Opinion
FBTCV156050335
11-23-2015
Christopher Fitzpatrick v. U.S. Bank, National Association as Trustee for MASTR 2007-2
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Michael P. Kamp, J.
The issue before the court is the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint, which petitions for a discharge of the plaintiff's mortgage, on the ground that the plaintiff cannot state a claim under General Statutes § 49-13 because the mortgage has a maturity date of 2037, and there is no statute of limitations that limits mortgage foreclosure actions.
FACTS
The plaintiff, Christopher Fitzpatrick, filed a single-count complaint in this action against the defendants, U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for MASTR 2007-2 and U.S. Bank National Association, on May 28, 2015. The plaintiff seeks a discharge of his mortgage and alleges the following facts in support of his claim. On August 16, 2007, the plaintiff executed a note for a $580,000 loan to Comp-U-Fund Mortgage Corp. On the same date, the plaintiff conveyed his interest in a property at 48 Second Avenue in Stratford, Connecticut, via open-end mortgage deed to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for Comp-U-Fund. After a number of endorsements and assignments, the defendants became the holder of both the note and the mortgage. Under the terms of the note and mortgage, the plaintiff was to make principal and interest payments on the first day of every month, beginning October 1, 2007, and ending September 1, 2037. The plaintiff has not made a single monthly payment since May 1, 2009, and, as a result, has been in default since that date. After the plaintiff's nonpayment, the defendants accelerated the note and declared the remaining unpaid principal due, along with interest, attorneys fees and costs. The plaintiff has remained in undisturbed possession of the Stratford property since May 1, 2009.
The plaintiff has not pleaded the date of acceleration in his complaint.
On July 15, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the plaintiff cannot state a claim for the discharge of his mortgage because the maturity date of the plaintiff's mortgage has not passed, and there is no statute of limitations on mortgage foreclosure actions. The motion is accompanied by a memorandum of law. The plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendants' motion on July 22, 2015. In response, on July 27, 2015, the defendants filed a reply memorandum of law in further support of the motion.
The court understands the defendants' argument regarding the statute of limitations as applied to mortgage foreclosure actions, but it is inapposite here. The plaintiff has neither argued that the statute of limitations precludes a foreclosure action against him, nor suggested the same in his pleadings.
DISCUSSION
" The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). " [A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court . . . [The court] construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Moreover, [the court notes] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Coppola Construction Co. v. Hoffman Enterprises Ltd. Partnership, 309 Conn. 342, 350, 71 A.3d 480 (2013). While all well-pleaded facts are taken as admitted by the court in ruling on a motion to strike, the motion " does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Emphasis omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). " In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 580.
The defendants argue that the plaintiff cannot state a claim for discharge of his mortgage under General Statutes § 49-13 because the statute does not permit the filing of a petition for discharge until at least six years after the time limited in the mortgage for the full performance of the conditions of the mortgage, which, for the purposes of this action, is the September 1, 2037 maturity date of the mortgage, and not the acceleration date. The defendants also argue that even if the temporal requirements of § 49-13 could be satisfied here, the parties' recognition of the validity of the plaintiff's mortgage within the last six years bars the relief sought by the plaintiff. Finally, the defendants argue that the plaintiff's mortgage is not discharged by a statute of limitations because no such statute exists as applied to mortgage foreclosure actions.
General Statutes § 49-13 provides in relevant part that " [w]hen the record title to real property is encumbered (1) by any undischarged mortgage, and (A) the mortgagor or those owning the mortgagor's interest therein have been in undisturbed possession of the property for at least six years after the expiration of the time limited in the mortgage for the full performance of the conditions thereof, and for six years next preceding the commencement of any action under this section . . . the person owning the property, or the equity in the property, may bring a petition to the superior court for the judicial district in which the property is situated, setting forth the facts and claiming a judgment as provided in this section . . ." General Statutes § 49-13(a). " [I]f no evidence is offered of any payment on account of the debt secured by the mortgage within a period set out in subsection (a) of this section, or of any other act within such a period as provided in said subsection (a) in recognition of its existence as a valid mortgage . . . the court may render a judgment . . . declaring the mortgage . . . invalid as a lien against the real estate, and may order payment of any balance of indebtedness due on the mortgage or foreclosure judgment to the clerk of the court be held for the benefit of the mortgagee or persons interested and to be paid . . . following the execution of a release of mortgage." General Statutes § 49-13(c).
In response, the plaintiff argues that, to the extent that the defendants argue the maturity date is the date that controls for the purposes of the statute, the defendants' arguments would be more apt for a motion for summary judgment or a hearing on the merits, rather than a motion to strike. The plaintiff points out that under § 49-13(a), a plaintiff only has to plead that he has been in undisturbed possession of the subject property for at least six years after the time limited in the mortgage for the full performance of the mortgage's conditions, and that he has satisfied this requirement because the relevant date of reference is the acceleration date that occurred after his May 1, 2009 default.
In reply, the defendants argue that the plaintiff has offered no case law to support his interpretation of the statute, and that several Superior Court decisions have " interpreted the 'time limited in the mortgage' [by referencing] the maturity date printed or determinable within the mortgage itself, rather than some external acceleration date." The court agrees with the defendants.
