Opinion
No. 1 CA-CV 17-0207
11-21-2017
FIRSTBANK HOLDING COMPANY, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. TINEE CARRAKER, Defendant/Appellant.
COUNSEL Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie, LLP, Phoenix By Justin James Henderson Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Tinee Carraker, Buckeye Defendant/Appellant
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2017-001270
The Honorable David W. Garbarino, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie, LLP, Phoenix
By Justin James Henderson
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Tinee Carraker, Buckeye
Defendant/Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Jon W. Thompson and Chief Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined. JONES, Judge:
¶1 Tinee Carraker appeals an injunction against harassment prohibiting her from contacting FirstBank Holding Company (Firstbank) and its employees, or entering any FirstBank premises. Carraker argues the injunction was issued based on perjured testimony. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Carraker is a former plaintiff in a lawsuit against FirstBank, in which she claimed the bank owed her $800 million after she deposited a promissory note into FirstBank's night deposit box. Carraker's boyfriend was the purported "holder" of the promissory note. Carraker had no relationship with FirstBank, and her boyfriend was a former customer with no open accounts at the time the promissory note was deposited at the bank. After FirstBank chose not to act on the note, suspecting it was either fraudulent or a hoax, Carraker sued FirstBank for $800 million. In January 2017, while the civil suit was pending, Carraker and her boyfriend went to the Goodyear branch of FirstBank, caused a disturbance, and were later issued a trespass notice from the police.
The record does not indicate Carraker attempted to obtain a loan from the bank or deposit such sums into the bank. Rather, Carraker appears to have believed that by simply generating a promissory note, the bank was obligated to satisfy the sum purportedly owed the holder as reflected within the note.
¶3 In February 2017, FirstBank sought and obtained an injunction against workplace harassment prohibiting Carraker from contacting FirstBank and its employees or from entering any FirstBank premises. At a contested hearing requested by Carraker, the trial court heard testimony from FirstBank's assistant vice president, Sebastian Porchini, Carraker, and her boyfriend.
¶4 Porchini testified that, on January 10, 2017, Carraker's boyfriend called FirstBank and left a voicemail to schedule an appointment to pick up some property. Porchini was familiar with Carraker and her boyfriend from the $800 million lawsuit. Porchini returned the boyfriend's call, and Carraker answered the phone. Porchini told Carraker to contact FirstBank's attorneys and to not come to the bank. Carraker continued to demand the bank return her property — presumably referencing the $800 million promissory note — so Porchini again told her not to come to the bank and hung up.
¶5 Despite Porchini's clearly articulated direction not to appear at the bank, Carraker and her boyfriend went to the Goodyear branch. Porchini saw them enter and met them near the front door. Carraker tried to give Porchini a folder with documents, but Porchini would not look at it. Porchini asked them to leave, and they refused. Porchini testified Carraker's hands were shaking and he believed she was either nervous or agitated. When Porchini told Carraker he would call the police if she did not leave, Carraker clapped her hands in his face and told him to make the call. The commotion caught the attention of FirstBank's customers and employees. Both a FirstBank employee and Carraker called the police. Carraker and her boyfriend were again asked to leave the bank but refused and remained in the lobby. After the police arrived and investigated, they issued a trespass notice against Carraker.
¶6 Carraker cross-examined Porchini and then testified herself. Carraker denied clapping her hands in Porchini's face and testified she was only at the bank to collect on her lien, i.e., retrieve her $800 million. Her boyfriend then testified he did not see Carraker "get into anybody's face" but admitted he saw Carraker get excited and talk loudly. Although both parties brought exhibits to the hearing, neither party moved to admit any exhibits into the record.
¶7 At the close of the hearing, the trial court affirmed the injunction. Carraker timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 12-120.21(A) and -2101(A)(5)(b).
Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute's current version.
DISCUSSION
¶8 Carraker argues the trial court erred in entering and affirming the injunction. We review a decision to issue an injunction against harassment for an abuse of discretion. LaFaro v. Cahill, 203 Ariz. 482, 485, ¶ 10 (App. 2002) (citing Ariz. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Superior Court, 190 Ariz. 490, 494 (App. 1997)). We will not disturb the injunction if it is supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 485-86, ¶ 12 (examining the record to "determine if the required finding of . . . harassment is supported by substantial evidence") (citing Prudential Ins. of Am. v. Pochiro, 153 Ariz. 368, 370 (App. 1987)).
¶9 An injunction against workplace harassment is appropriate when the trial court finds "reasonable evidence of workplace harassment by the defendant." A.R.S. § 12-1810(E). "'Harassment' means a single threat or act of physical harm or damage or a series of acts over any period of time that would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed or annoyed." A.R.S. § 12-1810(S)(2).
¶10 Carraker's principal argument on appeal is that the trial court's ruling was based on perjured testimony. Carraker had an opportunity to cross-examine FirstBank's witness and to produce her own witnesses to support her arguments. The court weighed the testimony presented and ruled in favor of FirstBank. We will not reweigh the testimony presented to the court or attempt to reevaluate the credibility of the witnesses, as this function is best left to the factfinder. See Berenter v. Gallinger, 173 Ariz. 75, 79 (App. 1992) (citing Van Emden v. Becker, 6 Ariz. App. 274, 275 (1967), and then Anamax Mining Co. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 147 Ariz. 482, 486 (App. 1985)).
Carraker also relies on exhibits attached to her opening and reply briefs, but we will not consider them because they were not admitted into evidence at the hearing. We limit our review to the evidence before the trial court. See GM Dev. Corp. v. Cmty. Am. Mortg. Corp., 165 Ariz. 1, 4 (App. 1990).
¶11 At the hearing, FirstBank presented evidence Carraker was told not to come to the bank but came to the bank anyway. While at the bank, Carraker was visibly agitated and spoke in a loud voice that attracted the attention of the bank's customers and employees. FirstBank's witness, Porchini, testified Carraker clapped in his face. Eventually, FirstBank called the police, who issued a trespass notice to Carraker. Although Carraker and her boyfriend denied Carraker clapped in Porchini's face, Carraker's own witness acknowledged Carraker became excited and spoke loudly, at least partially corroborating Porchini's testimony. On this record, we are satisfied substantial evidence supports the injunction. Further, Carraker has not shown the credibility determinations inherent in the court's decision constitute an abuse of discretion.
Carraker also argues the merits of her civil claim against Firstbank. These issues were not resolved by the trial court in this case, and we do not have jurisdiction to address them. See Brumett v. MGA Home Healthcare, L.L.C., 240 Ariz. 420, 426, ¶ 4 (App. 2016) (noting appellate jurisdiction is defined and limited by statute) (citing Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9, and Garza v. Swift Transp. Co., 222 Ariz. 281, 283, ¶ 12 (2009)); A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(5)(b) (permitting an appeal from the grant of an injunction); ARCAP 13(a)(7)(B) (requiring an appellant to identify within his opening brief "where the particular issue was raised and ruled on" by the trial court). --------
CONCLUSION
¶12 The trial court's order affirming the injunction against harassment is affirmed.