Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-1596
September 22, 2003
ORDER
AND NOW, this ___ day of ___, 2003, upon consideration of the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment, and after careful review of the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Arnold C. Rapoport, IT IS ORDERED that:
1. the Report and Recommendation dated September __, 2003, is APPROVED and ADOPTED;
2. the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED; and
3. the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Frederick C. Fitch ("Plaintiff"), brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), which incorporates 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) by reference, to review the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant"), denying his claim for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") provided under Title II of the Social Security Act ("the Act"). 42 U.S.C. § 401-433. Subject matter jurisdiction is based upon section 205(g) of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). Presently before this Court are the parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that Plaintiff's Motion should be denied, and Defendant's Motion should be granted.
FACTS
Born on February 27, 1948, Plaintiff was fifty-four years old at the time of the ALJ's decision. (R. 13, 40.) Plaintiff has a tenth grade education and work experience as an automobile detailer, chauffeur, van driver, and security guard. (R. 96, 98-100.) Plaintiff has not worked since December 15, 2000, when he was laid off. (R. 96, 98.) Plaintiff alleges disability since December 15, 2000. (R. 96.)
Plaintiff testified that he did not return to work after December 15, 2000, because he had problems with his hands and his back. (R. 96.)
Treatment notes from James B. Bell, Jr., M.D., dated April 19, 2001, are the earliest record of Plaintiff's medical treatment. (R. 70-79.) Dr. Bell, Plaintiff's primary care physician, examined Plaintiff for complaints of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, a torn left rotator cuff, and low back pain. (R. 72, 74, 97.) Dr. Bell noted that Plaintiff had swelling of both hands. (R. 72-73.) Plaintiff is right-handed. (R. 65.) Dr. Bell diagnosed Plaintiff with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and a torn left rotator cuff and referred Plaintiff to John B. Webber, M.D. and James F. Bonner, M.D. (R. 73.)
carpal tunnel syndrome — a complex of symptoms resulting from compression of the median nerve in the carpal tunnel, with pain and burning or tingling paresthesias in the fingers and hand. Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 27th edition, p. 1632.
Though the medical records indicate that Plaintiff is a "right handed male," (R. 65) Plaintiff testified that he is left handed. (R. 98.)
On April 30, 2001, Dr. Webber examined Plaintiff and noted edema over the dorsum of Plaintiff's right hand, Tinel's sign over both median nerves at the wrist, somewhat weak intrinsic motor function in the hand, significant tenderness over the anterior elements of the rotator cuff mechanism in the left shoulder, and pain in the hands and shoulder. (R. 65.) Dr. Webber's treatment note acknowledge an earlier rotator cuff repair. Likewise, Dr. Webber noted a cervical discectomy/fusion and bilateral carpal tunnel release surgery, which were also performed shortly after Plaintiff was involved in his second motor vehicle accident in 1994. (R. 65.) With regard to these prior surgeries, Plaintiff "reported significant improvement following the rotator cuff surgery and the cervical fusion procedure, but little or no difference in his carpal tunnel." (R. 65.) Plaintiff reported that he continued to have pain in his hands and his left shoulder. (R. 65.) Consequently, Dr. Webber administered a Marcaine/cortisone injection into the glenohumeral joint of the left shoulder. (R. 65.) Dr. Webber also provided Plaintiff with a precise exercise regimen, which was "critical to his improvement."` (R. 65.)
Tinel's sign — a tingling sensation in the distal end of a limb when percussion is made over the site of the divided nerve.Dorland's at 1526.
Some time after involvement in a automobile accident and prior to beginning treatment with Dr. Webber, Plaintiff underwent "a repair of the right rotator cuff elements." (R. 65.) Thus, when Plaintiff presented to Dr. Webber with left should pain, he had already undergone surgery for his right shoulder.
Three weeks later, on May 21, 2001, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Webber with the results of an MRI of his left shoulder and nerve conduction studies of both upper extremities. (R. 65-68.) Plaintiff returned to Dr. Webber at this time reporting reasonable relief following injections with the cortisone in his left shoulder. (R. 65.) Thus, Dr. Webber advised that Plaintiff "continue in this conservative mode rather than consider a cuff operation as he previously underwent on the right side." (R. 65.) Dr. Webber was also "reluctant to suggest any additional [hand] surgery based . . . on the results if the EMG." (R. 65.) Plaintiff was injected into the right carpal tunnel with a Xylocaine/cortisone and was advised to return in two weeks to monitor his response. (R. 65.)
