Opinion
3:20-cv-00940-MWB-GBC
06-28-2021
TIM FISHER, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL AND TO REVERSE AND REMAND DECISION OF COMMISSIONER
GERALD B. COHN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for decision. Tim Fisher (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration's decision finding of not disabled. As set forth below, the undersigned recommends to GRANT Plaintiff's appeal and REVERSE and REMAND the Commissioner's decision in this case.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To receive disability or supplemental security benefits under the Act, a claimant bears the burden to demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); accord 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act further provides that an individual:
shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). Plaintiff must demonstrate the physical or mental impairment “by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D).
Social Security regulations implement a five-step sequential process to evaluate a disability claim. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 551 (3d Cir. 2005). The process requires an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to decide whether an applicant (1) is engaged in “substantial gainful activity;” (2) suffers from a “severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment;” (3) suffers from “an impairment(s) that meets or equals one” listed in the regulation's appendix; (4) has a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) allowing for performance of “past relevant work;” and (5) can “make an adjustment to other work.” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 551; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v).
If at any of the steps a determination exists that a plaintiff is or is not disabled, evaluation under a subsequent step is not necessary. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. See Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 551 (3d Cir. 2005). If the claimant satisfies this burden, then the Commissioner must show at step five that jobs exist in the national economy that a person with the claimant's abilities, age, education, and work experience can perform. Id.
In reviewing a decision of the Commissioner, the Court is limited to determining whether the Commissioner has applied the correct legal standards and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“court shall review only the question of conformity with such regulations and the validity of such regulations”); Johnson v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Sanfilippo v. Barnhart, 325 F.3d 391, 393 (3d Cir. 2003) (plenary review of legal questions in social security cases). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); accord Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154, 203 L.Ed.2d 504 (2019). The Court's review is based on the record, and the Court will “meticulously examine the record as a whole, including anything that may undercut or detract from the ALJ's findings in order to determine if the substantiality test has been met.” Id. Substantial evidence is a deferential standard of review. See Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial evidence is “less than a preponderance” and “more than a mere scintilla.” Jesurum v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
The Court may neither re-weigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the fact-finder. Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). The Court will not set the Commissioner's decision aside if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if the Court would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income under Title XVI and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”), with a last insured date (“DLI”) of December 31, 2022, and an amended alleged disability onset date of September 30, 2016. (Tr. 25, 101). Plaintiff alleged disability due to the following impairments: (1) post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”); (2) Guillain-Barre syndrome; (3) major; (4) depressive disorder; (5) low thyroid; (6) two hernias; (7) high blood pressure; (8) high cholesterol; (9) sleep apnea; (10) overweight, and; (11) pre-diabetic. (Tr. 102). On April 4, 2019, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (Tr. 22-52). Plaintiff sought review of the decision, which the Appeals Council denied on April 29, 2020, thereby affirming the decision of the ALJ as the “final decision” of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. (Tr. 1-6).
Disability insurance benefits are paid if the individual is disabled by the last date that a claimant meets the requirements of being insured. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A), (c)(1).
On June 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed the above-captioned action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to appeal a decision of Defendant denying social security benefits. (Doc. 1). On December 9, 2020, Defendant filed an answer and an administrative transcript of proceedings. (Doc. 14, 15). On January 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed a brief in support of the appeal. (Doc. 16 (“Pl. Br.”)). On January 27, 2021, Defendant filed a brief in response. (Doc. 17 (“Def. Br.”)). On February 4, 2021, Plaintiff filed a reply brief. (Doc. 18 (“Reply Br.”)).
III. ISSUES
On appeal, Plaintiff argues: (1) the ALJ erred in the allocation of weight to the medical opinions; (2) substantial evidence does not support the residual functioning capacity (“RFC”) in the determination of Plaintiff's exertional and non-exertional limitations; (3) the ALJ erred in the consistency analysis regarding Plaintiff's alleged severity of limitations. Pl. Br. at 12-13.
IV. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is classified by the regulations as a younger individual through the date of the April 2019 ALJ decision. (Tr. 46, 101); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563(c), 416.963(c). Plaintiff has a college education. (Tr. 60). Plaintiff's past relevant work included: (1) a job as a billing representative under Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) number 214.382-014, described as sedentary with an SVP level 4; (2) a job as an accounting clerk under DOT 216.482-010, described as sedentary and skilled with an SVP of 5, and; (3) a job as a housekeeper under DOT 323.687-066, described as light and unskilled with an SVP of 2. (Tr. 75).
