment does not constitute prejudice per se. Where a legitimate cause of action is available, but not raised in the original complaint, and allowing such claim in the proceedings will not unduly prejudice the opposing party, then allowing the amendment is not an abuse of the court's discretion. Indeed, trial courts may be well-advised to exercise leniency when amendments are proffered in response to a motion for summary judgment, rather than on the eve of trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McNeil v. Riccio, 45 Conn.App. 466, 474, 696 A.2d 1050 (1997).
There is no evidence that the plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint in an effort to evade the defendants' pending motion for summary judgment. In the present case, a greater injustice will be done by denying the plaintiff the opportunity to pursue the amended claims than the defendants will encounter due to the resultant delay. Accordingly, prejudice is not a valid reason to deny the proposed amendment.
II
Next, the defendants argue that the proposed counts of the amended complaint assert new and independent causes of action, founded in tort, which are time barred by General Statutes § 52-577. The defendants' statute of limitation argument is unpersuasive because the new counts do not sound in tort.
Count two of the proposed amended complaint sounds in unjust enrichment. "Unjust enrichment applies wherever justice requires compensation to be given for property or services rendered under a contract, and no remedy is available by an action on the contract." 5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed.) § 1479. Furthermore, an unjust enrichment claim is based in equity. In Vissa v. Pagano, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV 98 0168124, (April 28, 2000, Karazin, J.,) ( 27 Conn. L. Rptr. 150), the defendant argued that an unjust enrichment claim was barred by the tort statute of limitations. The Vissa court stated that "in an `equitable proceeding' the court need not adhere to the statute of limitations of the underlying cause of action . . . Accordingly, this court will not apply the tort statute of limitations to the plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim." Id. (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) "Where a party seeks equitable relief pursuant to a cause of action that would also allow that party to seek legal relief, concurrent legal and equitable jurisdiction exists, and the statute of limitations that would be applicable to bar the legal claim also applies to bar the equitable claim." Dowling v. Finley Associates, Inc., 248 Conn. 364, 367-68, 727 A.2d 1245 (1999). "There is no Connecticut appellate authority that squarely addresses the applicable statute of limitations for unjust enrichment. Because unjust enrichment is a form of contract action, often called quasi-contract, the court concludes that the most applicable statute in this case is the six-year contract statute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gianetti v. Individual Practice, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 02 4001685 (July 21, 2005, Schuman, J.) ( 39 Conn. L. Rptr. 745). The six-year contract statute of limitations applies to the present case. The defendants claim the statute of limitations began to run no later than March 2002. Accordingly, since less than six years has elapsed since the plaintiff first received his pension benefits, the unjust enrichment claim is not barred by the statute of limitations.
Count three of the proposed amended complaint sounds in detrimental reliance, also known as promissory estoppel. "The doctrine of promissory estoppel serves as an alternative basis to enforce a contract in the absence of competing common-law considerations . . . For actions for breach of contract it is the legislature that has determined the time period in which a cause of action must be brought . . . The trial court, therefore, should . . . appl[y] § 52-276(a) directly." Torringford Farms Ass'n. v. Torrington, 75 Conn.App. 570, 576-77, 816 A.2d 736 (2003). Because the plaintiff's proposed detrimental reliance claim sounds in contract, the six-year statute of limitations applies and accordingly, count three is not barred by the statute of limitations.
The Plaintiff's Request For Leave to Amend Complaint is granted.
Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
The defendants have moved for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiff's claims cannot be sustained for lack of consideration and that, even if consideration exists, the plaintiff cannot establish that the employment benefits sought were authorized and binding on the defendants.
A right of recovery under the doctrine of unjust enrichment is essentially equitable, its basis being that in a given situation it is contrary to equity and good conscience for one to retain a benefit which has come to him at the expense of another . . . With no other test than what, under a given set of circumstances, is just or unjust, equitable or inequitable, conscionable or unconscionable, it becomes necessary in any case where the benefit of the doctrine is claimed, to examine the circumstances and the conduct of the parties and apply this standard." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Meaney v. Connecticut Hospital Ass'n., Inc., 250 Conn. 500, 511-12, 735 A.2d 813 (1999). The plaintiff, in his memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, has stated circumstances and alleged conduct on the part of the defendants which may constitute ratification of the agreement claimed to be unauthorized and as such, material facts are in dispute. Therefore, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.