MRI testing of the left shoulder, on May 16, 2001, showed a small, full thickness tear of the supraspineatus tendon and anatomic impingement on the rotator cuff by a low lying acromion. (R. 66-67.)
The EMG results, dated May 8, 2001, show bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and reflex sympathetic dsytrophy in both hands, which "would explain the swelling and pain in both hands." (R. 68.)
Two weeks later, on June 11, 2001, Plaintiff return to Dr. Webber and reported ongoing symptoms. (R. 64.) Dr. Webber noted that Plaintiff had "a difficult time being precise about whether his current symptoms suggest[ed] a recurrence or not." (R. 64.) Dr. Webber's treatment notes indicate that Plaintiff's reported symptoms "suggest a certain component of carpal tunnel," but that his pain could also be the result of "small joint degenerative changes." (R. 64.) In reviewing the EMG report, Dr. Webber noted that "prolongation of the distal motor latency really never returns to normal after carpal tunnel syndrome anyhow, [and] it is tough to make a determination for surgery based on that alone." (R. 64.) Thus, Dr. Webber administered the left carpal tunnel with a Xylocaine/cortisone injection and advised Plaintiff to return in four weeks for further discussion regarding additional treatment. (R. 64.) Other than a check-box form, no further treatment notes from Dr. Webber appear in the record. (R. 80.) At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that he voluntarily discontinued treatment with Dr. Webber. (R. 97.)
The check-box form, dated September 10, 2001, documents Plaintiff's unlimited ability to perform fine and dexterous movements. (R. 80.)
On June 21, 2001, Dr. Bell prescribed Ultram, every four hours for pain, after seeing Plaintiff on that date. (R. 71.) Plaintiff then telephoned Dr. Bell on June 26 and June 27, 2001, with complaints of pain in the back and swelling and pain in the leg. (R. 71.) Dr. Bell advised Plaintiff to go to the emergency room. (R. 71.) The record contains no evidence that Plaintiff followed Dr. Bell's instruction to visit the emergency room.
On September 13, 2001, Oliver Finch, M.D., a state agency medical consultant, reviewed Plaintiff's medical records and completed a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment. (R. 81-86.) Dr. Finch opined that Plaintiff had carpal tunnel syndrome and rotator cuff impingement, which limited him to occasionally lifting twenty pounds, frequently lifting ten pounds, standing/walking for six hours in an eight-hour workday, and sitting for six hours during an eight hour workday. (R. 82.) Dr. Finch further opined that Plaintiff had a limited ability to push-pull with his upper extremities, was able to frequently climb ramps/stairs, occasionally climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds, frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and occasionally crawl. (R. 82-84.) Dr. Finch also opined that Plaintiff had a limited ability for overhead/extended reaching, a limited ability for gross hand manipulation, an unlimited ability to finger/feel, and should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold/heat, humidity, and vibration. (R. 81-86.) Dr. Finch did not find Plaintiff disabled, but found that Plaintiff was precluded from "heavy work." (R. 86.) Dr. Finch also concluded that Plaintiff was only "partially credible." (R. 86.)
In correspondence to Plaintiff's counsel, dated December 4, 2001, James F. Bonner, M.D., indicated that he examined Plaintiff on that date. (R. 89.) Plaintiff presented with signs and symptoms of spinal dysfunction in the cervical spine status-post anterior cervical discectomy with degenerative changes and herniation, and status-post carpal tunnel release. (R. 89.) Dr. Bonner noted that an EMG test indicated neuropathy and lumbar radiculopathy. (R. 89.) Dr. Bonner also noted Plaintiffs complaints of decreased range of motion and sensation. (R. 89.) "In summary, [Dr. Bonner's] electrodiagnostic examination reveal[ed] evidence of a neuropathy/multiple level lumbar radiculopathy." (R. 89.) Dr. Bonner concluded that Plaintiff "is disabled." (R. 90.) Dr. Bonner did not state the date upon which Plaintiff became disabled. (R. 89-90.) Dr. Bonner recommended that Plaintiff "abstain from all aggravating factors including prolonged sitting, bending, twisting, lifting, straining, stooping, or climbing." (R. 90.) Dr. Bonner indicated that he would see Plaintiff in follow up on a "p.r.n. basis." (R. 90.) Though Plaintiff alleges he saw Dr. Bonner on one more occasion, there is no indication in the record that Plaintiff continued treatment with Dr. Bonner.