The SVP levels are referenced in the regulations and are routinely accounted for during disability proceedings by determining whether the claimant can engage in skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568; see also SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704 at *3. SVP is defined as the amount of lapsed time required by a typical worker to learn the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facility needed to average performance in a specific job-worker situation. United States Department of Labor, DOT Vol. 2, 1009 (4th ed. Rev. 1991) available on Westlaw 1991 WL 688702. “Using the skill level definitions in 20 CFR 404.1568 and 416.968, unskilled work corresponds to an SVP of 1-2; semi-skilled work corresponds to an SVP of 3-4; and skilled work corresponds to an SVP of 5-9 in the DOT.” SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704 at *3. Diaz v. Colvin, No. 4:16-CV-00358, 2017 WL 1078229, at *15 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2017).
“As the parties are familiar with the record, we raise here only those facts that are essential to our decision.” Kibe v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 787 Fed.Appx. 801, 802 (3d Cir. 2019).
A. Consistency and Supportability of Medical Opinions
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in the allocation of weight to the medical opinions and, therefore, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's RFC determination. Pl. Br. at 14-17. Specifically, Plaintiff argues: (1) the ALJ erred in allocating little weight to the opinions of Drs. Ted Tribble, Psy.D. and Aimee Pearson, Psy.D. and greater weight to the opinions of Drs. Cava, Kniefati, and Tardibuono; (2) the ALJ erred in allocating significant weight to Dr. Butler's opinion without noting the opinion was rendered prior to the alleged onset date; (3) the ALJ failed to explain why “Plaintiff could lift up to fifty pounds when Dr. Butler limited the Plaintiff to lifting no more than twenty pounds”; (4) the ALJ impermissibly highlighted the normal findings of state agency psychologists Popma and Williams, and consulting psychologist Dr. Tardibuono without addressing parts of their opinions indicating moderate limitations. Pl. Br. at 14-16.
Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Tribble's opinion because the opinion was based upon a one-time examination (an attribute applying to opinions from Drs. Cava, Kniefati, and Tardibuono which were given greater weight) and Dr. Tribble's objective findings contradict his own opinion. Pl. Br. at 14. In support of allocated little weight to Dr. Tribble's opinion the ALJ explained:
Dr. Tribble notably examined the claimant on only one occasion and had access to only a limited selection of outside records for review in forming his opinion, such that this “snapshot” view may not accurately reflect the claimant's longitudinal functioning. Further, Dr. Tribble's own objective examination findings are not supportive of the substantial degree of mental limitation suggested, as the claimant notably presented with abnormal mood and affect, signs of psychomotor agitation, inability to volunteer information spontaneously, reported suicidal ideation, and minor signs of difficulty concentrating, but was otherwise noted to be adequately dressed and groomed, to have cooperative attitude and interview behavior, to show no signs of psychomotor impairment or slowing, to have coherent and organized thought processes, to have essentially intact thought content without delusions, homicidal ideations, hallucinations, loose associations, circumstantiality, or psychotic thought, to have normal speech and articulation, to be alert and fully oriented with at least average intelligence, to have intact memory and good fund of knowledge, to be capable of performing serial 7 testing, doing simple mental calculations, and concentrating sufficiently to complete that portion of the examination “well, ” to have intact capacity for abstract thinking, and to have intact judgment and insight (Ex. B9F, pp. 6-7), overall suggestive of quite good retained mental functioning, rather than the serious limitations suggested in Dr. Tribble's opinion statement. Finally, Dr. Tribble's opinion statement is not consistent with the other medical evidence of record, as detailed above and particularly noting the overall stable and conservative course of required treatment to date and largely intact presentation upon objective mental status examination by other providers, neither of which are consistent with the serious limitations suggested in Dr. Tribble's opinion statement. Accordingly, because it is not supported or consistent, the undersigned affords this opinion little weight.(Tr. 42-43). Plaintiff does not cite evidence in the record or present any argument to contradict the ALJ's findings regarding the internal inconsistency of Dr. Tribble's opinion and inconsistency of Dr. Tribble's opinion with the conservative treatment throughout the record. For example, Dr. Tribble noted Plaintiff drove for transportation and was unable to drive and the ALJ noted Plaintiff commend self-employment as a driver in February 2018 and continued through the date of the March 2019 hearing. (Tr. 28, 651). The Court finds no reversible error given the record supporting the ALJ's finding of conservative treatment to be inconsistent with the severe limitations opined in Dr. Tribble's opinion. See Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p; Garrett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 274 Fed.Appx. 