In the next case, Lubliner v. Gaston (1926), 243 Ill. App. 627 (abstract of opinion), the appellate court upheld judgment of forfeiture of a lease in favor of the lessor in an action against the tenants where the evidence established that a subtenant operated a house of prostitution. In the third case, First Trust Savings Bank v. Raklios (1928), 247 Ill. App. 183, the court affirmed a determination that the tenant's covenant not to permit the premises to be used for an unlawful purpose was a covenant running with the land. Thus, the court held that both the defendant-tenant and the subtenant were bound by the covenant, "yet, in violation of that obligation, [the defendant] sublet the premises to one who * * * pretended to run a radio business * * * [as] a cover for the operation of an illicit still."

As stated in the case of Schilling v. Holmes, 23 Cal. 227: "His [tenant's] liability to pay rent is not discharged by an eviction unless under a title superior to the landlord's, or by some agency of the landlord." (See, also, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 396; 15 Ann. Cas. 1103; Blaustein v. Pincus, 47 Mont. 202, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 405, 131 P. 1064; Hallet v. Sigerson, 93 Misc. Rep. 99, 156 N.Y. Supp. 490; Kesselman v. Cohen, (N.J.) 135 A. 348; Jacobs v. Mingle, 278 Pa. St. 250, 122 A. 285; First Trust Sav. Bank v. Raklios, 247 Ill. App. 183; Goelet v. National Surety Co., 249 N.Y. 287, 164 N.E. 101.) The defendant, Max Fregger, was the original lessee of the plaintiffs.

While it may well be that "suffer" as used in the regulation would not render the permittee responsible for the acts of a trespasser upon the premises, we conclude that it is effective to make him responsible, regardless of knowledge or negligence, for failure to take effectual measures to prevent prohibited conduct by those occupying them with his authority. See Miller v. Prescott, 163 Mass. 12, 13, 39 N.E. 409; First Trust Savings Bank v. Raklios, 247 Ill. App. 183, 193. The requirement of strict accountability, in connection with the underlying purpose of the regulations, suffices to distinguish this case from the situation in Selleck v. Selleck, 19 Conn. 501, 505, in which we held that a person was not criminally liable for suffering a ram to go at large unless, he failed to exercise due care to restrain him; we treated the word "suffer" in the statute then before us as the equivalent of "permit."