While the court need not set forth evidentiary facts, it must state ultimate facts: that is, those facts upon which the rights and liabilities of the parties depend. (See Rosen Trust v Rosen, 53 A.D.2d 342, 361, affd 43 N.Y.2d 693; Fischer v Fischer, 45 A.D.2d 917.) In the present case, the Family Court made no findings of fact, concluding only that it was not persuaded that appellant had proved its case.

In any event, this omission, as well as the Family Court's failure to make a "further finding of the specific sex offense as defined in article one hundred thirty of the penal law" (Family Ct Act § 1051 [e]), is of no serious moment. On the instant record, this court can, in order to save judicial time and avoid multiplicity of litigation, make the finding that the Family Court should have made (see, Fischer v Fischer, 45 A.D.2d 917). Accordingly, we find, based on the aforenoted testimony of Ms. Layish and Dr. Bogard, that the petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the father inserted his fingers in Meredith's vagina and touched Erika's vagina, as alleged in the petitions, in violation of Penal Law § 130.65. However, we find that the allegation of the father's penile intercourse with Meredith, even though corroborated by Ms. Layish, was not proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

This statutory requirement mandates that the court set forth those ultimate or essential facts on which it relies to reach its decision. ( General Instrument Corp. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 99 A.D.2d 460, 461; Fischer v. Fischer, 45 A.D.2d 917.) This requirement recognizes that intelligent appellate review is impossible if the appellate court cannot ascertain on what facts and conclusions of law the lower court rested its decision.

We find that Trial Term's decision "does not comply with the requirements of CPLR 4213 (subd [b]) which provides that a court's decision * * * 'shall state the facts it deems essential'. While the statutory requirement does not mean that the court need set forth the evidentiary facts contained in the record, it should set forth those ultimate or essential facts relied upon in reaching its decision" ( Fischer v Fischer, 45 A.D.2d 917). "There is no way of knowing [from reading Trial Term's decision] what ultimate facts the court found to support the conclusion" that plaintiff was entitled to the amount of the judgment it was awarded by Trial Term ( Power v Falk, 15 A.D.2d 216, 218 [material in brackets added]).

Finally, we note that the essential facts to support the trial court's decision should have been set forth by that court (see CPLR 4213, subd [b]). In the interest of judicial economy, we have made the necessary findings as supported by the record (see Fischer v. Fischer, 45 A.D.2d 917). Hopkins, J.P., Damiani, Lazer and Cohalan, JJ., concur.

Memorandum: The conclusion reached by the trial court that respondent is the father of the child born out of wedlock to petitioner on January 26, 1978 finds ample support in the record. While the trial court does not sufficiently state the ultimate facts in support of its conclusion (CPLR 4213, subd [b]), the record reveals the existence of such facts and we make the following findings which the Trial Judge (now deceased) should have made (Fischer v Fischer, 45 A.D.2d 917). The parties engaged in sexual intercourse over a period of time which included April, 1977.

Thus, the trial court did not fulfill the requirements of CPLR 4213 (subd [b]). The state of the record, in particular the absence of evidence as to how defendant's take home pay is calculated, does not permit this court, on appeal, to make proper findings of fact and thus avoid a remand to the trial court (see Fischer v Fischer, 45 A.D.2d 917). Upon conclusion of the new hearing, the trial court should set forth appropriate findings of fact, in particular, concerning defendant's spendable income and the needs of the parties.

Instances abound where appellate courts have remitted causes for findings of "essential" facts relied on by original court (Nutone, Inc. v Bouley Co., 38 A.D.2d 670; George v George, 34 A.D.2d 888; Matter of Harris v Doley, 22 A.D.2d 769; Sager v Sager, 21 A.D.2d 183). Where the record is sufficiently complete, as in the instant case, the appellate court may make its own findings on the basis of the record (Fischer v Fischer, 45 A.D.2d 917). Not only will this avoid multiplicity of litigation, but is particularly advisable here by reason of the fact that the Special Term Justice is now deceased.

Family Court, however, improperly awarded the petitioner $10.65 for refrigerator repairs and $234.22 for the purchase of a set of bunk beds since these items do not constitute necessary repairs to the house. Since it is preferable with respect to alimony and support payments, in the interest of avoiding multiplicity of litigation, to direct periodic payments of a fixed and specified amount (Fischer v Fischer, 45 A.D.2d 917; De Gasper v De Gasper, 31 A.D.2d 886), the trial court should consider, in the event of future litigation with respect to what is or is not a necessary repair, upon sufficient evidence, awarding an increase in alimony and support to cover this expense and deleting from the decree the provision directing the husband to pay "all necessary repair bills".

Here, the court failed to translate its conclusions into intelligible form, and we write on this point to inform these courts of the clear requirements to be met." With respect to the requirement of CPLR 4213 (subd. [b]), this court has recently spoken in Fischer v. Fischer ( 45 A.D.2d 917) as follows: "The conclusions reached by the trial court find ample support in the record. However, the decision pertaining to the award of alimony, child support and the direction of other payments does not comply with the requirements of CPLR 4213 (subd. [b]) which provides that a court's decision may be either oral or in writing 'and shall state the fact its deems essential'.