Opinion
CV-19-05219-PHX-MTL
03-10-2023
DEATH PENALTY CASE
ORDER
MICHAEL T. LIBURDI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
In his habeas petition, Fitzgerald claims two errors under Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994). (Docs. 21 at 265-77 and 35 at 270-86.) In Simmons, the Supreme Court held that the accused has a due process right to inform the jury that he is ineligible for parole in deciding whether to sentence him to death. 512 U.S. at 156. The Supreme Court later reversed the Arizona Supreme Court's decision that Simmons did not apply to another death-sentenced prisoner in Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U.S. 613 (2016) (per curiam). Respondents filed their answer to Fitzgerald's petition, and the Court stayed the deadline for Fitzgerald's reply “until 30 days after” the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cruz v. Arizona (Cruz II), 142 S.Ct. 1412 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2022) (Mem.), in which the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the Arizona Supreme Court's decision that Lynch was not a significant change in the law that applied to other death-sentenced petitioners. (Docs. 52 and 56.) This Court reasoned that a decision in Cruz II “impacts” Fitzgerald's Simmons claims. (Doc. 56 at 3.)
On February 22, 2023, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Cruz II, reversing the Arizona Supreme Court's holding that Lynch “was not a significant change in the law for purposes of [Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure] 32.1(g)” and that the Arizona Supreme Court's decision therefore did not rest on an adequate and independent state-law ground barring a successive petition for postconviction relief. Cruz II, 143 S.Ct. 650, 655 (Feb. 22, 2023). The Supreme Court thus vacated the Arizona Supreme Court's judgment and remanded the case. Id. at 662. The Arizona Supreme Court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs on the merits of Cruz's Simmons claims. (Doc. 57-1 at 2, Order in State v. Cruz (Cruz I), No. CR-17-0567-PC.)
Rule 32.1(g) allows a defendant “to bring a successive petition [for postconviction relief] if ‘there has been a significant change in the law that, if applicable to the defendant's case, would probably overturn the defendant's judgment or sentence.'” Cruz II, 143 S.Ct. at 655 (quoting Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g) (Cum. Supp. 2022)).
Fitzgerald now asks this Court to extend the stay of the deadline for his reply pending a decision in Cruz. (Doc. 57.) Respondents do not oppose the request. (Id. at 2.) Because a decision in that case may bear on Fitzgerald's Simmons habeas claims, this Court will grant Fitzgerald's request.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED granting Fitzgerald's Unopposed Motion to Extend Stay (Doc. 57).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED staying the deadline for Fitzgerald to file a reply to Respondents' Answer pending the Arizona Supreme Court's decision on remand in Cruz I.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that starting from this Order's filing date, the parties shall file a joint report every 90 days on the status of Cruz I.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that within 14 days of the decision on remand in Cruz I, Fitzgerald shall file a status report, proposing a briefing schedule for this federal habeas case. Fitzgerald shall include Respondents' position on this proposal.