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming ALJ decision wherein conservative treatment contradicted the degree of symptom severity alleged by claimant); Vargas v. Berryhill, No. CV 18-1121, 2019 WL 3036533, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 18-1121, 2019 WL 3002958 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 2019); Fligger v. Berryhill, No. CV 17-1187, 2018 WL 6338328, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2018) (affirming SSR 16-3P consistency analysis where “[t]he ALJ considered the relatively conservative treatment Plaintiff had received for his condition, and the fact that his treatment included significant gaps. As explained in SSR 16-3p, “[i]mportant information about symptoms recorded by medical sources and reported in the medical evidence may include . . . precipitating and aggravating factors, frequency and duration, change over a period of time (e.g., whether worsening, improving, or static), and daily activities.” Plaintiff's ability to engage in part-time work driving others and independently accomplishing errands which entail social interaction, all undermine Dr. Tribble's opinion indicating Plaintiff has a marked impairment in the ability to: (1) relate to co-workers and the public in an appropriate manner; (2) maintain concentration, attention, persistence and pace, and; (3) maintain regular attendance in the work place and perform work activities on a consistent basis. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571, 416.971; (Tr. 654-55 (Dr. Tribble's opinion)). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's noted inconsistencies in the record which undermine the severity of the alleged symptoms. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571, 416.971, “a claimant's ability to work on a part-time basis may constitute probative evidence of his or her ability to perform the duties of a full-time job.” Forster v. Colvin, 208 F.Supp.3d 636, 645 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting Henderson v. Astrue, 2011 WL 6056896, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2011); see also, Tucker v. Saul, 2020 WL 6255420, at *15 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2020); Ojeda Perez v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 18-CV-01464-NYW, 2019 WL 6769859, at *6-8 (D. Colo. Dec. 12, 2019) (affirming the ALJ's rejection of treating physician opinion relying, in part, upon the claimant working 25 hours per week during the period in which physician opined disabling limitations). Regarding Dr. Pearson's September 2017 opinion, Plaintiff's argument lacks merit. Plaintiff failed to address the ALJ's threshold reasoning that the opinion is not a “medical opinion” pursuant to the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d) (statements that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work” are defined as “opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner, ” and are not considered “medical opinions”). The ALJ correctly found:
In September 2017, Aimee Pearson Psy.D., the claimant's then-current treating psychologist/group therapy provider, opined that, secondary to PTSD, the claimant “meets the medical criteria of physical and mental disability and these impairments are prohibitive to secure any type of consistent gainful employment, ” with no reasonable expectation for cure or substantial improvement in the future (Ex. B12F). The determination of disability or inability to work is a finding reserved to the Commissioner, making this opinion of no particular significance in assessing the claimant's case.(Tr. 43). The Court finds no reversible error regarding the ALJ's allocation of weight to the opinions of Drs. Tribble and Pearson.
Next Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in allocating significant weight to Dr. Butler's April 2016 opinion without noting the opinion was rendered five months prior to the alleged onset date. Pl. Br. at 15. The ALJ does note Dr. Butler's opinion was rendered in April 2016 and notes Plaintiff's alleged onset date of September 2016. (Tr. 27, 40). The undersigned finds no error in the ALJ's reliance on Dr. Butler's opinion in support for the RFC. The undersigned is persuaded by the court in the Eastern District of California observing:
What is more, the ALJ not only properly relied on the disputed medical evidence, but also, he may very well have erred had he ignored such evidence. As explained, the regulations clearly direct an ALJ to base her decision on a review of the entire record. Surely plaintiff would have cried foul if the ALJ here had ignored some critical piece of evidence in the record demonstrating disability, simply because it predated the amended alleged onset date.Sisco v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:18-CV-00098-CKD, 2019 WL 330909, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2019), see also Austin v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-467-SPS, 2015 WL 1209384, at *4 (Mar. 17, 2015) (“Although the 2008 report does cover a time period prior to the amended alleged onset date, it is nevertheless relevant to a proper longitudinal assessment of the claimant's impairments and should not have been ignored out of hand”); Stephens v. Astrue, No. CV 07-2191-PJW, 2008 WL 4381615, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2008) (“There is no support in law or fact for ignoring a medical opinion because it was completed before the [amended] alleged onset date”). Based on the foregoing, the Court find no error where an ALJ allocates greater weight to a medical opinion that precedes the alleged onset date.
Next Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to explain why “Plaintiff could lift up to fifty pounds when Dr. Butler limited the Plaintiff to lifting no more than twenty pounds.” An ALJ is entitled generally to credit parts of an opinion without crediting the entire opinion. See Hopkins v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 813 Fed.Appx. 775, 779-80 (3d Cir. 2020) (affirming where ALJ “afforded [the medical opinion] partial weight because ‘his findings [were] not wholly supported by the record and were inconsistent'”); Carter v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 511 Fed.Appx. 204, 205-06 (3d Cir.2013) (upholding the decision where the ALJ afforded treating physician “great weight” but discounted statement that claimant was unable to work where progress notes failed to support statement); Lee v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 248 Fed.Appx. 458, 461 (3d Cir. 2007) (upholding decision where the ALJ had afforded “great weight” to the opinions of treating physicians, but did not “fully credit” them where there were treatment gaps in their records that undermined Plaintiff's claimed severity). There is no error where the ALJ allocates significant weight to a medical opinion without adopting all the limitations articulated in the opinion. See e.g., Lee v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 248 Fed.Appx. 458, 461 (3d Cir. 2007); Durden v. Colvin, 191 F.Supp.3d 429, 455-56 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (explaining cases in support of an ALJ crafting an RFC that falls between competing opinions). In support of the fifty-pound lifting ability the ALJ explained:
Dr. Noli Cava, the consultative medical doctor who examined the claimant in May 2017, opined that the claimant could lift and carry twenty-five pounds frequently and fifty pounds occasionally, stand and walk six hours out of an eight-hour workday, sit six hours out of an eight-hour workday, frequently balance, crouch, kneel, stoop, and crawl, frequently walk on uneven terrain and climb stairs, ramps, ladders, and scaffolds, see and hear without limitation, reach, handle, and feel without limitation, and tolerate common environmental conditions without limitation [citing Tr. 656-663]. This opinion is also generally supportive of the findings of the undersigned, was based upon a detailed, personal examination of the claimant, is supported by Dr. Cava's own examination findings, and is more generally consistent with the other objective examination findings and treatment history of record, as detailed above, although the undersigned finds that the record as whole, which was not available to Dr. Cava at the time of the examination, is suggestive of slightly different/greater limitations. Accordingly, this opinion is afforded significant weight to the extent it is consistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.(Tr. 40). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's allocation of weight to the opinions of Drs. Butler and the ALJ's finding Plaintiff was capable of lifting fifty pounds.
Finally, Plaintiff argues the ALJ “impermissibly highlighted the normal findings of state agency psychologists Popma and Williams, and consulting psychologist Dr. Tardibuono without explanation of their areas of concern . . . . [that] Plaintiff would have [moderate limitations] in maintaining attention and concentration for extended periods, working in coordination with or in proximity to others without being distracted by them, completing a normal work day and work week without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, performing at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods, interacting appropriately with the general public, accepting instructions and responding appropriately to criticism from supervisors, and responding appropriately to changes in the work setting.” Pl. Br. at 16-17. The Court finds moderate limitations in social functioning found in the April 2019 opinion and reflected in the opinions of Drs. Popma and Williams, and Tardibuono compatible with an RFC's limitation of “occasional interaction with coworkers.” See Hyer v. Colvin, No. CV 15-297-GMS, 2016 WL 5719683, at *12 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2016) (listing cases upholding RFCs with “occasional” or “superficial” contact with supervisors, co-workers, or the public as adequate to reflect moderate limitations in social functioning). However, the ALJ's RFC of frequent interaction with the public and supervisors is not supported by the ALJ's finding of moderate limitation in social functioning. (Tr. 33-35 (discussion of RFC and evidence supporting non-exertional impairments); see e.g., Duran v. Berryhill, No. 18-cv-0734 SMV, 2019 WL 1992103, at *4 (D.N.M. May 6, 2019) (concluding that a limitation to “frequent interactions with supervisors” failed to account for medical opinions that assessed a “moderate” limitation in interacting with supervisors); Justin H. v. Berryhill, No. 2:18CV383, 2019 WL 2417423, at *9 (N.D. Ind. June 7, 2019) (finding error were the ALJ gave “great weight to the State agency doctors' opinions, and did not explain how the presence of “moderate” limitations in both categories led to the conclusion that Plaintiff could only occasionally interact with the general public but could frequently interact with supervisors”); Vialpando v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 19-CV-02655-STV, 2021 WL 1222493, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 1, 2021) (“the ALJ erred by simultaneously adopting Dr. Frommelt's conclusions that Plaintiff was moderately impaired in dealing with others but nonetheless crafting an RFC that allowed for frequent interaction with coworkers and supervisors”).
