O.C.G.A. § 9-3-23. See Hixon v. Woodall, 246 Ga. 758, 759 ( 272 S.E.2d 727) (1980). 2. Relying on Smith v. Early, Sparagon urges that, unlike with ordinary promissory notes governed by O.C.G.A. § 11-3-118 (b), an actual demand for payment and subsequent refusal to pay is necessary to start the limitation period against the State bond payable "on demand."
The Supreme Court has held that the combination of the words "Witness my hand and seal" in the body of the note and the letters "L. S." following the maker's signature renders the note a sealed instrument. Hixon v. Woodall, 246 Ga. 758 ( 272 S.E.2d 727) (1980). Here, the words "Witness _____ hand and seal" are found in the body of the note, and Cooper's signature is followed by the letters "L. S." Although the word "my" is not written in the blank, the blank was obviously meant to be filled with either the singular "my" or the plural "our," depending on the number of makers.
Murphy, supra at 788. Because the undisputed evidence showed that Hodge did not meet this duty, the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict for Johnson. See Woodall v. Hixon, 154 Ga. App. 844 (2) ( 270 S.E.2d 65) (1980), reversed on other grounds, 246 Ga. 758 ( 272 S.E.2d 727) (1980). 2.
However, if the document at issue is a promissory note or other simple written contract, the plaintiff's cause of action was subject to a 6-year statute of limitation. If this be true, the plaintiff's lawsuit was timely filed. OCGA § 9-3-24; Woodall v. Hixon, 154 Ga. App. 844 ( 270 S.E.2d 65) (1980), reversed on other grounds, 246 Ga. 758 ( 272 S.E.2d 727) (1980). On appeal, the defendant asserts that the document at issue does not constitute the basis for an action seeking a recovery of money from her because it does not contain an unconditional promise to pay.
" "Contrary to the situation in Echols v. Phillips, 112 Ga. 700 ( 37 S.E. 977) (1900), [and in Johnson v. Intl. Agricultural Corp., 41 Ga. App. 740 ( 154 S.E. 465) (1930), where the words, "Signed, sealed and delivered in the presence of," were held to have been intended as the expression of attesting witnesses] it is clear that the maker of the note did intend to use these words as his own." Hixon v. Woodall, 246 Ga. 758, 759 ( 272 S.E.2d 727) (1980). Following appellee's signature on the contract appears the word "(SEAL)."
Thus appellee's counterclaim was not barred by the statute of limitations. Code Ann. § 3-703 (now OCGA § 9-3-23); Hixon v. Woodall, 246 Ga. 758 ( 272 S.E.2d 727) (1980). It was not error for the trial court to deny Merritt's motion to dismiss.