Fishman v. Paolucci

7 Citing cases

  1. Fishman v. Daines

    164 F. Supp. 3d 409 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)   Cited 2 times

    MyWebGrocer, LLC v. Hometown Info, Inc., 375 F.3d 190, 192 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the Second Circuit reiterated on the appeal in this case, “[a] mandatory preliminary injunction ‘that alters the status quo by commanding some positive act’ by the state, as is requested here, ‘should issue only upon a clear showing that the moving party is entitled to the relief requested, or where extreme or very serious damage will result from a denial of preliminary relief.’ ” Fishman v. Paolucci, 628 Fed.Appx. at 800, 2015 WL 5999318, at *2 (emphases in original) (quoting Cacchillo v. Insmed, Inc., 638 F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir.2011) ).III. Discussion

  2. Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm'n v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin.

    1:24-cv-00833-TWP-TAB (S.D. Ind. Sep. 3, 2024)

    Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644, 658 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. California, Inc., 565 U.S. 606 (2012); see also Bontrager v. Indiana Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin., 697 F.3d 604, 611 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding a risk of irreparable injury when plaintiffs would be denied medically necessary care); Beltran v. Myers, 677 F.2d 1317, 1322 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the possibility of plaintiffs being denied Medicaid benefits sufficient to establish irreparable harm); Fishman v. Paolucci, 628 Fed.Appx. 797, 801 (2d Cir. 2015) ("A lack of medical services is exactly the sort of irreparable harm that preliminary injunctions are designed to address.").

  3. Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm'n v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin.

    1:24-cv-00833-TWP-TAB (S.D. Ind. Aug. 30, 2024)

    Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644, 658 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. California, Inc., 565 U.S. 606 (2012); see also Bontrager v. Indiana Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin., 697 F.3d 604, 611 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding a risk of irreparable injury when plaintiffs would be denied medically necessary care); Beltran v. Myers, 677 F.2d 1317, 1322 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the possibility of plaintiffs being denied Medicaid benefits sufficient to establish irreparable harm); Fishman v. Paolucci, 628 Fed.Appx. 797, 801 (2d Cir. 2015) ("A lack of medical services is exactly the sort of irreparable harm that preliminary injunctions are designed to address.").

  4. Scofero v. VNA HomeCare Options, LLC

    No. 6:17-cv-06391(MAT) (W.D.N.Y. Jul. 21, 2017)

    The Court now considers whether Plaintiff can demonstrate that "extreme or very serious damage," Cacchillo, 638 F.3d at 401, will result to him if the mandatory injunctive relief is not issued. Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable harm. He therefore necessarily cannot fulfill the heightened showing required in the context of mandatory injunctions, that is, "extreme or very serious damage" in the absence of relief. The "irreparable harm" cases on which Plaintiff relies in his initial memorandum of law largely deal with situations where the movants face "[a] lack of medical services[,]" Fishman v. Paolucci, 628 F. App'x 797, 800 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order), which the Second Circuit has characterized as "exactly the sort of irreparable harm that preliminary injunctions are designed to address." Id. at 800-01 (Medicaid recipients would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction enjoining state officials from terminating, without notice, benefits for failure to appear at a hearing; recipients' very survival was threatened by denial of medical assistance benefits); see also Caldwell v. Blum, 621 F.2d 491, 493 (2d Cir. 1980) (plaintiffs, who were aged, blind or disabled New York residents, proved sufficient threat of irreparable harm to entitle them to relief against enforcement of the New York transfer-of-assets prohibition; "[t]hose medically needy applicants who [had] already transferred their assets and are being denied Medicaid benefits can hardly be expected to recover those assets for use in payment of medical bills; in the meantime they would, absent relief, be exposed to the hardship of being denied esse

  5. Kelly v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc.

    Civil Case Number 3:16-cv-00543 (VLB) (D. Conn. Jun. 27, 2017)

    Both the threat of termination as well as the actual termination of medical coverage benefits constitute irreparable harm. See Whelan v. Colgan, 602 F.2d 1060, 1062 (2d Cir. 1979) ("In fact, the threatened termination of benefits such as medical coverage for workers and their families obviously raised the spectre of irreparable injury."); Commc'ns Workers of Am., Dist. One, AFL-CIO v. NYNEX Corp., 898 F.2d 887, 891 (2d Cir. 1990) ("In this circuit, the threat of termination of medical benefits to striking workers has been held to constitute irreparable harm."); Fishman v. Paolucci, 628 F. App'x 797, 801 (2d Cir. 2015) ("A lack of medical services is exactly the sort of irreparable harm that preliminary injunctions are designed to address."); LaForest v. Honeywell, No. 03-CV-6248T, 2003 WL 23180220, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2003) ("If the mere threat of termination of medical benefits constitutes irreparable harm, then the actual termination of medical benefits certainly constitutes irreparable harm.") (internal citations omitted). Factors demonstrating retirees will experience irreparable harm include:

  6. Gilmore v. Bouboulis

    3:15-CV-0686 (GTS/DEP) (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2016)   Cited 7 times

    "Violations of rights thus give rise to § 1983 actions; mere violations of laws do not," Shakhnes, 689 F.3d at 250, and such rights may be created by federal statute. See, e.g., Fishman v. Paolucci, 628 F. App'x 797, 801 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order) (noting that, "[w]hen a federal statute creates a right enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal regulations 'may be relevant in determining the scope of the right conferred by Congress.'") (quoting Shakhnes, 689 F.3d at 251); accord, Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997). Further complicating the issue is the fact that the Second Circuit "has yet to determine whether a federal regulation, standing alone, can create a right enforceable via § 1983."

  7. Nicholas v. Bratton

    15-CV-9592 (JPO) (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 1, 2016)

    Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks "[a] mandatory preliminary injunction that alters the status quo by commanding some positive act by the state," injunctive relief is warranted only upon "a clear showing that the moving party is entitled to the relief requested, or where extreme or very serious damage will result from a denial of preliminary relief." Fishman v. Paolucci, 628 F. App'x 797, 800 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits