Opinion
C/A No. 8:20-cv-01480-TMC-JDA
05-08-2020
Ricardo Fishbourne, a/k/a Ricardo Fishburne, Plaintiff, v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, Internal Revenue Service, South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Ricardo Fishbourne ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his civil rights. Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections and is currently incarcerated at the McCormick Correctional Institution. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Upon review, the undersigned concluded that this case was subject to summary dismissal and entered a Report and Recommendation on April 21, 2020. [Doc. 9.] On May 4, 2020, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. [Doc. 16.] By Order dated May 6, 2020, the Honorable Timothy M. Cain recommitted this case to the undersigned for review of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, finding the Report and Recommendation moot. [Doc. 18.] Having reviewed the Amended Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
As noted, Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint on the standard court form [Doc. 16], and has also filed an attachment entitled "Statement of Claim" in which he makes additional allegations [Doc. 16-1]. The undersigned notes that the Amended Complaint names the same Defendants and contains nearly identical allegations as the original Complaint.
Plaintiff names the following Defendants in this action: the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC"), and the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division ("SLED"). [Doc. 16 at 1-3.] Plaintiff alleges Defendants defamed his character in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by using Plaintiff as bait to lure informants via a cell phone network. [Id. at 4.] Plaintiff alleges that, beginning in the early 2000s and continuing to the present date, Defendants have used individuals to set a trap for Plaintiff to use him as bait. [Id. at 5.] Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the FBI and SLED charged Richard Leon Pinckney with car insurance fraud, and he implicated 50 to 75 other individuals in return for a lesser sentence. [Id.; Doc. 16-1 at 1.] The FBI and SLED then charged those 50 to 75 other individuals, but granted them immunity in return for using Plaintiff as bait to lure in possible informants or inmate workers. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges the FBI and SLED knew or should have known that allowing Plaintiff to be used in a prison environment without his consent was tantamount to placing him in danger and resulted in his character being defamed. [Id.] Defendants compensated the individuals, who appear to be inmates, for their cooperation to participate in the cell phone network. [Id.] As a result, Plaintiff was "lynched," stabbed, and robbed by inmates working in the cell phone network for Defendants. [Id.] Defendants compensated these inmates by providing them with tobacco, marijuana, cell phones, and money for their cooperation. [Id.] Plaintiff became aware that he was being used as bait and stopped using cell phones to call those 50 to 75 individuals who were granted immunity for using Plaintiff as bait. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that, when he stopped using the cell phones, Defendant's contacts in prison began to "lynch" Plaintiff until he submitted and started cooperating by using the phones to call the 50 to 75 individuals. [Id.]
Plaintiff alleges the IRS charged numerous individuals with tax fraud and granted those individuals immunity in return for them using Plaintiff as bait. [Id. at 3.] Plaintiff alleges SCDC has done the same thing and has used Plaintiff's friends to employ him as bait without his consent. [Id. at 3.] Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants are cooperating and are using inmates to compete with one another, causing Plaintiff to be stabbed. [Id.] Defendants are causing division among inmates to force Plaintiff to stand and say that there is one cell phone network where all Defendants are connected. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that the federal government funds SCDC and its operations. [Id.]
Plaintiff alleges he was used by Defendants to build a cell phone spy network with inmates and forced Plaintiff to become a part of that network. [Id.] Plaintiff learned he was being used in this manner in 2013 at the Lee Correctional Institution when Defendants informed inmates about the benefits they could gain for cooperating and allowing Plaintiff to use their cell phones. [Id. at 4.] Plaintiff alleges Defendants' conduct defamed his character. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges every officer, warden, and nurse knew of Plaintiff being used as bait. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges a nurse told him that he was being used as jail bait even though she was cooperating in the network. [Id.] When Plaintiff would try to stop using cell phones, gangs working for Defendants would beat and "lynch" him. [Id.]
Plaintiff alleges "Defendants [d]efamed the Plaintiff[']s character as a sacrifice for them to create the network they [are] controlling now that has the entire prison system cooperating of fighting one another to cooperate or fighting each other over positions in network. [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have directed inmates in the cafeteria to put penis softener in his food. [Id. at 7.] Plaintiff alleges they put drugs in Plaintiff's food that makes him volatile at times. [Id.]
For his injuries, Plaintiff alleges he has been "lynched" at least 9 times by inmates trying to force him to make an announcement to the inmate population concerning the cell phone networks. [Doc. 16 at 6.] For his relief, Plaintiff requests to be transferred to another state prison outside of South Carolina and to be compensated for the defamation to his character. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Amended Complaint if (1) it were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) if it sought monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Amended Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the Amended Complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). "A claim has 'facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). As noted, although the court must liberally construe the pro se complaint, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; see also Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining that, although the court must liberally construe the pro se complaint, a plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements to state a claim); White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723-74 (4th Cir.1989) (dismissing complaint dismissed because it "failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion"). While Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his Amended Complaint, he must allege facts that support a claim for relief. Bass v. DuPont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003).
