Opinion
2022-46-Appeal
04-23-2023
Douglas Fisher v. Jamie Lau.
For Plaintiff: Kevin J. Bristow, Esq. For Defendant: Lawrence Almango, Jr., Esq.
Providence County Superior Court, PC 21-593, Associate Justice R. David Cruise
For Plaintiff: Kevin J. Bristow, Esq.
For Defendant: Lawrence Almango, Jr., Esq.
Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
ORDER
The defendant, Jamie Lau (Ms. Lau or defendant), appeals from a Superior Court order granting the motion by the plaintiff, Douglas Fisher (Mr. Fisher or plaintiff), to dismiss her counterclaim and amended counterclaim on statute-of-limitations grounds. For the reasons set forth in this order, we vacate the order of the Superior Court and remand this matter for further proceedings.
On January 22, 2021, Mr. Fisher filed a complaint asserting negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Ms. Lau, his former intimate partner; she subsequently filed a counterclaim and an amended counterclaim for invasion of privacy. Mr. Fisher moved to dismiss the amended counterclaim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that it was time-barred. In opposing the motion to dismiss, Ms. Lau filed a memorandum with attachments: an affidavit by a third party and two exhibits. On January 13, 2022, after hearing oral arguments, the trial justice disposed of Ms. Lau's amended counterclaim with the following brief, equivocal statement: "All right. I've listened to both of you this morning and I've read the filings so far. Based upon what I've seen and what I've heard, I'm going to grant the motion." On January 20, 2022, Ms. Lau filed a premature notice of appeal. The trial justice thereafter entered an order granting the motion to dismiss "as being barred by the Statute of Limitations * * *." The trial justice did not enter judgment on the counterclaim.
"A notice of appeal filed after the judicial officer issues a decision or order but before the entry of the judgment or order shall be deemed to have been filed after such entry and on the day the judgment or order was entered." Article I, Rule 4(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure.
On appeal, Ms. Lau argues that the trial justice erred in dismissing her amended counterclaim. She argues that her counterclaim is timely because it is a compulsory counterclaim; alternatively, she argues that equitable tolling applies.
This Court has said that review of a motion to dismiss, such as the one plaintiff filed, must be "confined to the four corners of that pleading." Audette v. Poulin, 127 A.3d 908, 911 (R.I. 2015) (quoting Ho-Rath v. Rhode Island Hospital, 115 A.3d 938, 942 (R.I. 2015)). However, when a party files exhibits that were not incorporated into the pleading at issue, as defendant did here, and the trial justice "does not 'explicitly exclude them from * * * consideration,' the motion 'automatically' converts to one for summary judgment." Mokwenyei v. Rhode Island Hospital, 198 A.3d 17, 22 (R.I. 2018) (quoting Pontarelli v. Rhode Island Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, 176 A.3d 472, 477 (R.I. 2018)). Although the trial justice provided no insight as to his reasons for dismissing the amended counterclaim, it is clear from his short statement that he did not explicitly exclude the affidavit and exhibits attached to defendant's memorandum. Absent an explicit exclusion, the trial justice should have evaluated the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. See id.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party," and grant the motion only if the court concludes that "there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law * * *." Yanku v. Walgreen Co., 224 A.3d 1130, 1133 (R.I. 2020) (quoting Ballard v. SVF Foundation, 181 A.3d 27, 34 (R.I. 2018)). When the trial justice's decision is brought before this Court on appeal, we "[e]xamin[e] the case from the vantage point of the trial justice * * *." Id. at 1132 (quoting Ballard, 181 A.3d at 34).
The trial justice's decision in this case is devoid of any meaningful analysis, and our examination of the record and decision is hampered by this vacuum. Moreover, it is undisputed that the trial justice did not enter judgment on Ms. Lau's counterclaim. In the absence of a judgment and without clarification by the trial justice of the material and undisputed facts relied upon in reaching a dispositive decision on the issues raised in this case, we conclude that review of his decision is premature.
We therefore vacate the order of the trial justice granting the motion to dismiss the counterclaim and amended counterclaim and remand with instructions to complete a meaningful analysis of the issues raised, consistent with this order.
In light of the intensely personal nature of the allegations by these former intimate partners, the Court hopes that the parties will strive to achieve final resolution of their claims through alternative dispute resolution or settlement.
Entered as an Order.
Justice Lynch Prata did not participate.