Opinion
No. 04-17-00818-CV
01-03-2018
Maggie FISHER-REED, Appellant v. ALTAIR SUBDIVISION PROPERTY OWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 408th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2017-CI-09235
Honorable Stephani A. Walsh, Judge Presiding PER CURIAM Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Karen Angelini, Justice Irene Rios, Justice PERMISSION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL DENIED; REMANDED
Petitioner Maggie Fisher-Reed has filed an unopposed petition for interlocutory appeal, in which she seeks to invoke this court's jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order. Petitioner asserts the trial court's Order on Summary Judgment and the dismissal of her counterclaim involve a controlling question of law of which there is a substantial difference of opinion and the immediate appeal of the orders may materially advance the ultimate termination of the underlying litigation. The trial court signed an Order Authorizing Interlocutory Appeal.
To be entitled to a permissive appeal from an interlocutory order that is not otherwise appealable, the requesting party must establish that the order "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion" and allowing immediate appeal "may advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d) (West Supp. 2017); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3.
The petition in this case does not "contain a table of contents, index of authorities, issues presented, [or] a statement of facts." See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3 (e)(3). Additionally, petitioner did not "attach a copy of the order from which appeal is sought" or "argue clearly and concisely why the order to be appealed involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and how an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance termination of the litigation." Id. 28.3 (e)(2), (4); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d). Having considered the petition, we conclude it fails to meet the requirements for a permissive appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3; Gulf Coast Asphalt Co., L.L.C. v. Lloyd, 457 S.W.3d 539, 545 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
Accordingly, we deny the petition for permissive appeal and remand this cause to the trial court.
PER CURIAM