Here, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, like the original Complaint, is subject to summary dismissal because Defendants are each immune from suit and because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief that is cognizable. The Court will address each issue below.
Defendants are entitled to dismissal
As noted, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the United States Constitution. However, all of the named Defendants are entitled to dismissal from this action because they are immune from suit.
Defendants FBI and IRS
As noted, Plaintiff asserts his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants for the purported violation of his civil rights. While a plaintiff may pursue a claim against a state actor under § 1983, a plaintiff must pursue a claim against a federal defendant under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (a "Bivens claim") rather than § 1983. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006) ("[A] Bivens action is the federal analog to suits brought against state officials under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983."). Liberally construing Plaintiff's pro se Complaint, the undersigned construes Plaintiff's claims against Defendants FBI and IRS as Bivens claims. Nevertheless, Defendants FBI and IRS are subject to dismissal from this action.
A Bivens claim lies only against individual, personally responsible federal officials or employees and not against the United States of America or its agencies. Plaintiff cannot bring a Bivens claim against the FBI and IRS because they are federal agencies and "[a]ny remedy under Bivens is against federal officials individually, not the federal government." Randall v. United States, 95 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 1996)); see also Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 184 (4th Cir. 2002) ("[A] Bivens action does not lie against either agencies or officials in their official capacity.") (citation omitted). "The United States, its departments, and agencies cannot be sued without its express consent, and express consent is a prerequisite to a suit against the United States." Pollack v. FBI, No. 2:02-cv-2195-23, 2002 WL 32710129, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 19, 2002), aff'd, 49 F. App'x 449 (4th Cir. 2002). However, the United States has not consented to suit under Bivens, and an extension of Bivens to agencies of the federal government is not supported by the logic of Bivens itself. See Sifford v. United States, No. 8:11-cv-3019-MBS-JDA, 2011 WL 6112830, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 15, 2011), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 6101932 (D.S.C. Dec. 6, 2011). Thus, no Bivens claim may be prosecuted against the United States of America or its agencies such as the FBI or IRS. See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994). Accordingly, Defendants FBI and IRS are immune from suit under Bivens and should be dismissed from this action.
Defendants SCDC and SLED
Likewise, Defendants SCDC and SLED are agencies of the State of South Carolina that have Eleventh Amendment immunity from a suit for damages brought in this Court. See Belcher v. South Carolina Bd. of Corr., 460 F. Supp. 805, 808-09 (D.S.C. 1978). The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution divests this Court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages brought against the State of South Carolina or its integral parts. U.S. Const. amend. XI; see also Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1996); Bellamy v. Borders, 727 F. Supp. 247, 248-50 (D.S.C. 1989). SCDC and SLED, as South Carolina state agencies, are both an integral part of the State and, thus, entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). Such immunity extends to arms of the state and also bars this court from granting injunctive relief against the State or its agencies. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978). SCDC and SLED, as state agencies, have immunity from suit under § 1983. See S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-10 (establishing SLED as an agency of the State of South Carolina); Abebe v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 0:09-cv-3111-MBS-PJ, 2010 WL 2991595, at *2 (D.S.C. July 2, 2010) ("As a state agency, SCDC is an arm of the State of South Carolina."), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 3258595 (D.S.C. Aug. 16, 2010). Under Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984), a state must expressly consent to suit in a federal district court. However, the State of South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal court. See S.C. Code § 15-78-20(e) (1976) (South Carolina statute expressly provides that the State of South Carolina does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suit only in a court of the State of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court or in a court of another State). Because the Eleventh Amendment bars the relief that Plaintiff requests against SCDC and SLED, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against these Defendants and, as a result, they should be dismissed from this action.
Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal
Further, the Amended Complaint as a whole should be dismissed because Plaintiff's allegations are frivolous and fail to state a claim for relief. As noted, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 ("§ 1915") permits an indigent litigant to proceed in forma pauperis, allowing the litigant to commence a federal court action without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. See Staley v. Witherspoon, No. 9:07-cv-195-PMD-GCK, 2007 WL 1988272, at *1 (D.S.C. July 3, 2007). However, the statute provides limitations to such actions by permitting the Court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted" or is "frivolous or malicious." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). A complaint is deemed frivolous when it is "clearly baseless" and includes allegations that are "fanciful," "fantastic," or "delusional." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327-28 (1989)).
