Opinion
No. 3D12-389 Lower Tribunal No. 06-22941
03-20-2013
Katz Barron Squitero Faust, and John R. Squitero, H. Eugene Lindsey III, and Mathai Jacob, for appellant. Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, and M. Stephen Smith and Manu Leila Davidson, for appellee.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Victoria Platzer, Judge.
Katz Barron Squitero Faust, and John R. Squitero, H. Eugene Lindsey III, and Mathai Jacob, for appellant.
Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, and M. Stephen Smith and Manu Leila Davidson, for appellee. Before ROTHENBERG, SALTER and EMAS, JJ.
ROTHENBERG, J.
Florida Diversified Films, Inc. ("FDF"), which was the plaintiff below, appeals from the trial court's final order denying FDF's motion for attorney's fees based on a proposal for settlement filed pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2007). Based on the law of the case doctrine, we reverse.
In a prior appeal from this same underlying case, FDF filed a motion for appellate attorney's fees based on the same proposal for settlement now at issue. In the prior appeal, Simon Roofing, the defendant, objected to FDF's motion for appellate attorney's fees based on the proposal for settlement, arguing that FDF made the proposal in bad faith. This Court, after considering the arguments and the record, ultimately granted FDF's motion for appellate attorney's fees. Simon Roofing then filed a motion for rehearing, raising the same arguments now raised in the instant appeal, and suggesting that they had been overlooked by this Court. Again, this Court rejected Simon's arguments, and denied Simon Roofing's motion for rehearing.
Accordingly, FDF's entitlement to attorney's fees based on its proposal for settlement became the law of the case. See Specialty Rests. Corp. v. Elliott, 924 So. 2d 834, 837-39 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Because we find no manifest injustice, see Tiede v. Satterfield, 870 So. 2d 225, 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) ("[T]o alter the law of the case, we must look to see if the 'strict adherence to the rule would result in 'manifest injustice.'") (citation omitted), the trial court was bound, and this Court is bound, by this previous determination.
Our decision is consistent with Specialty Restaurants, which is directly on point. In Specialty Restaurants, when presented with a similar factual scenario, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of the appellant's motion for attorney's fees, reasoning as follows:
On appeal, SRC argues that the trial court erred in refusing to award attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the proposal for settlement because this court's order [in the previous appeal] awarding appellate attorney's fees found entitlement to fees under the proposal for settlement and this ruling became the law of the case on the issue of the enforceability of that proposal. We agree . . . .Specialty Rests., 924 So. 2d at 837-39.
When successive appeals are taken in the same case, the law of the case doctrine applies. Under the law of the case doctrine, questions of law that have actually been decided on appeal must govern the case in the same court and in the trial court through all subsequent stages of the proceedings. This doctrine includes not only issues explicitly ruled upon by the court, but also those issues which were implicitly addressed or necessarily considered by the appellate court's decision. Thus, absent extraordinary circumstances, the ruling of this court in the earlier appeal was binding on the trial court on remand and on this court in the present appeal. . . .
. . . .
. . . By granting Appellees' motion to reconsider and determining that SRC is not entitled to appellate attorney's fees, the trial court clearly violated a settled principle of law requiring it to follow the mandate of this court. Therefore, we must reverse and remand for entry of an award of appellate attorney's fees on this basis
. . . .
. . . [W]e hold that this earlier order [awarding appellate attorney's fees] became the law of the case on the issue of the enforceability of the proposal for settlement and entitlement to trial court attorney's fees and costs under that proposal . . . .
. . . .
We recognize that in Tiede this court decided that it was appropriate to alter the law of the case based on a supreme court decision that was issued after the award of appellate attorney's fees had been made. In doing so, this court explained that a strict application of the law of the case under those circumstances would result in a manifest injustice.
. . . .
The same situation is not present in this case, and therefore we decline to alter the law of this case. . . .
Based on the authority set forth in Specialty Restaurants, which we conclude governs the instant set of facts, we reverse the trial court's denial of FDF's motion for attorney's fees, and remand for the award of $770,000—the amount agreed to by the parties as a reasonable amount.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.