Opinion
24-cv-02353-MSN-tmp
12-27-2024
JONTAE ARON AUSTIN FISCHIETTIE, Plaintiff, v. SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TU M. PHAM CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Shelby County, Tennessee (“the County”) on June 13, 2024.(ECF No. 15.) Pro se plaintiff Jontae Aron Austin Fischiettie filed an Opposition to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on June 17, 2024. (ECF No. 17) For the reasons below, it is recommended that the County's Motion to Dismiss be granted.
Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case has been referred to the United States magistrate judge for management and for all pretrial matters for determination or report and recommendation, as appropriate.
I. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
Fischiettie filed his complaint in this case on May 24, 2024, and then amended his complaint on May 31, 2024. (ECF Nos. 1 & 10.) In his amended complaint, Fischiettie alleges that he was a defendant in a state court civil case regarding a dispute over payment for roofing work done to his house and subsequent comments he and his mother posted online. (ECF No. 10 at PageID 157.) The plaintiff in that case obtained a default judgment in Shelby County General Sessions Court. (Id.) Fischiettie appealed to the Shelby County Circuit Court and his case was tried in a bench trial before Judge Rhynette Hurd on May 15, 2024. (Id. at PageID 142.) Judgment had not been rendered on Fischiettie's appeal at the time he filed his complaint in the instant case, but, according to the County, was later entered on June 4, 2024. (ECF No. 15-1 at PageID 198.) According to Fischiettie, he demanded a jury trial “over 61 times” but was forced to have his case heard in a bench trial, and no court reporter was present. (ECF No. 10 at PageID 140.) Fischiettie alleges that Judge Hurd violated his “State of Tennessee Constitutional and Federal Constitutional secured 5th, 7th, and 14th amendment rights[,]” as well as 28 U.S.C. § 753, which outlines rules for use of court reporters . (Id. at PageID 130, 138.) He also makes extraneous statements like “[i]t is against the law to use white out on a legal document.” (Id. at PageID 137.) He raises his constitutional and statutory claims against the County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at PagelD 131.) Fischiettie raises a separate claim against the County under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, arguing that “had I been Caucasian, my rights would not have been violated” and,
The undersigned notes that, in his response to the County's Motion to Dismiss, Fischiettie appears to assert an Eighth Amendment claim. (See ECF No. 17 at PageID 219-24.) Given that it was not alleged in his complaint and, in any event, Fischiettie makes no attempt to allege any facts that remotely support an Eighth Amendment claim, the undersigned recommends that any claims purportedly based on violations of the Eighth Amendment be dismissed.
Judge Hurd took an oath, (contractual obligation) to uphold the laws of the United States as a licensed lawyer and as an elected official to office, its this very oath (contractual obligation) she has violated, as plead and stated in the amended action, under color of state law, under color of office.(ECF No. 10 at PageID 131; ECF No. 17 at PageID No. 224) (emphasis in original). Fischiettie raises an additional claim against the County under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, alleging that Judge Hurd and Malcolm B. Futhey, III, the attorney for the plaintiff in Fischiettie's state court case, conspired to deprive him of his civil rights. (ECF No. 10 at PageID 131.) Finally, Fischiettie argues that Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 38.03 is unconstitutional. (Id. at PageID 139.)Fischiettie seeks significant relief, including suspension of Judge Hurd, $2,250,000.00 in compensatory damages, and an order vacating all orders against him, among other forms of relief. (Id. at PageID 146-49.)
The undersigned notes that Fischiettie's brief references “Rule 38.3”; however, Rule 38.3 does not exist. It appears he is referring to Rule 38.03.
II. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Standard of Review
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court views the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). However, “[t]he factual allegations in the complaint need to be sufficient to give notice to the defendant as to what claims are alleged, and the plaintiff must plead ‘sufficient factual matter' to render the legal claim plausible, i.e., more than merely possible.” Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). To satisfy this requirement, plaintiffs must plead more than “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” or “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557) . “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and are thus liberally construed. Williams v. Thomas, No. 16-1330, 2019 WL 1905166, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 29, 2019); Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011). Even so, pro so litigants must adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989), and the court cannot create a claim that has not been spelled out in a pleading, see Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011); Payne v. Sec'y of Treas., 73 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003).
B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
In its brief, the County argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Fischiettie's complaint. Under Rooker-Feldman, “lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review a case litigated and decided in state court; only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to correct state court judgments.” Gottfried v. Med. Planning Servs., Inc., 142 F.3d 326, 330 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983)). The operative question “is whether the ‘source of the injury' upon which plaintiff bases his federal claim is the state court judgment.” Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 2008). “If the source of the injury is the state court decision, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would prevent the district court from asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 394-95 (6th Cir. 2006)).
The Sixth Circuit has interpreted Rooker-Feldman as barring federal courts from reviewing state court orders, Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2003), including where plaintiffs are challenging procedural errors, Hall v. Callahan, 727 F.3d 450, 453-54 (6th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against various state court judges for alleged procedural errors on Rooker-Feldman grounds); see also Lloyd v. Pokorny, No. 22-3321, 2023 WL 3294531, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 2023) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's § 1983 and § 1985 claims against state court judges for alleged procedural errors on Rooker-Feldman grounds). At its core, Fischiettie's complaint amounts to a procedural challenge: he asserts that Judge Hurd improperly ignored his request for a jury trial and violated his constitutional rights by holding a bench trial. This is the very sort of challenge that Fischiettie “could have directly appealed to the state appellate court,” and thus this court lacks jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman. Hall, 727 F.3d at 454.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Motion to Dismiss be granted and Fischiettie's complaint be dismissed with prejudice. However, independent of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the undersigned finds that Fischiettie claims also fail for the reasons discussed below.
C. § 1983 Claims
Fischiettie's allegations center around purported violations of his Fifth, Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. “[Section] 1983 serves as a vehicle to obtain damages for violations of both the Constitution and of federal statutes.” Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 459 F.3d 676, 681 (6th Cir. 2006). “To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must first identify a constitutional right, then show that a person acting under the color of state law deprived him of that right.” Susselman v. Washtenaw Cty. Sheriff's Office, 109 F.4th 864, 870 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep't of Corr., 979 F.3d 472, 482 (6th Cir. 2020)).
“Neither the state, nor a governmental entity that is an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, nor a state official who acts in his or her official capacity, is a ‘person' within the meaning of § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). Because Shelby County Circuit Court is a state court that is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983, those claims must be dismissed. Dillard v. Wayne Cnty. Dist. & Cir. Ct., No. 2:14-CV-10198, 2014 WL 358556, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 31, 2014).
Fischiettie argues that Judge Hurd “is a county employe [sic], and not paid by the State of Tennessee and answers to the County of Shelby, not the State of Tennessee.” (ECF No. 17 at PageID 220.) However, it is well-settled that Shelby County Circuit Court judges are state employees, not employees of the county in which the court is located. See Clark v. Skahan, No. 07-2294-B/V, 2007 WL 2688553, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 11, 2007) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 823-103, 8-26-101(a), 16-1-101, 16-2-506(30)(A), 16-10-101).
Fischiettie is therefore barred from using § 1983 to sue the County in opposition to the actions taken during a state court proceeding. Regardless of whether Fischiettie has successfully pleaded a constitutional violation, his grievances do not flow from the actions of the County or a County employee acting under color of state law; as such he has not plausibly alleged a § 1983 claim against the County. Susselman, 109 F.4th at 870. Thus, the undersigned recommends that the Motion to Dismiss be granted as to Fischiettie's § 1983 claims and those claims be dismissed with prejudice. D. § 1981 Claim
The undersigned notes that the County does not seek dismissal on judicial immunity grounds.
Fischiettie next argues that he is entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1981 states, in its entirety:
(a)Statement of equal rights
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
(b)“Make and enforce contracts” defined
For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce contracts” includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.
(c)Protection against impairment
The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.42 U.S.C. § 1981.
The entirety of Fischiettie's § 1981 claim in his complaint is as follows: “had I been Caucasian, my rights would not have been violated.” (ECF No. 10 at PageID 131.) Not until his response to the County's Motion to Dismiss does Fischiettie explain his reasoning further:
Judge Hurd took an oath, (contractual obligation) to uphold the laws of the United States as a licensed lawyer and as an elected official to office, its this very oath (contractual obligation) she has violated, as plead and stated in the amended action, under color of state law, under color of office.(ECF No. 17 at PageID No. 224 (emphasis in original).) There is no legal support for Fischiettie's argument for liability under § 1981. A plaintiff is obligated to “plead ‘sufficient factual matter' to render the legal claim plausible,” which he has not done. Fritz, 592 F.3d at 722 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677) . Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the Motion to Dismiss be granted as to Fischiettie's § 1981 claim and this claim be dismissed with prejudice.
E. § 1985 Claim
Fischiettie next argues that he is entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). In order to state a claim for conspiracy under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must plead:
(1) a conspiracy involving two or more persons, (2) for the purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly, a person or class of persons the equal protection of the laws[,] and (3) an act in furtherance of that conspiracy (4) that causes injury to person or property, or a deprivation of a right or privilege of a United States citizen.Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 233 (6th Cir. 1996) . “The plaintiff must also show the conspiracy was motivated by racial, or other class based animus.” Id. Moreover, “conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of specificity.” Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987).
Here, Fischiettie makes only vague allegations that Judge Hurd and Futhey, neither of whom are employees of the defendant, conspired to deprive him of his civil rights. After a district court dismissed a claim with similar vague allegations, the Sixth Circuit, affirming dismissal, explained: “Aside from [the plaintiff's] single vague and conclusory allegation of a conspiracy, she alleged no facts that would lead to an inference that any of the defendants were involved in a conspiracy to deprive her of equal protection of the laws.” Lloyd v. City of Streetsboro, No. 18-3485, 2018 WL 11298664, at *7 (6th Cir. Dec. 20, 2018). Fischiettie's claim provides none of the necessary specificity to overcome the additional requirement for conspiracy claims, nor has he pleaded any facts to suggest § 1985 liability against the County. The undersigned recommends that the Motion to Dismiss be granted as to Fischiettie's § 1985 claim and this claim be dismissed with prejudice.
F. Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 38.03
As Fischiettie correctly points out in his response to the County's motion, the County does not explicitly address Fischiettie's claim that Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 38.03 is unconstitutional. Nonetheless, this does not save Fischiettie's complaint.
Fischiettie's complaint broadly contends that Rule 38.03 is unconstitutional on its face, but it appears the core of his challenge arises as part of his § 1983 claim. Indeed, in the section of his complaint discussing Rule 38.03, Fischiettie asserts “[i]ts this very existence of Judge Hurds [sic] custom of tolerance to violate the very federal civil rights that gives support to my title 42 U.S.C § 1983 claims.” (ECF No. 10 at PageID 140.) Thus, to the extent Fischiettie is challenging Rule 38.03 under § 1983, that claim fails for the same reasons discussed above.
Moreover, Fischiettie's argument that Rule 38.03 is unconstitutional is completely devoid of merit. Rule 38.03 cannot violate the Seventh Amendment's right to a civil jury trial because the Seventh Amendment does not apply to state proceedings, Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916), nor is there any basis to find a violation of the Fifth Amendment. Therefore, to the extent Fischiettie has asserted a separate claim as to the constitutionality of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 38.03, the undersigned recommends that the Motion to Dismiss be granted and that the claim be dismissed with prejudice.
III. RECOMMENDATION
For the above reasons, the undersigned recommends that the County's Motion to Dismiss be granted and that Fischiettie's complaint be dismissed with prejudice on all claims.
NOTICE
WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A COPY OF THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION, ANY PARTY MAY SERVE AND FILE SPECIFIC WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. ANY PARTY MAY RESPOND TO ANOTHER PARTY'S OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A COPY. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2); L.R. 72.1(g)(2). FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS MAY CONSTITUTE A WAIVER/FORFEITURE OF OBJECTIONS, EXCEPTIONS, AND FURTHER APPEAL.