Opinion
No. 1D21-2475
03-30-2022
FLORIDA AUTOMOBILE DEALERS ASSOCIATION, Appellant, v. HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA CORPORATION, Appellee.
John W. Forehand and R. Craig Spickard of Kurkin Forehand Brandes LLP, Winter Park, for Appellant. David B. Massey, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Miami, and Jessica L. Ellsworth, admitted Pro Hac Vice, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Washington, DC, for Appellee.
John W. Forehand and R. Craig Spickard of Kurkin Forehand Brandes LLP, Winter Park, for Appellant.
David B. Massey, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Miami, and Jessica L. Ellsworth, admitted Pro Hac Vice, Hogan Lovells US LLP, Washington, DC, for Appellee.
Bilbrey, J. The Florida Automobile Dealers Association appeals a final order dismissing its petition for an administrative hearing before the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. That petition was dismissed on the ground that Association lacked standing. Because we agree that the Association lacks standing under the statute at issue, we affirm.
The Association alleged in its petition that certain requirements being imposed by Hyundai Motor America Corporation on the sale and marketing of Hyundai's electric vehicles violate section 320.64(22), Florida Statutes (2021). The Association claimed that Hyundai violated section 320.64(22) by requiring members of the Association to execute "a separate franchise agreement in order to receive a vehicle model of the Hyundai line-make."
The Department concluded that the Association lacked standing to allege a violation of section 320.64(22). More particularly, the Department determined that (1) only a "motor vehicle dealer" or "a person with entitlements to or in a motor vehicle dealer," who has been "directly and adversely affected by the action or conduct of an applicant or licensee" is allowed to "seek a declaration and adjudication of its rights with respect to the alleged action and conduct," per section 320.699(1), Florida Statutes ; (2) the Association is neither a "motor vehicle dealer" nor a "person with entitlement to or in a motor vehicle dealer," as those terms are defined in sections 320.60 through 320.70; and finally, (3) the Association is not directly and adversely affected by the action or conduct of Hyundai.
On appeal, the Association argues the Department erred in finding a lack of standing, noting that there is ample case law recognizing the standing of trade or professional associations to appear in a proceeding under chapter 120, Florida Statutes. See, e.g. , Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Dep't of Lab. & Emp. Sec ., 412 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1982). The Association, however, did not seek a hearing under section sections 120.569 or 120.57. As the Florida Supreme Court explained, the "recognition of associational standing in the chapter 120 context was not a blanket adoption of the doctrine." Palm Point Prop. Owners’ Ass'n of Charlotte Cnty., Inc. v. Pisarski , 626 So. 2d 195, 197 (Fla. 1993).
Instead, the Association seeks a determination from the Department pursuant to chapter 320, Florida Statutes. In a proceeding alleging a violation of sections 320.60 through 320.70, standing is limited to the parameters set forth in section 320.699. The specific standing requirements of section 320.699 supersede the broader standards for establishing standing under Chapter 120. See Braman Cadillac, Inc. v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles , 584 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) ; see also Conservation All. of St. Lucie Cnty., Inc. v. Dep't of Env't Prot. , 144 So. 3d 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).
Accordingly, the Department correctly dismissed the Association's petition, and we affirm that dismissal.
AFFIRMED .
Makar and Kelsey, JJ., concur.