Opinion
14-P-615
03-27-2015
SHAWN FISHER v. KELLY RYAN & another.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Shawn Fisher, is an inmate in the custody of the Massachusetts Department of Correction and is incarcerated at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution in Shirley, Massachusetts (MCI-Shirley). He appeals from a Superior Court judgment dismissing his complaint against Thomas Fedele, the disciplinary hearing officer who presided over the disciplinary hearing which is at issue in this case, and Kelly Ryan, the superintendent at MCI-Shirley. We affirm.
Background. In March, 2012, Fisher was involved in a fight with three other inmates. One of the inmates was seriously injured but he did not report his injuries until the following day at which time he stated that he sustained the injuries in a fall. Upon receiving information from an informant that Fisher was involved, an investigation ensued. That investigation disclosed that the fight was over a discrepancy in bets placed with regard to a basketball game and resulted in the issuance of a disciplinary report against Fisher.
A disciplinary hearing was held on March 26, 2012. At the hearing, Fisher, who was represented by counsel, pleaded not guilty. He claimed that, although he was involved in the altercation, he had only gone to the aid of the injured inmate. Three of the charges against Fisher -- "conduct which interferes with the security or orderly running of the institution"; "gambling and/or possession of gambling paraphernalia"; and "violating any departmental rule" -- were dismissed, but Fisher was found guilty of "fighting with any person" for which he received a fifteen day disciplinary detention. See 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 430.24 (2-7) (2006).
After his appeal to the superintendent was denied, Fisher brought this action in the Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 231A, §§ 1-9, G. L. c. 249, § 4, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint alleges that (1) the hearing officer lacked sufficient evidence to find him guilty on the fighting charge, and (2) the hearing officer improperly denied him exculpatory evidence, including witness affidavits and video footage, which presumably would have corroborated his version of the event. Fisher sought injunctive relief, a declaration of his rights under G. L. c. 124, § 1(e) , and monetary damages. On the parties' cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, a Superior Court judge concluded that (1) Fisher himself admitted to conduct satisfying the definition of "fighting with any inmate" under 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 430.24 (2-7); (2) a reasonable person might discredit Fisher's explanation; and (3) regardless of any noble intentions Fisher may have had, his involvement posed a risk to Fisher's safety and the safety of other inmates and staff. The judge further concluded that the hearing officer properly exercised his discretion in excluding the contested evidence and that Fisher was not entitled to injunctive relief or monetary damages.
General Laws c. 231A, §§ 1-9, governs the procedure for declaratory judgments, G. L. c. 249, § 4, as appearing in St. 1973, c. 1114, § 289, governs civil actions to correct "proceedings which are not according to the course of the common law," and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, creates a civil action for deprivation of certain rights, privileges, and immunities.
General Laws c. 124, § 1(e), inserted by St. 1972, c. 777, § 5, mandates that the Commissioner of Correction "establish, maintain and administer programs of rehabilitation, including but not limited to education, training and employment, of persons committed to the custody of the department, designed as far as practicable to prepare and assist each such person to assume the responsibilities and exercise the rights of a citizen of the commonwealth." While Fisher has requested a clarification of his rights under this provision and related damages, he has not expanded upon this request and we ascertain no basis for this request in the record.
Discussion. Fisher makes several arguments on appeal. First, he contends that there was no evidence supporting the hearing officer's determination that he violated 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 430.24 (2-7). We disagree. As the Superior Court judge observed, Fisher's admission claiming that he intervened only to assist another inmate supports the hearing officer's determination that Fisher was involved in the fray, placing him within the ambit of the proscribed behavior. See 103 Code Mass. Regs. § 430.16 (1) (2006) (in inmate disciplinary hearing, proponent of disciplinary report must prove case by a preponderance of the evidence); Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 341 Mass. 513, 517 (1960) ("'Substantial evidence' means 'such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' G. L. c. 30A, § 1[6]"). The hearing officer was also justified in deciding not to credit Fisher's explanation of his involvement.
Second, Fisher asserts that the hearing officer improperly excluded certain affidavits from the hearing and denied him certain materials, including video footage and audio recordings. We review these arguments to determine whether the hearing officer abused constitutional principles or the regulatory requirement that Fisher have access to certain evidence, or otherwise exceeded the discretion afforded him. See generally G. L. c. 30A, § 14. As concerns the excluded affidavits, the hearing officer gave thorough and reasoned explanations for excluding the affidavits and did not abuse his "considerable discretion" in so doing. See Hurney v. Carver, 602 F.2d 993, 995 (1st Cir. 1979). Likewise, the hearing officer was well within his discretion in determining that no video footage existed and that the other evidence requested was irrelevant. See ibid.
Third, Fisher argues that the regulation proscribing "fighting with any person" is unconstitutionally vague. He raised this claim in his administrative appeal, but not in his appeal to the Superior Court. Because Fisher did not put this claim before the judge in the Superior Court, we decline to consider it on appeal. See Aronoff v. Board of Registration in Med., 420 Mass. 830, 834 n.5 (1995).
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Trainor, Brown & Vuono, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
Clerk Entered: March 27, 2015.