Opinion
CV-19-05219-PHX-MTL
10-05-2022
John Vincent Fitzgerald, Petitioner, v. David Shinn, et al., Respondents.
DEATH PENALTY CASE
ORDER
Michael T Liburdi United States District Judge
I.
Before the Court is Petitioner John Vincent Fitzgerald's Motion to stay this case. (Doc. 53.) Fitzgerald has filed an amended habeas corpus petition, and Respondents have filed their Answer. (Docs. 21 and 35.) Fitzgerald's reply to the Answer is due October 12, 2022. (Doc. 51 at 1.) Fitzgerald seeks a stay of this case until the United States Supreme Court decides Cruz v. Arizona (Cruz II), 142 S.Ct. 1412 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2022) (Mem.). (Doc. 53.) Alternatively, he asks the Court to stay the reply deadline until 30 days after the Supreme Court decides Cruz II. (Id. at 6; Doc. 55 at 1-2.) Respondents object to a stay of the case, but agree to stay the reply deadline until 30 days after Cruz II is decided. (Docs. 52; 53 at 6; 54 at 2; 55 at 1-2.)
II.
The Court “has discretionary power” to grant stay requests. Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)); see Landis, 229 U.S. at 254 (explaining that such power “is incidental to” the inherent power of courts “to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants”). For example, the Court “may, with propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the parties to” stay a case “pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case.” Leyva v. Certified Grocers of California, 593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1979). In assessing whether to stay a case, courts will weigh “the competing interests” in the stay request:
Among those competing interests are the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay.CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55); see Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1110-11 (noting that a stay may be suitable when the resolution of issues in the other case will help in resolving the case sought to be stayed).
Fitzgerald seeks to stay this habeas corpus case until the United States Supreme Court decides Cruz II, asserting that the Cruz II decision will directly affect two of his sentence-related claims and Respondents' procedural defense to them. (Doc. 53 at 1, 4, citing Docs. 21 at 265-77; 35 at 270-86; and 52 at 137-38, n.17.) Both habeas corpus claims allege errors under Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994). (Doc. 53 at 1, citing Docs. 21 at 265-77 and 35 at 270-86.) In Simmons, the Supreme Court held that the accused has a due process right to have his jury know of his parole ineligibility, in deciding whether to sentence him to death. 512 U.S. at 156. The Court enforced Simmons against Arizona in Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U.S. 613 (2016) (per curiam).
In State v. Cruz (Cruz I), the Arizona Supreme Court assessed whether Lynch was “a significant change in the law” as to whether to grant postconviction relief under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(g). 487 P.3d 991, 992, ¶ 7 (Ariz. 2021). Rule 32.1(g) lists, as a ground for postconviction relief, that “there has been a significant change in the law that, if applicable to the defendant's case, would probably overturn the defendant's judgment or sentence.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) (precluding postconviction review of a constitutional claim that could have been raised at trial, on direct appeal, or in a prior postconviction review case); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b) (excluding the Rule 32.1(g) ground from Rule 32.2(a)(3) preclusion). The court denied Cruz such relief under Rule 32.1(g), holding that Lynch was not a significant change in Arizona law. Cruz 1, 487 P.3d at 992 and 995-96, ¶¶ 2, 23 (reasoning that Lynch “was based on precedent well established at the time [Cruz] was convicted and sentenced”). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether that holding “is an adequate and independent state-law ground for the judgment.” Cruz II, 142 S.Ct. 1412.
Federal courts will not upset state-court judgments on “adequate and independent state law procedural grounds.” Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 (2004) (citations omitted).
The answer to this question impacts two of Fitzgerald's sentence-related habeas corpus claims and Respondents' procedural defense to them. (See Docs. 21 at 265-81; 35 at 270-90; and 52 at 134, 137-39.) The decision will likely affect this Court's review of whether to reach the merits of those claims and whether they warrant relief. (Id.) Post-Cruz II reply and surreply deadlines will allow the parties to address these issues. Thus, staying the reply deadline will advance the interests of judicial efficiency and fairness to the parties. Leyva, 593 F.2d at 863; see also Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1110-11; e.g., Cropper v. Shinn, No. CV-19-05618-PHX-GMS, 2022 WL 2018358, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 13, 2022) (staying Cropper's reply deadline for those reasons because of Cruz II).
The Court need not stay this entire case, as Cruz II will not affect Fitzgerald's other 30-non-Simmons-habeas corpus claims. See, e.g., Cropper, 2022 WL 2018358, at *1. (Doc. 54 at 2, citing Doc. 35.) The Court expects Fitzgerald to continue to investigate and prepare these claims for his reply and any requests for evidentiary development. See, e.g., Cropper, 2022 WL 2018358, at *1.
Fitzgerald suggests that the Cruz II decision may allow him to return to state court for postconviction relief. (Doc. 53 at 5.) The Court need not consider that issue at this time.
III.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED denying Fitzgerald's Motion to Stay Proceedings to the extent that he seeks to stay this case pending resolution of Cruz II. (Doc. 53).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED staying the deadline for Fitzgerald to file a reply to Respondents' Answer until 30 days after the Supreme Court's decision in Cruz II. The briefing schedule is amended as follows:
1. Fitzgerald shall file the reply within 30 days of the filing date of the Cruz II decision.
2. Respondents shall file a surreply, limited to issues arising from the Cruz II decision, within 30 days of the filing date of Fitzgerald's reply.
3. Any notice of a request for evidentiary development shall be filed within 60 days of the filing date of Respondents' surreply.
4. A response to any such notice shall be filed within 30 days of the filing date of the notice.
5. A reply to a response to any such notice shall be filed within 15 days of the filing date of the response.