First Union Nat. Bank v. J. Reisbaum Co.

4 Citing cases

  1. Gerschick v. Pounds

    262 Ga. App. 554 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 6 times

    Thus, we have no basis for considering these defenses on appeal. See, e.g., First Union National Bank of Georgia v. J. Reisbaum Co., 190 Ga. App. 234, 235 ( 378 S.E.2d 317) (1989) (movant for summary judgment required to come forward with evidence to negate defense of nonconformity.) See Court of App. Rule 27(c) ("Any enumeration of error which is not supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument may be deemed abandoned.").

  2. Johnson Johnson v. Kaufman

    226 Ga. App. 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 20 times
    Concluding that there are other means of obtaining direct appellate review, including being held in contempt, when an order is not "directly appealable" under the collateral order doctrine

    "While we are bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we must, of course, follow the decisions of our own Supreme Court with respect to the meaning of Rule 56(c) of the Georgia Civil Practice Act, OCGA Sec. 9-11-56(c). [Cits.]" First Union Nat. Bank v. J. Reisbaum Co., 190 Ga. App. 234 ( 378 S.E.2d 317) (1989). This court must follow the Georgia Supreme Court's rule established in Scroggins v. Edmondson, 250 Ga. 430, 431 (1) (c) ( 297 S.E.2d 469) (1982).

  3. First Rome Bank v. Reese Oil Co.

    426 S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 5 times

    ... (T)he moving party's papers are carefully scrutinized, while the [opponent's] papers, if any, are treated with considerable indulgence.' Ham v. Ham, 230 Ga. 43, 45 ( 195 S.E.2d 429) (1973)." First Union Nat. Bank v. J. Reisbaum Co., 190 Ga. App. 234, 235 ( 378 S.E.2d 317) (1989). Reese Oil had the burden of piercing the "commercial reasonableness" defense.

  4. Gresham v. Atlanta Gas Light Co.

    193 Ga. App. 841 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 3 times

    [Cit.]" First Union Nat. Bank v. J. Reisbaum Co., 190 Ga. App. 234, 235 ( 378 S.E.2d 317) (1989). While the Standard Building Code may not have constituted proof of the Rockdale County Housing Code, plaintiffs "had no initial burden of coming forward with such evidence.