Here, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint contains assertions that are manifestly delusional. Presuming that Plaintiff has set forth these statements sincerely, as assertions of fact, they cannot be given credibility. A district court's review of a case for factual frivolousness under § 1915 is guided by the Supreme Court's decision in Denton. See Thomas v. Barri, No. 8:10-cv-0431-MBS-BHH, 2010 WL 1993881, at *2-3 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 1993860 (D.S.C. May 18, 2010). When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, § 1915 "gives courts the authority to 'pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations[,]' mean[ing] that a court is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the plaintiff's allegations." Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. The "initial assessment of the in forma pauperis plaintiff's factual allegations must be weighted in favor of the plaintiff," id., and "[a]n in forma pauperis complaint may not be dismissed . . . simply because the court finds the plaintiff's allegations unlikely." Id. at 33. However, the district court is entrusted with the discretion to dismiss the case for factual frivolousness "when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible." Id. "[A] court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only if the facts alleged are 'clearly baseless', a category encompassing allegations that are 'fanciful,' 'fantastic,' and 'delusional.'" Id. at 32-33 (citations omitted) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 328). In reviewing for frivolousness or malice, the Court looks to see whether the complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. Harley v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 2d 980, 981 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. 319). It is well-settled that the Court has the authority to dismiss claims that are obviously "fantastic" or "delusional." Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994); Raiford v. FBI, No. 1:10-cv-2751-MBS-JRM, 2010 WL 6737887, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 17, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 2020729 (D.S.C. May 23, 2011) (explaining a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when "the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible").
The present action is comprised of factual allegations that are "wholly incredible," and which fail to state a claim for relief. As noted, the Amended Complaint asserts that "Defendants [d]efamed the Plaintiff[']s character as a sacrifice for them to create" a cell phone network to control the prisons and that Defendants are implementing this cell phone network in society outside of prison [Doc. 16-1 at 6]; that Defendants placed "Plaintiff on the front line of a war" [id.]; that Defendants know that inmates in the cafeteria to put penis softener in Plaintiff's food and drugs that make him volatile [id. at 7]; and that Defendants directed inmates to harass Plaintiff [id.]. The Court finds that these bare allegations clearly fall within the statute's definition of frivolity. McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are "so nutty," "delusional," or "wholly fanciful" as to be simply "unbelievable." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Simmons v. Clinton Police Dep't, No. 7:14-cv-248-BO, 2014 WL 7151242, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 12, 2014). Plaintiff's conclusory assertions fail to show any arguable basis in fact or law. See, e.g., Brock v. Angelone, 105 F.3d 952, 953-54 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding a prisoner's claim, that he was being poisoned or experimented upon via an ingredient in pancake syrup served at his prison, was fanciful or delusional, and dismissing the appeal as frivolous with sanctions); Neal v. Duke Energy, No. 6:11-cv-1420-HFF-KFM, 2011 WL 5083181, at *4 (D.S.C. June 30, 2011), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 5082193 (D.S.C. Oct. 26, 2011) (dismissing action upon finding plaintiff's factual allegations were frivolous, fanciful, and delusional where plaintiff claimed defendants clandestinely placed a GPS device in her car while it was in the shop for repairs and that she was being stalked by the defendants, noting the allegations were "made without any viable factual supporting allegations and appears to be the product of paranoid fantasy").
Further, Plaintiff's defamation claim fails because an alleged act of defamation of character or injury to reputation is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697-710 & nn.3-4 (1976) (finding that "any harm or injury to [Plaintiff's interest in his reputation], even where as here inflicted by an officer of the State, does not result in a deprivation of any 'liberty' or 'property' recognized by state or federal law"). Civil rights statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, do not impose liability for violations of duties of care arising under a state's tort law. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200-03 (1989); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991) ("Defamation, by itself, is a tort actionable under the laws of most states, but not a constitutional deprivation."). Thus, although state law provides for a right of action for slander or defamation, an alleged act of defamation of character or injury to reputation is not actionable under § 1983. See Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084106, at *3 (D.S.C. May 7, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 2084383 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). Accordingly, Plaintiff's allegations concerning the purely state law claim of defamation fail to establish a claim for a violation of a federal right as required under § 1983, and his claim is subject to dismissal. Wilson v. Ozmint, No. 3:10-cv-2887-RMG, 2011 WL 1336391, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 2011).
CONCLUSION
Consequently, for the reasons stated above, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).
Plaintiff has attempted to cure the deficiencies of his original Complaint by filing an Amended Complaint. The undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his Amended Complaint by mere amendment and therefore recommends that the instant action be dismissed without affording Plaintiff another opportunity to amend because further amendment would be futile. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 2015); Thomas v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-169-AMQ, 2018 WL 5258811, at *2 (D.S.C. July 25, 2018) (declining to automatically give plaintiff leave to amend pursuant to Goode because plaintiff could not cure the defects in his claims against defendant by mere amendment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 5255183 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2018); Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018) (declining to give plaintiff leave to amend because it would be futile for plaintiff to amend his complaint against the defendants being dismissed), aff'd, 766 F. App'x 1 (4th Cir. 2019).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge May 8, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).