Opinion
8:21-cv-03542-TMC-JDA
03-15-2022
Ricardo Fishburne, Plaintiff, v. S.C. Department of Corrections, A/W Anne Sheppard, Warden Brian Kendell, A/W Clark, Director Brian Stirling, Sergeant Howard, Classification Ravenel, SLED, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's motions for preliminary injunction, to amend/supplement the Complaint, and for summary judgment. [Docs. 34, 35, 54.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in prisoner civil rights cases, such as this one, and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas on August 31, 2021, alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Doc. 1-1 at 10-26.] Defendants removed the action to this Court on October 28, 2021. [Doc. 1.]
On December 29, 2021, the Clerk docketed a filing from Plaintiff as a motion for preliminary injunction and a motion for summary judgment. [Docs. 34; 35.] Defendants filed responses opposing the motions on January 12, 2022. [Docs. 46; 47.] On February 2, 2022, the Clerk docketed Plaintiff's motion to amend/supplement the Complaint. [Doc. 54.] All of these motions are ripe for review.
As the Court has previously noted, it construes the original Complaint filed in the state court [Doc. 1-1 at 13-26] along with Plaintiff's subsequent amendments [Docs. 8; 9] together as the Complaint in this action [see Doc. 21 at 2]. The facts in this background section are from Plaintiff's Complaint.
Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (?SCDC”) and is incarcerated at the Broad River Correctional Institution (?Broad River”). Plaintiff alleges that his custody level designation as of August 12, 2021, was “med-2.” [Doc. 1-1 at 13.] Despite this custody level designation, Defendants housed Plaintiff in a “level 3 prison in a high Alfa gang unit.” [Id.] Plaintiff has filed other lawsuits regarding his custody designation because gang members have stabbed Plaintiff on numerous occasions. [Id.] According to Plaintiff, even though he has “several pending restraining orders in his pending lawsuits,” Defendants continue to house him in “violent gang units.” [Id.] According to Plaintiff, Defendants have failed to protect him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. [ Id. at 13-14.]
Plaintiff alleges that, on one occasion, the mailroom lady lured him out of his cell, claiming to have legal mail for him. [Id. at 14.] After going to the mailroom, Plaintiff walked past a cell and some other inmates asked him to step into that cell because someone needed to speak to him. [Id.] When Plaintiff entered the cell, five gang members surrounded him, “lynched” him, and knocked him unconscious. [Id.] These gang members repeatedly kicked and punched Plaintiff, stabbed him above the eye, urinated on him, and stole his shoes. [Id.] Plaintiff was eventually able to flee and was then taken to medical. [Id. at 15.] Plaintiff alleges that, prior to this incident, he had complained to Defendants that he was in danger; however, Defendants failed to protect him. [Id.]
Plaintiff contends that this incident “stems from SCDC/Government FBI etc. using the Plaintiff as bait to build [an] intelligence/snitch network via cellphones with inmates.” [ Id. at 15-16.] Plaintiff provides numerous allegations concerning his belief that he is being targeted by government agencies, including the FBI, IRS, DEA, SLED, SCDC, and others, in a “campaign of harassment” that has led gang members in prison to “hunt” him down and attack him. [Id. at 17-24.]
For his relief, Plaintiff requests that the Court issue a preliminary injunction ordering his transfer to a mental health hospital and/or to an out-of-state or federal prison and that the Court award him $10 million in damages. [Id. at 24.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. The mandated liberal construction means only that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
This action is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Requirements for a Preliminary Injunction
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very far-reaching power, which is to be applied only in the limited circumstances which clearly demand it.” Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 811 (4th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 524 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because granting a motion for preliminary injunctive relief “requires that a district court, acting on an incomplete record, order a party to act, or refrain from acting, in a certain way[,] [t]he danger of a mistake in this setting is substantial.” Hughes Network Sys., Inc. v. InterDigital Commc'ns Corp., 17 F.3d 691, 693 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods., Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction is committed to the equitable discretion of the district court. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714 (2010); Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 2007).
The current standard for granting preliminary injunctive relief is set forth in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). Under Winter, to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate:
1) he is likely to succeed on the merits,
2) he will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is not granted,
3) the balance of equities favors him, and
4) the injunction is in the public interest.555 U.S. at 20; see also League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 236 (4th Cir. 2014). Moreover, Winter requires that each preliminary injunction factor “be 'satisfied as articulated.'” Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), aff'd, The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)). To succeed, Plaintiff must satisfy all four of these requirements. Pashby, 709 F.3d at 320-21. Therefore, the movant bears a heavy burden in seeking a preliminary injunction. Id. at 321.
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.
DISCUSSION
Motions for Preliminary Injunction and for Summary Judgment
On December 8, 2021, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation recommending denial of Plaintiff's earlier-docketed motion for preliminary injunction on the basis that he had not shown that he was likely to succeed on the merits of his claims. [Doc. 21; see Docs. 7, 20.] This Report and Recommendation remains pending. In the filing that has been docketed as Plaintiff's second motion for preliminary injunction [Doc. 34] and his motion for summary judgment [Doc. 35], the Court sees nothing that would warrant a different result. Thus, for the reasons set out in this Court's earlier-issued Report and Recommendation, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's second motion for preliminary injunction and his motion for summary judgment both be denied. The Court further instructs Plaintiff not to file additional motions requesting the same relief based on the same facts until the district judge has ruled on these motions.
Motion to Amend/Supplement the Complaint
As noted, the Clerk has also docketed a motion from Plaintiff to amend/supplement his Complaint to add new allegations. [Doc. 54.]
A party may amend its pleading once before trial as a matter of course, under certain circumstances, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1), and “[i]n all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). “The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. “A district court may deny a motion to amend when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, the moving party has acted in bad faith, or the amendment would be futile.” Equal Rights Ctr. v. Niles Bolton Assocs., 602 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 2010); see Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (noting that leave to amend may be denied for “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.”).
In this instance, the Court recommends denying Plaintiff's motion because an amendment at this stage in the litigation would unfairly prejudice Defendants, as Defendants have already responded to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and Defendants' dispositive motions are due soon.
Additionally, amendment would be futile insofar as Plaintiff's new allegations are incoherent, fantastical, and nonsensical. [See, e.g., Doc. 54-1 (alleging that Plaintiff's mind and life are used as bases for television shows, movies, books, music, etc., and that Plaintiff has had a 12-pound tumor on his brain since birth).]
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's motions for preliminary injunction [Doc. 35], for summary judgment [Doc. 34], and to amend/supplement the Complaint [Doc. 54] be DENIED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.