p.r.n. — abbreviation for pro re na'ta, according as circumstances may require. Dorland's at 1355.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff applied for DIB on June 26, 2001, alleging disability due to bilateral hand pain and swelling, left shoulder rotator cuff tear, foot pain, and back pain, since December 15, 2000, when Plaintiff was laid off work. (R. 40-42, 48.) Plaintiff's date last insured is June 30, 2003. (R. 22-23.) The state agency denied Plaintiff's DIB application. (R. 12, 24.) Plaintiff filed a timely request for a hearing. (R. 12.)
Thereafter, on April 9, 2002, an administrative law judge ("ALJ") held a hearing, at which Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, appeared and testified. (R. 12.) Agnes Gallen, an impartial vocational expert ("VE") also appeared and testified. (R. 12.) On May 30, 2002, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff's application for benefits. (R. 12-19.) The ALJ found that from Plaintiff's alleged onset date, December 15, 2000, through the date of the ALJ decision, which preceded Plaintiff's date last insured, Plaintiff's severe limitations did not prevent Plaintiff from performing a significant number of jobs in the national economy, at the light exertional level. (R. 12-19.) The ALJ thus concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to DIB, and Plaintiff subsequently requested review by the Appeals Council.
Plaintiff testified that he has continued seeing Dr. Bell but has discontinued treatment with Dr. Webber. (R. 15.) Plaintiff testified that he takes Alleve or Advil "every now and then" for pain. (R. 15.) Though Plaintiff insisted that a doctor prescribed use of a cane, Plaintiff was "not able to remember which doctor." (R. 15.) Plaintiff testified that two or three times a month his hands swelled and he was unable to pick up objects. (R. 15.) Plaintiff testified that he had trouble sleeping, but he took no medication to address the problem. (R. 95, 104-106.) Plaintiff testified that he has to take a nap twice a day. (R. 15.) Plaintiff also testified that his daily activities include driving, doing the dishes, laundry, occasional shopping, driving to see his mother in New Jersey twice a week, and visiting with his grandchildren. (R. 117.)
The VE testified that Plaintiff's past relevant work was light and medium exertional level occupation, and he had no transferrable work skills. (R. 17, 110.) The VE testified that Plaintiff could not perform any of his past relevant work. (R. 17, 111.) The VE then testified that Plaintiff could perform other jobs, such as usher or gate guard. (R. 18, 112.) The VE also testified that if Plaintiff's testimony regarding his physical limitations were fully credited, Plaintiff would still be capable of work as a cashier. (R. 117.) Finally, the VE testified that Plaintiff could also work considering his alleged need to nap during the day, if his naps were limited to one nap per day, because Plaintiff could sleep on his lunch hour. (R. 117.)
A claimant must demonstrate that he was disabled before his date last insured in order to be entitled to DIB. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1) (A), (c)(1)(B); 20 C.F.R. § 404.131(a) (2002).
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's subsequent request for review. (R. 4-6.) The ALJ's decision then became the final decision of the Commissioner, and Plaintiff brought this civil action seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff filed this action on March 14, 2003. The matter was referred to this Magistrate Judge for preparation of a report and recommendation on July 9, 2003.
LEGAL STANDARD
The role of this Court on judicial review is to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the Commissioner's final decision. Any findings of fact made by the Commissioner must be accepted as conclusive, provided that they are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence" is deemed to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a decision. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 407 (1971), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). See also, Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1294 (1993). When determining whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Court may look to any evidence in the record, regardless of whether the ALJ cites to it in his decision. Hook v. Bowen, 677 F. Supp. 305, 306 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Eposito v. Apfel, 66 Soc. Sec. Rep.Ser. 217, 2000 WL 218119, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2000). Thus, the issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner's final decision of "not disabled" should be sustained as being supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, apart from the substantial evidence inquiry, a reviewing court must also ensure that the ALJ applied the proper legal standards in evaluating a claim of disability. Coria v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1984).
