Opinion
March 31, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Carol Huff, J.).
Preliminarily, we note that there was no appeal from the order of reference in which the IAS Court specifically observed that "[t]here is no allegation that plaintiff's outgoing attorneys were discharged for cause" and in which the court, accordingly, expressly limited the scope of the reference to a determination of the reasonable value of outgoing counsel's services ( see, e.g., Teichner v. W J Holsteins, 64 N.Y.2d 977, 979). The issue, then, as to whether outgoing counsel had been discharged for cause and therefore forfeited compensation is not properly before us and we do not, despite plaintiff's urging, reach it.
Respecting the issues that are properly before us, we agree with the IAS Court that the Special Referee properly took into account the numerous factors pertinent to fixing the fee, on a quantum meruit basis, of outgoing counsel. Although appellant makes extensive factual arguments disputing the findings of the Special Referee, we see no ground to prefer its view of the evidence to that of the Special Referee ( see, Maloku v. Nikkah, 239 A.D.2d 255), who did not award an excessive amount. To the extent, if any, that the Special Referee misapplied CPLR 4519 ( cf., Kiser v. Bailey, 92 Misc.2d 435), the error was harmless, since the record fully supports the fee figure without the disputed testimony ( see, Berger v. Estate of Berger, 203 A.D.2d 502).
Concur — Lerner, P. J., Milonas, Rosenberger, Nardelli and Williams, JJ.