" In Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 800, 108 S.W.2d 1041, and Bailey v. Commonwealth, 312 Ky. 764, 229 S.W.2d 767, the Commonwealth was permitted to prove defendant's age after all the evidence had been introduced, and in both cases it was held that the trial court had not abused his discretion in permitting the introduction of such evidence. A case which we believe is exactly in point is White v. Commonwealth, 301 Ky. 228, 191 S.W.2d 244, where (although it is not shown in the opinion, the record so discloses) appellant insisted he was prejudiced because, after the Commonwealth had closed and appellant had moved for a directed verdict, the Commonwealth was permitted to recall a prosecuting witness who was allowed to give a material fact in a robbery case that the property had been taken against his will and consent. It was held that the trial court might for the "extraction of the truth as it may be" exercise a sound discretion, and the court refused to reverse the judgment on the ground that such action of the trial court was an abuse o
After the defense had closed, the Commonwealth recalled appellant for further cross-examination. Up to this point the Commonwealth had failed to prove appellant's age, a fact necessary to be shown since the offense of which appellant was accused was only a misdemeanor if he was under twenty-one years of age. Commonwealth v. Hines, 282 Ky. 791, 140 S.W.2d 386. In answer to the one question asked when he was recalled, the appellant said he was twenty-seven years of age. Precisely the same question was presented in Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 800, 108 S.W.2d 1041, and we held that it was not an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court to permit the defendant to be recalled after he had offered all of his evidence and be examined concerning his age although this was evidence in chief. It is argued that it was incumbent upon the Commonwealth's Attorney to state his reason for recalling the defendant before his motion to recall could be sustained.
"A. He said he had two more cartridges in his pocket." In support of his contention that the Court's rulings were so erroneous and prejudicial as to constitute an abuse of discretion and to entitle him to a new trial, the appellant relies upon section 224 of the Criminal Code of Practice, Marcum v. Commonwealth, 282 Ky. 799, 140 S.W.2d 387; Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 800, 108 S.W.2d 1041; Howard v. Commonwealth, 227 Ky. 142, 12 S.W.2d 324. Severally or collectively the Code provision and the authorities cited do no more than affirm what the Commonwealth concedes; i. e., evidence which properly belongs in chief may be introduced in rebuttal when, in the exercise of a sound discretion, justice requires it. Whether in any given case the proffered evidence is of that strength and quality must be determined by considering it in its relationship to the other evidence and to the facts peculiar to that case.