In considering harmless error, the Court acknowledges a “‘number of other courts have found harmless error where an alleged limitation that was not included in the ALJ's hypothetical (or in the RFC) was not necessary to perform one or more of the jobs identified by the VE, according to the DOT.'” Sweeney v. Colvin, No. 3:13-CV-02233-GBC, 2014 WL 4294507, at *17-18 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2014). In Sweeney v. Colvin, the Court found harmless error where the ALJ failed to include social interaction limitations in the RFC, however, identified the plaintiff was capable of doing a job with a “people code” of 8 in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) indicating no significant requirement to take instructions and “[m]any Courts have held that a position with this ‘people' code is one that can be performed despite limitations in interacting with others.” Sweeney v. Colvin, No. 3:13-CV-02233-GBC, 2014 WL 4294507, at *17-18 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2014). However, the Court finds reversible error as it fails to discern the ALJ's reasoning as to why moderate impairments would translate into occasional contact with co-workers while still permitting frequent contact with supervisors and the public. See e.g., Justin H. v. Berryhill, No. 2:18CV383, 2019 WL 2417423, at *9 (N.D. Ind. June 7, 2019). As the RFC appears inconsistent with the ALJ's findings, the Court cannot discern the logic of the decision and infer an omitted limitation. Moreover, the Vocational Expert's (“VE”) testimony supports remand. During the hearing, the ALJ presented the VE with the hypothetical of an individual who could “occasionally interact with co-workers . . . [and] frequently interact with the public or supervisors.” (Tr. 76). The VE testified an individual with those limitations would be capable of performing past work as a “housekeeper” (identified in the DOT under number 323.687-066 with a people code of 8) and other jobs to include: (1) “mail sorter” identified in the DOT under number 209.687-026 with a people code of 8; (2) “line attendant” identified in the DOT under number 920.687-042 with a people code of 8, and; (3) “produce sorter” identified in the DOT under number 529.687-186 with a people code of 8. (Tr. 45-46); see also, “Sorter, Agricultural Produce, ” 1991 WL 674781, DICOT 529.687-186; “Bottling-line Attendant, ” 1991 WL 687971, DICOT 920.687-042; “Mail Clerk, ” 1991 WL 671813, DICOT 209.687-026. In response to the ALJ's question as to whether there were any conflicts between the DOT's requirements and the hypothetical's limitations, the VE testified “. . . I'll note issues regarding . . . other social cognitive aspects of the hypotheticals are not addressed by the DOT [and] for those issues, I did rely on my 30 plus years of experience in the vocational field to respond.” (Tr. 77-78). The VE testimony creates a factual deficit that requires the ALJ to address in the first instance. Given the abovementioned discrepancies regarding Plaintiff's social limitations, VE testimony, and jobs identified at steps four and five, the Court recommends remand.
The Court was unable to find the cited job under the referenced number, however, found a house keeping position identified by a similar number. 1991 WL 672783, Housekeeping, DICOT 323.687-014.
B. Other Allegations of Error
Plaintiff's additional claims of error may be remedied through the case's treatment on remand. Thus, the Court declines to address those claims. A remand may produce different results on these claims, making discussion of them moot. Burns v. Colvin, 156 F.Supp.3d 579, 598 (M.D. Pa. 2016). See also Steininger v. Barnhart, 2005 WL 2077375, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2005) (declining to address plaintiff's other arguments for remand, “as the ALJ's findings may be revised in any decision issued following the new hearing”); LaSalle v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2011 WL 1456166, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2011); Bruce v. Berryhill, 294 F.Supp.3d 346, 364 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
VI. Recommendation
The undersigned recommends the Court vacate the decision of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and remand the case for further proceedings. Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED:
1. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's benefits under the Act be vacated and the case remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security to develop the record fully, conduct a new administrative hearing and appropriately evaluate the evidence;
2. The Clerk of Court close this case.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A Judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The Judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The Judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions.