Opinion
EDCV 02-691-OMP (SGLx).
May 28, 2003.
OPINION
Pro se plaintiff Janet I. Fischer brings this civil rights and racketeering action against almost 100 defendants, including state and federal judges, prosecutors, court administrative personnel, and private attorneys in California, Texas, Oklahoma, and Florida. In a 91-page first amended complaint, with 55 pages of attachments, plaintiff alleges that defendants conspired to prevent persons who had been prosecuted for animal welfare violations from proceeding with subsequent civil lawsuits.
Defendants move to dismiss. I grant the motions and dismiss this action in part for lack of personal and subject-matter jurisdiction and with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that from 1968 to 1992, she was "engaged in product development," breeding exotic animals. See First Am. Compl. at 34; Exh. A, at 6. Plaintiff alleges that in the early 1990s, raids "by local government and private vigilantes resulted in theft of pedigreed exotic fowl valued at over $100,000.00." Exh. A, at 6. Plaintiff brought an action in state court against state officials and others she blamed for the raids, but that action was apparently dismissed at least six years ago. Id. at 7.
Plaintiff alleges defendants initiated "[b]aseless complaints and false charges" against "older American citizens who owned property." First Am. Compl. at 29. "The perpetrators committed criminal trespass and theft to extort fees and fines from their 'targets/victims' on the pretext that the victim violated some city or county codes, while factually there was no jurisdiction, no crime, no indictment, and no verified complaint." Id. Defendants used the courts to impose "phony" fines, costs, and sanctions. When defendants' victims responded by bringing legal actions against defendants, even the lawyers representing the victims joined defendants' conspiracy, "suckering" the victims "into more fees and costs with honeyed words about how 'you have a good case for an appeal. . . .'" Id. at 30. Meanwhile, court clerks collected filing fees from defendants' victims although they knew that other defendants "had the courts rigged and would dismiss the case with prejudice, not for publication, no hearings, no trial by jury so as not to have any of these fraud and swindle schemes exposed to the public." Id. at 30-31.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as civil penalties, compensatory damages, and attorney's fees. She also seeks "[a] damn good explanation for all this from each defendant." First Am. Compl. at 91 (original emphasis).
DISCUSSION
The court should construe the pleadings of a pro se litigant more leniently than those drafted by a lawyer. See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987). Pro se litigants are not, however, entitled to the benefit of every conceivable doubt. The court is obligated to draw only reasonable factual inferences in the plaintiff's favor. McKinney v. De Bord, 507 F.2d 501, 504 (9th Cir. 1974). The court is not required to toss out common sense when it interprets a pro se litigant's pleadings. Id.
In the following discussion, I address different grounds for dismissal. Many defendants are entitled to dismissal on several grounds, such as out-of-state judges who are entitled to dismissal for failure to establish personal jurisdiction and absolute immunity.
I. Standing
Plaintiff's complaint appears to assert claims based on alleged acts directed at other persons who have no apparent connection to plaintiff other than being alleged victims of defendants. To establish that she has standing to maintain a civil action under RICO, plaintiff must show that she was injured in her business or property because of a violation of the statute's substantive provisions. Oregon Laborers-Employers Health Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 185 F.3d 957, 963 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). "[T]he alleged violation of the law [must] be a 'proximate cause' of the injury suffered." Id. (citingHolmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)). "A direct relationship between the injury and the alleged wrongdoing, although not the 'sole requirement' of RICO . . . proximate causation, 'has been one of its central elements.'" Id. (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269). "Civil rights violations and injury to reputation do not fall within the statutory definition of 'racketeering activity.'"Bowen v. Oistead, 125 F.3d 800, 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
Here, plaintiff's complaint alleges that persons in other states, with no alleged business relationship or any other connection to plaintiff, were the victims of defendants' alleged RICO enterprise. A plaintiff who complains "of harm flowing merely from the misfortunes visited upon a third person by the defendant's acts" generally is too far removed to recover damages. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268-69.
Because plaintiff is not a lawyer, she cannot represent anyone other than herself. See C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697-98 (9th Cir. 1987). I conclude that plaintiff lacks standing to bring RICO claims as to alleged misconduct concerning third parties to this action.
Similarly, plaintiff lacks standing to bring civil rights claims on behalf of third parties. Plaintiffs generally cannot base a claim on the legal rights or interests of third parties. Voigt v. Savell, 70 F.3d 1552, 1564 (9th Cir. 1995). There is an exception if the plaintiff can show that (1) the plaintiff has a concrete interest in the outcome of the dispute; (2) the plaintiff has a close relationship with the third party; and (3) there is a hindrance to third party's ability to protect her interests. Wedges/Ledges of Cal., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, Ariz., 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has not shown that she falls within this exception. She has no standing to bring civil rights claims based on third-party victims of defendants' alleged conspiracy.
Plaintiff also has failed to establish taxpayer standing. "Taxpayer status alone ordinarily does not confer Article III standing to challenge general exercises of governmental power." Gutierrez v. Pangelinan, 276 F.3d 539, 544 (9th Cir.) (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 479 (1982)), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 113 (2002).
Because plaintiff lacks standing as to her claims regarding defendants' alleged third-party victims, all of those claims must be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
II. No Personal Jurisdiction over Out-of-State Defendants
Plaintiff names as defendants judges, court officials, prosecutors, and private attorneys in Texas, Florida, and Oklahoma. Most of the out-of-state defendants have moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction because they have no contacts with California. Plaintiff has not alleged that the out-of-state defendants have ties to California other than conclusory statements that these defendants conspired with the California defendants.
"California's long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to the limits imposed by the Due Process Clause." Gordy v. Daily News, L.P., 95 F.3d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10). To determine whether personal jurisdiction is roper for a non-resident defendant based on the "minimum contacts" necessary to satisfy due process, the court should consider three requirements: (1) the non-resident defendant must act to purposefully avail himself of the privilege of doing business in the forum state, invoking the protections of the forum state's laws; (2) the claim must arise or result from the forum-related conduct; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. Id. at 831-32.
Here, plaintiff's conclusory and unfounded allegations of a conspiracy between defendants in California and out-of-state defendants cannot establish the minimum contacts necessary to assert personal jurisdiction over these out-of-state defendants based solely on plaintiff's bare allegations of a nation-wide conspiracy. I dismiss the non-California defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction.
II. Absolute Judicial and Prosecutorial Immunity
Many of the named defendants are judges, court personnel, and prosecutors, both state and federal. Plaintiff alleges that prosecutors brought baseless criminal actions for violations of animal welfare laws and failed to prosecute officials for civil rights violations, while judges and court employees improperly dismissed legal actions brought by alleged victims of defendants' conspiracy.
Although this court lacks personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state defendants, the court retains authority to dismiss plaintiffs claims against those defendants on other grounds. Wages v. IRS, 915 F.2d 1230, 1234-35 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1990).
A. Judicial Defendants
Judges are absolutely immune from actions for damages based on judicial acts taken within the jurisdiction of their courts, and lose their immunity only when they act "in the clear absence of all jurisdiction or perform an act outside [their] 'judicial' capacity." Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
"[T]he factors determining whether an act by a judge is a 'judicial' one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to he expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). "[A]bsolute immunity insulates judges from charges of erroneous acts or irregular actions, even when it is alleged that such action was driven by malicious or corrupt motives, or when the exercise of judicial authority is 'flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.'" In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted)).
Allowing this action to proceed against the defendant judges would defeat the purpose of absolute immunity, which "is to 'free the judicial process from the harassment and intimidation associated with litigation.'"Fry v. Melaragno, 939 F.2d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation and emphasis omitted). All the alleged misconduct concerns judicial acts, such as dismissing cases before trial. I dismiss plaintiff's claims against the defendant judges with prejudice.
B. Defendant Prosecutors
Prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit when "performing functions that require the exercise of prosecutorial discretion." Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 125 (1997). Discretionary functions include the prosecutor's "determination that the evidence was sufficiently strong to justify a probable-cause finding, her decision to file charges, and her presentation of the information and the motion to the court." Id. at 130. Prosecutorial immunity applies "even if it leaves 'the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty.'" Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1075 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976)).
Here, the misconduct alleged by plaintiff concerns inherently prosecutorial decisions, such as whether to file criminal charges. The defendant prosecutors' actions are protected by absolute immunity. Otherwise, it would be a declaration of open season on prosecutors whenever a person disagrees with a prosecutor's decision to file, or not to file, charges. Plaintiff cannot plead facts that could possibly support her claims against the defendant prosecutors, so those claims must be dismissed with prejudice.
C. Clerical and Administrative Defendants
Plaintiff names court clerks and staff in state and federal courts as defendants. For example, she alleges that "clerks" obstructed justice and encouraged organized crime and corruption "by not entering defaults, by entering motions to dismiss as 'answers,' by entering prohibited pre-trial motions, or by altering the sequence of events (numbers and entry dates) while supposedly 'correctly docketing a case.'" First Am. Compl. at 46. Plaintiff also asserts claims for alleged violations of the federal Clerk's Manual Code of Conduct and Attorney Admissions Procedures.
Court clerks and administrators are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for damages "when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process." Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity regarding filing a decision). See also Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1996); Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th cir. 1979) (court clerk's "failure . . . to perform a ministerial duty [giving notice of order] which was a part of judicial Process is also clothed with quasi-judicial immunity").
Here, the alleged misconduct by the defendant clerks and other court employees concern tasks that are "an integral part of the judicial process." All the named court clerks and other judicial employees are entitled to absolute immunity.
I note that in plaintiff's complaint and briefs, she appears to assert a constitutional right to have her claims tried to a jury. There is no such unqualified right. Granting a properly supported motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment does not violate a litigant's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. See Christensen v. Ward, 916 F.2d 1462, 1466 (10th Cir. 1990) (dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) does not violate right to jury trial); Etalook v. Exxon Pipeline Co., 831 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The very existence of a summary judgment provision demonstrates that no right to a jury trial exists unless there is a genuine issue of material fact suitable for a jury to resolve.").
III. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Plaintiffs asserts claims against several state entities, such as the offices of the attorney general for Texas and Florida. These claims are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity and must be dismissed. See Forster v. County of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) ("'arms of the State' for Eleventh Amendment purposes" are not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987).
IV. Failure to State a Claim
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Conclusory allegations, unsupported by facts, cannot support a claim.See Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1977)). A plaintiff must specifically allege the conduct of the defendants giving rise to the claim. Id.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court takes allegations of material fact as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Mishler v. Clift, 191 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 1999). The court should not dismiss the complaint "unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Id.
"To state a claim for a conspiracy to violate one's constitutional rights . . ., the plaintiff must state specific Facts to support the existence of the claimed conspiracy." Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). Claims based on vague and conclusory conspiracy allegations, which fail to specify each defendant's role in the alleged conspiracy, are subject to dismissal. Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992); Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991).
Here, plaintiff has attempted to support her racketeering and civil rights claims with conclusory allegations. She has not alleged facts concerning the role of each defendant in the alleged racketeering enterprise or the alleged conspiracy to violate civil rights. She has not shown any connection between the various defendants, other than the basic fact that they are all associated with the legal process in one role or another. Plaintiff's allegations that property owners in different states were prosecuted for trumped-up violations of animal welfare regulations does not show, without more, that prosecutors in different states were part of a vast conspiracy. Similarly, plaintiff's allegations that courts dismissed legal challenges to the alleged baseless prosecutions does not show that courts were also part of the conspiracy. There is a simpler explanation: the courts concluded independently that the lawsuits were not legally sufficient.
All of plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Given the nature of plaintiff's complaint, I conclude that she could not possibly plead a viable claim. Dismissal for failure to state a claim is therefore with prejudice. See Gabrielson v. Montgomery Ward Co., 785 F.2d 762, 766-67 (9th Cir. 1986).
V. Statute of Limitations
The only alleged injuries that were suffered by plaintiff herself occurred when state or local authorities allegedly seized her property and dismissed her subsequent legal action before trial. The federal civil rights statute at issue here, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, does not contain statute of limitations, so federal courts borrow the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). In California, a one-year statute of limitations applies. Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff's claims against federal defendants are subject to the same one-year statute of limitations as her claims against state defendants.See Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1991).
"Under federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action."TwoRivers, 174 F.3d at 991. The district court may dismiss for failure to state a claim on statute of limitations rounds "'only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.'" Id. (quoting Vaughan v. Grijalva, 927 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir. 1991)).
Plaintiff alleges that her property was illegally seized and that her legal action was improperly dismissed more than six years before this complaint was filed. First Am. Compl., Exh. A, at 7. Any claim based on plaintiff's prior dispute with state and local authorities is barred by California's one-year statute of limitations.
VI. Sanctions Against Plaintiff
Several defendants seek sanctions against plaintiff. I will issue a separate show cause order on this issue.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' motions to dismiss (see attachments la-4a) are ranted. Plaintiff's claims as to alleged third-party victims re dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; plaintiff's claims against defendants domiciled outside of California are dismissed without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction; and the entire complaint is dismissed with rejudice for failure to state a claim. All other pending motions are denied as moot.