To prove disability, a claimant must demonstrate that there is some "medically determinable basis for an impairment that prevents him from engaging in any `substantial gainful activity' for a statutory twelve-month period." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1). Each case is evaluated by the Commissioner according to a five-step process:
The sequence is essentially as follows: (1) if the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful employment, [he] will be found not disabled; (2) if the claimant does not suffer from a "severe impairment," [he] will be found not disabled; (3) if a severe impairment meets or equals a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 and has lasted or is expected to last continually for at least twelve months, then the claimant will be found disabled; (4) if the severe impairment does not meet prong (3), the Commissioner considers the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC") to determine whether [he] can perform work [he] has done in the past despite the severe impairment — if [he] can, [he] will be found not disabled; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform [his] past work, the Commissioner will consider the claimant's RFC, age, education, and past work experience to determine whether [he] can perform other work which exists in the national economy. See id. § 404.1520(b)-(f).Schaudeck v. Comm'r of Social Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431-32 (3d Cir. 1999).
ALJ DECISION AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff's alleged impairment involves an inability to work due swelling and pain in both hands, a torn rotator cuff, foot pain, and back pain. (R. 12.) The ALJ, however, proceeded through the sequential evaluation process and found Plaintiff was not disabled due to his physical impairments.
The ALJ proceeded through the first four steps, finding that: 1. Plaintiff has not been engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date; 2. Plaintiff's back pain, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, reflex dystrophy of the hands, and left rotator cuff impingement are severe impairments; 3. Plaintiff's impairments or combination of impairments do not meet or equal the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4; and 4. Plaintiff cannot engage in his past relevant work. (R. 18.) The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a limited range of light work, and is capable of making an adjustment to work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. (R. 19.)
In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to properly weigh the medical evidence, the ALJ erred in his RFC assessment, the hypothetical posed to the VE was inaccurate, the ALJ's credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence, and the ALJ erred in his application of the age categories. The issue before this Court, however, is whether the Commissioner's final decision of "not disabled" should be sustained as being supported by substantial evidence. Based on an independent review of the record and for the reasons that follow, we find that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence of record. We will, therefore, recommend that Plaintiff's motion be denied.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ failed to properly weigh the medical evidence, and in relation to this allegation, argues that the ALJ's RFC assessment and hypothetical to the VE were incorrect. Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ incorrectly relied upon the opinion of Dr. Finch, a state agency medical consultant, as opposed to the opinion of Dr. Bonner, who examined Plaintiff on one occasion and found him to be disabled in a narrative report sent to Plaintiff's counsel. Plaintiff alleges that greater weight should be applied to Dr. Bonner's assessment, because Dr. Bonner examined Plaintiff and issued a narrative report. However, as Defendant correctly points out, the ALJ did not reject Dr. Bonner's opinion on the basis of Dr. Finch's report alone. Rather, the ALJ considered all of the evidence in rejecting Dr. Bonner's assessment. The ALJ explicitly reviewed all of the medical reports and concluded that Dr. Bonner's assessment was inconsistent with the record as a whole. Moreover, the ALJ explicitly stated his reasons for rejecting Dr. Bonner's opinion that Plaintiff was not disabled. Finally, the ALJ considered the medical evidence, as well as, the testamentary evidence of Plaintiff's complaint's of pain, which the ALJ discredited due to significant gaps in Plaintiff's treatment history and overall inconsistencies with the record. Accordingly, having reviewed the evidence of record, as well as the ALJ's decision, we find adequate support for the weight the ALJ applied to the medical evidence.
For example, the ALJ found that Dr. Finch's report, which found Plaintiff not disabled, was consistent with the record as a whole. (R. 16.)