The parties also dispute whether the plaintiff recognized the validity of the mortgage, given the prior foreclosure action and the parties' participation in mediation in 2009, 2010, and 2011. In the present case, it is unnecessary to reach the merits of the parties' arguments regarding validation to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim for relief under § 49-13, because the defendants' arguments regarding the time limited for full performance of the plaintiff's mortgage are dispositive of the defendants' motion. Moreover, as the facts on which the defendants rely concerning the parties' recognition of the validity of the mortgage within the last six years are not alleged in the pleadings, they cannot be considered in ruling on a motion to strike. " It is well established that a motion to strike must be considered within the confines of the pleadings and not external documents . . . We are limited . . . to a consideration of the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zirinsky v. Zirinsky, 87 Conn.App. 257, 268-69 n.9, 865 A.2d 488, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 916, 871 A.2d 372 (2005).
Section 49-13 provides a vehicle for the discharge of a mortgage, whereby a " person owning the property, or the equity in the property, may bring a petition to the superior court" and " the court may render a judgment . . . declaring the mortgage . . . invalid as a lien against the real estate . . ." General Statutes 49-13(a) and (c). Importantly, " [§ 49-13] does not declare that a mortgage upon which no payment has been made for [the statutory period] or which has not been recognized as a valid mortgage within that period is unenforceable, but it gives the court the right to declare it invalid . . . The purpose of a statute of this type is to provide a simple method whereby a mortgage, the invalidity of which is undisputed, may be declared invalid by the court and removed as a cloud on the title to the property." (Citation omitted, emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gordon v. Tufano, 188 Conn. 477, 483, 450 A.2d 852 (1982). The relief afforded by § 49-13(a) is available to " a mortgagor plaintiff, or those owning the mortgagor's interest, who has been in undisturbed possession of the property for at least six years after the expiration of the time limited in the mortgage for full performance of the conditions thereof, and for six years next preceding the commencement of the action . . . [F]urthermore, the court rendering a judgment of invalidity under that statute may order the balance of any indebtedness due on the mortgage to be paid . . ." Macker v. Republic Bank, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-14-6044369-S (January 2, 2015, Jennings, J.T.R.) .
In the present case, the plaintiff has pleaded that his mortgage has a maturity date of September 1, 2037, that he has not made any payments on his mortgage since May 1, 2009, and that the plaintiff has been in undisturbed possession of the burdened property since the defendants' acceleration of his mortgage due to his default. These facts do not state a cause of action under § 49-13(a) because the acceleration date of the mortgage is irrelevant for purposes of § 49-13(a). The only date the plaintiff has pleaded that is relevant to the full performance of his mortgage obligations is the mortgage maturity date of September 1, 2037, and that date cannot support a claim under § 49-13(a) because it is not at least six years prior to the commencement of this action, and therefore does not satisfy the statute's requirements.
While there is no appellate authority addressing the issue, our Superior Court has previously determined that, for purposes of § 49-13(a), the time limited for full performance of a mortgage is the mortgage maturity date, even in situations where the mortgagor's default has caused the mortgagee to accelerate the mortgage debt. See Easton Memorial Gardens v. Piccolo, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-99-0361504 (May 26, 2000, Mottolese, J.) . In Easton, the court considered a mortgage that " was executed on December 28, 1979 . . . The plaintiff failed to make the first quarterly payment due January 1, 1983 [and] [o]n May 4, 1983 the holder of the mortgage commenced an action for foreclosure thereby triggering acceleration of the note." Id. The note at issue did not specify the time limited in the mortgage for its full performance, nevertheless, the court concluded that the maturity date " [was] easily determinable to be 10 years of quarterly payments, or 40 payments, with the last payment to be made on October 1, 1992, " in accordance with the payment terms of the mortgage contract. Id. Despite the acceleration date of May 4, 1983, the court held that " there is no genuine issue of material fact . . . [that] the date limited in the mortgage for full performance of the mortgage is [the maturity date], October 1, 1992." Id. Other Superior Court decisions have similarly concluded that the maturity date of a mortgage is the time limited for its full performance under § 49-13(a). See Macker v. Republic Bank, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-14-6044369-S (" [u]nder § 49-13, the . . . mortgage to [the defendant] involved in this case would not even be eligible for relief until September 1, 2029 (six years after the September 1, 2023 maturity date)"); Smith v. Mid-Eastern Mortgage & Investment Associates, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV-98-063120 (May 24, 1999, Flynn, J.) (plaintiff's mortgage dischargeable under § 49-13 given maturity date of February 24, 1991 and action was commenced in 1998).
Under the plaintiff's interpretation of § 49-13(a), a defendant who elects the remedy of acceleration to cure a plaintiff's default under a mortgage contract would cause the time limited in the mortgage for its full performance to change from the date of final payment to the acceleration date as a matter of law. Such an interpretation would flout the well-recognized principle that " [t]he terms of [a] mortgage determine [a bank's] right to foreclose the mortgage, " and by extension, to elect remedies in the event of a borrower's default. CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Speer, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-09-6001411, (February 17, 2011, Devine, J.). Further, the plaintiff's reading of § 49-13(a) would greatly increase the interference of the court system with the contractual rights of the parties to a mortgage contract and expand the role of the court beyond the limited power granted to it under § 49-13(a), which merely allows the court to prevent invalid mortgages from remaining as clouds encumbering the title to real property. The plaintiff has not cited to any authority that would support his interpretation, and such a reading of § 49-13(a) would circumvent the plain meaning of both the text, and our courts' interpretations, of the statute. Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for the discharge of his mortgage under § 49-13(a).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint is GRANTED.