The ALJ wrote that
Dr. Bonner was not the claimant's treating physician, but a consultant for the claimant and his representative. The doctor wrote the evaluation the same day he first evaluated the claimant. The doctor provided no test results, only reported on them. His report leaves a question about how recently the tests were conducted. The report is unclear and Dr. Bonner may have been reporting about the claimant's condition at the time he, the claimant, underwent back and carpal tunnel surgery, in the early 1990s . . . [Thus, the ALJ] gives more weight to the report of the treating physician, Dr. Webber. (R. 16.)
In addition to a general lack of credibility, as discussed infra, the record also reveals that Plaintiff did not aggressively pursue treatment, which suggests that his pain was not as disabling as alleged. For example, Plaintiff did not go to the emergency room when so instructed by Dr. Bell; Plaintiff testified that he only took Alleve and Advil for pain, though he was prescribed Ultram; and Plaintiff sought no medical treatment until at least four months after he alleges he became disabled. Thus, Plaintiff's allegations of disabling pain are not supported by substantial evidence of record. Accordingly, Plaintiff's contention that the ALJ erred in assessing the medical evidence is without merit.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff alleges that the report of the state agency medical consultant should be disregarded, because Dr. Finch "softened [his] assessment just enough to deny [Plaintiff] benefits." (Pl. Br. at 23.) This allegation is unfounded and without merit. To suggest that the ALJ would rely upon conclusions fabricated merely "to deny [Plaintiff] benefits" is an outrageous accusation with absolutely no substantiation, nor did Plaintiff point to any evidence in support of this allegation. This Court has throughly and independently reviewed all of the evidence of record and we have found no evidence of any impropriety on the part of the ALJ or the state agency consultant. Further the treatment notes of Dr. Webber support the findings made by Dr. Finch. Thus, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's dtermination that Plaintiff's RFC enabled him to perform light work. Consequently, the ALJ's hypothetical to the VE, which limited Plaintiff to light work, accurately described Plaintiff's limitations, and Plaintiff's allegation that the ALJ erred in assessing the medical evidence is without merit.
Likewise, Plaintiff's contention that the ALJ erred in his credibility determination is without merit. This Court has examined all of the evidence of record and has found substantial evidence in support of the ALJ's credibility determination. Plaintiff's testimony at the administrative hearing illustrates this point. Plaintiff testified that he is left handed, but treatment notes document Plaintiff as right handed. (R. 65, 104.) Plaintiff also testified that Dr. Webber gave him injections in his leg; however, Dr. Webber's treatment notes do not substantiate this claim. (R. 63-69, 80, 107.) Plaintiff also testified that he stopped going to Dr. Webber because Dr. Webber "would just give me cortisone shots and he said there was really nothing they could do for me because I was too old to be operated on and he said it may just make the problem worse." (R. 97-98.) This claim, too, was not substantiated by the record. Thus, Plaintiff's testimony clearly conflicts with the evidence of record. Accordingly we find Plaintiff's testimony regarding his limitations less than fully truthful. Evidence of this propensity to exaggerate supports the ALJ's credibility determination, wherein the ALJ found Plaintiff less than fully credible. (R. 15.)
Dr. Webber's treatment notes never stated or implied that Plaintiff was too old for surgery or that surgery may worsen his condition. Dr. Webber's treatment notes merely indicate that it was "tough to make a determination for surgery" based on the results on the EMG alone. (R. 64.) Dr. Webber opined that Plaintiff continue "conservative" treatment and "return for further discussion regarding additional treatment needs," which Plaintiff voluntarily failed to do. (R. 64.) Thus, Dr. Webber's treatment notes do not correspond with Plaintiff's testimony.
Further, the ALJ's opinion appropriately documents his credibility determination. The regulations describe a two-step process to determine whether a claimant is disabled by subjective symptoms. First, the claimant must make a threshold showing that there are medical signs and laboratory findings showing that he has a medical impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which, when considered with all the other evidence, would lead to a conclusion of disability. Second, if the medical signs or laboratory findings show that the claimant has a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, the ALJ must then evaluate the intensity and persistence of the symptoms to determine whether they limit the claimant's capacity to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1). In determining the credibility of a claimant's subjective complaints the ALJ must take into consideration the available record evidence, including the medical evidence, the claimant's statements about his symptoms, physician statements, and information provided about the claimant's symptoms and how they affect the claimant, and other relevant evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2), (3).
Allegations of subjective symptoms must be supported by objective evidence. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999). The regulations governing the evaluation of subjective complaints provide that a claimant's statements about his impairments will not alone serve to establish disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (a).
In this case, the ALJ evaluated the medical reports, the medical history, the findings made on examination, Plaintiff's assertions concerning his ability to work, Plaintiff's description of his activities and lifestyle, and in light of the degree of medical treatment sought. (R. 15-16.) At the first step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's impairments were not capable of causing the type of symptoms he alleged. (R. 15.) Consequently, the ALJ determined that "the claimant's testimony is exaggerated, not fully supported by the documentary evidence, and not fully credible." (R. 15.)
In further support of this determination, the ALJ thoroughly addressed Plaintiff's medical history. Thus, the ALJ's decision sets forth appropriate reasons for discounting Plaintiff's credibility. Furthermore, the ALJ did not totally discount all of Plaintiff's subjective complaints, but rather accommodated them to the extent that they were consistent with the overall record.
The ALJ noted that Plaintiff alleged "that he became unable to work in December 2000, but he did not have any medical care from some time in 1994 until April 2000, when he saw Dr. Bell." (R. 15.) Thus, though Plaintiff alleged disability in December 2000, he did not seek any medical care until about four months later. The ALJ also noted that there was "no evidence that any medical practitioner suggested that [Plaintiff] use a cane," though Plaintiff alleged that he was so instructed. (R. 15, 102.) Finally, the ALJ noted that there was "no support for [Plaintiff's] allegation that his medical condition causes him to nap during the day." (R. 15.) The ALJ then systematically reviewed the records submitted by each physician in support of his conclusions. (R. 12-19.)
The ALJ's RFC assessment limited Plaintiff to light work that did not require any activities precluded by Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments. (R. 18-19.)
In sum, the ALJ considered the record evidence, followed the credibility analysis outlined in the regulations, and relied on substantial evidence to support his finding that Plaintiff was not entirely credible. Further, this Court has independently reviewed the record and has found substantial evidence in support of the ALJ's credibility determination. Consequently, the ALJ made an appropriate credibility determination, which does not disturb his final determination that Plaintiff was capable of performing light work with certain restrictions. This Court has fully considered all of Plaintiff's arguments and finds no basis to undermine the ALJ's credibility determination.
For example, Plaintiff argues that because Plaintiff was prescribed Ultram the ALJ was incorrect in finding that Plaintiff used only non-prescribed medications to control his pain. (R. 15.) We find this argument unpersuasive, because Plaintiff actually testified that he only used Alleve and Advil to control his pain. (R. 15.) Plaintiff also testified that he "did not like to take anything more than that." (R. 98.) Thus, just because Plaintiff was prescribed a medication does not mean that he used the medication, and the ALJ was correct to use that fact in evaluating Plaintiff's complaints of pain.
Credibility determinations are reserved for the ALJ. Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir. 1983).
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by mechanically applying the age categories. (Pl. Br. at 26.) Plaintiff argues that the age categories should not be strictly applied in "borderline" situations. Plaintiff argues that his was a borderline situation, because he was fifty-four years old at the time of the ALJ decision, but he had turned fifty-five before his date last insured. The regulations provide that a borderline situation occurs where the claimant is "within a few days to a few months of reaching an older age category." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(b). Here, Plaintiff was fifty-four years and three months old at the time of the ALJ's decision, on May 30, 2002. Plaintiff did not reach the older age category until February 27, 2003, nine months after the ALJ's decision. Nine months is not a borderline situation. Therefore, we find that the ALJ did not err in deciding not to use the older age category.
If the ALJ had applied the regulations with more flexibility, as suggested by Plaintiff, the regulations would have directed the ALJ to find Plaintiff disabled, because a fifty-five year old with Plaintiff's limitations would be "disabled."
Conclusion
Having reviewed the evidence of record, we find the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence of record, including the ALJ's evaluation of Plaintiff's ability to perform light work, the ALJ's credibility determination, and the ALJ's decision not to utilize the older age category. Accordingly, the ALJ's decision in this case is based on substantial evidence of record.
Therefore, I make the following:
RECOMMENDATION
AND NOW, this ___ day of September, 2003, it is RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED; and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED.