Opinion
2023 CA 1272
11-20-2024
FIRST PAY, INC. v. ELTON DUKES
Richard D. Bankston Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Richard D. Bankston, Attorney at Law, Inc., successor in interest of First Pay, Inc. D. Scott Rainwater Jordan Faircloth Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant-Garnishee/Appellee Quantix SCS, LLC
On Appeal from the City Court of Baton Rouge In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana Docket No. 16-04613 Honorable Yvette Alexander, Judge Presiding
Richard D. Bankston Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Richard D. Bankston, Attorney at Law, Inc., successor in interest of First Pay, Inc.
D. Scott Rainwater Jordan Faircloth Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant-Garnishee/Appellee Quantix SCS, LLC
BEFORE: McCLENDON, WOLFE, HESTER, MILLER, AND STROMBERG, JJ.
McCLENDON., J.
Judgment creditor appeals the city court's judgment granting garnishee's motion to reopen garnishment proceedings and vacate judgment pro confesso previously rendered against the garnishee. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This dispute arises out of a garnishment proceeding instituted by the judgment creditor, First Pay, Inc., against the debtor, Elton Dukes, in Baton Rouge City Court (city court). By judgment dated October 16, 2017, the city court executed a written judgment in favor of First Pay, Inc. and against Mr. Dukes in the amount of $32,873.04, plus interest, attorney's fees, and all costs.
On September 21, 2022, Richard D. Bankston, Attorney at Law, Inc., as the successor in interest of First Pay, Inc., filed a petition for garnishment of Mr. Dukes' wages to satisfy the debt. Mr. Bankston's petition for garnishment named Quantix SCS, LLC (Quantix) as Mr. Dukes' alleged employer. The city court issued an order of garnishment, and on October 5, 2022, Quantix received personal service of the garnishment petition and garnishment interrogatories. The garnishment interrogatories sought information regarding Mr. Dukes' alleged employment with Quantix, Quantix's alleged indebtedness to Mr. Dukes, and Quantix's alleged payments to Mr. Dukes.
Quantix did not answer the garnishment interrogatories within the delays provided by law. Thus, on March 7, 2023, Mr. Bankston filed a motion for judgment pro confesso pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 2413. Mr. Bankston's motion for judgment pro confesso sought the amount of the judgment against Mr. Dukes, costs, and the attorney's fees incurred in connection with the motion for judgment pro confesso. The motion for judgment pro confessors set for hearing on April 12, 2023, and Quantix received notice of same on March 17, 2023. Quantix provided answers to the garnishment interrogatories to Mr. Bankston on March 22, 2023, but did not file its answers to the garnishment interrogatories into the record.
Quantix did not appear at the April 12, 2023 hearing on Mr. Bankston's motion for judgment pro confesso. Later that same day, the city court executed a written judgment in favor of Mr. Bankston as successor in interest to First Pay, in the full sum of $32,873.04, together with interest and attorney's fees.
On June 28, 2023, Quantix filed a "Motion to [Reopen] Garnishment Proceedings" pursuant to LSA-R.S. 13:3923, together with a memorandum in support of the motion. In seeking to reopen the garnishment proceedings, Quantix asserted it never employed Mr. Dukes, was never indebted in any manner to Mr. Dukes, and was never responsible for any debt Mr. Dukes purportedly owed to First Pay or Mr. Bankston. Quantix further asserted that, in the interim between receiving notice of Mr. Bankston's motion for judgment pro confesso and the hearing of the motion, Quantix provided Mr. Bankston with answers to the garnishment interrogatories, wherein Quantix denied employing Mr. Duke and identified Mr. Dukes' actual employer. Quantix contended that Mr. Bankston proceeded with the pro confesso hearing, despite having "certified evidence and direct knowledge" that Quantix was not indebted to Mr. Dukes, and speculated that Mr. Bankston may not have notified the city court that Quantix answered the garnishment interrogatories prior to the hearing. Based on these claims, Quantix requested that the city court reopen the garnishment proceedings under LSA-R.S. 13:3923, vacate and set aside the April 12, 2023 pro confesso judgment against Quantix, and stay all other proceedings in the matter pending resolution of the motion to reopen.
Quantix submitted a number of exhibits with its memorandum in support of its motion to reopen the garnishment proceedings, including Mr. Bankston's petition for garnishment; Mr. Bankston's motion for judgment pro confessa, Quantix's answers to the garnishment interrogatories; the April 12, 2023 pro confesso judgment; the affidavit of Quantix's general counsel, Blake Dietrich; and the affidavit of Quantix's payroll manager, Shellie Madsen. Mr. Dietrich attested that, as Quantix's general counsel, he had direct knowledge of the underlying legal proceedings. According to Mr. Dietrich, he notified Mr. Bankston that Quantix never employed or was indebted to Mr. Dukes, and Quantix provided Mr. Bankston with answers to the garnishment interrogatories on or about March 22, 2023. Ms. Madsen attested that in her role as Quantix's payroll manager, she had direct knowledge of and access to Quantix's employees and personnel files, and she had confirmed Mr. Dukes was never a Quantix employee or on Quantix's payroll.
In response to Quantix's motion to reopen garnishment proceedings, Mr. Bankston filed a pleading captioned, "Opposition to Motion to Reopen [Pro-Confesso] Proceeding[.]" Mr. Bankston contended that Quantix's motion to reopen was actually an impermissible "motion to set aside or re-open a [pro confesso] judgment." Mr. Bankston argued that LSA-R.S. 13:3923 allows a court to reconsider a garnishment judgment rendered pursuant to default, which is part of a continuing proceeding, but LSA-R.S. 13:3923 does not authorize the reopening or reconsideration of a pro-confesso judgment rendered pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 2413, which is a money judgment. To the contrary, Mr. Bankston argued that the reopening or reconsideration of a pro-confesso judgment rendered pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 2413 is expressly precluded by LSA-R.S. 13:3923(B), which was enacted in August of 2022 by 2022 La. Acts. No. 265, § 2 (Act 265), and was therefore in effect at the time Mr. Bankston filed the petition for garnishment and the motion for judgment pro confesso.
Quantix filed a reply memorandum in support of its motion to reopen the garnishment proceedings on August 28, 2023. Quantix argued the proceedings should be reopened because the transcript of the April 12, 2023 hearing on Mr. Bankston's motion for judgment pro confesso "confirmed that, despite having direct knowledge that Quantix did not employ [Mr.] Dukes and was never indebted to [Mr.] Dukes, [Mr.] Bankston proceeded with the hearing and did not inform [the city court] of those facts." Quantix also challenged Mr. Bankston's claim that LSA-R.S. 13:3923(B) precludes the reopening or reconsideration of a pro-confesso judgment rendered pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 2413, arguing LSA-R.S. 13:3923(B) is ambiguous and employs permissive, rather than mandatory, language. Quantix further maintained that, because LSA-R.S. 13:3923(A) states all effects of the garnishment "shall cease" upon the termination of employment of the debtor with the garnishee, and because Quantix never employed Mr. Dukes, Quantix did not owe Mr. Bankston money "by operation of law[.]"
Quantix's motion to reopen the garnishment proceedings was heard on August 30, 2023. Following the hearing, the city court signed a written judgment on September 27, 2023, which provided, in pertinent part:
After considering the pleadings, exhibits, law, and argument of counsel, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Motion to Re-Open Garnishment Proceedings is GRANTED as prayed for and that the April 12, 2023 Judgment against Quantix, SCS, LLC and in favor of Richard D. Bankston, Attorney at Law, Inc., successor in interest of First Pay, Inc., "in the full sum of $32,873.04 plus interest, costs, and attorney's fees" is hereby set aside and vacated.
Mr. Bankston appeals this adverse judgment, arguing that the city court erred in setting aside and vacating the April 12, 2023 pro confesso judgment because it lacked the statutory authority to do so.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
A garnishment proceeding is a streamlined legal process for obtaining the seizure of property of a judgment debtor in the hands of a third party. Dads BR1, L.L.C, v. Conner, 2022-0141 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/16/22), 352 So.3d 1012, 1014. The test of a garnishee's liability to the judgment creditor is whether the garnishee has in his hands the principal debtor's property, funds, or credits for the recovery of which the debtor has a present subsisting cause of action. Houma Mortgage & Loan, Inc. v. Marshall, 94-0728 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/9/95), 664 So.2d 1199, 1203.
Louisiana law contains general provisions for garnishment, set forth in LSA-C.C.P. art. 2411, et seq., and specialized procedures for the garnishment of wages, set forth in LSA-R.S. 13:3921, et seq. See Dads BR1, 352 So.3d at 1014. In this appeal, Mr. Bankston's sole assignment of error concerns whether the specialized provisions governing the garnishment of wages, specifically the current version of LSA-R.S. 13:3923 applicable herein, authorized the city court to reopen the underlying garnishment proceeding and vacate the April 12, 2023 pro confesso judgment, which was rendered under the general garnishment provision set forth in LSA-C.C.P. art. 2413.
Rather than filing a motion to reopen the garnishment proceedings pursuant to LSA-R.S. 13:3923, Mr. Bankston argues Quantix could have sought relief from the pro confesso judgment by filing a motion for new trial, a motion for appeal, or a petition for nullity pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 2001, et seq. While the appeal delays had run by the time Quantix filed its motion to reopen, based on Quantix's allegations, we note that a petition for nullity in accordance with LSA-C.C.P. arts. 2001, et seq., may have provided Quantix with a means for seeking relief.
To answer this question, we rely on well-settled rules of statutory interpretation. The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. Hartman v. St. Bernard Parish Fire Department & Fara, 2020-00693 (La. 3/24/21), 315 So.3d 823, 829. When a statute is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the provision is applied as written with no further interpretation made in search of the Legislature's intent. Martin v. Thomas, 2021-01490 (La. 6/29/22), 346 So.3d 238, 242; LSA-C.C. art. 9; LSA-R.S. 1:4. Further, it is presumed that every word, sentence, or provision in a statute was intended to serve some useful purpose, that some effect is to be given to each such provision, and that no unnecessary words or provision were employed. Hartman, 315 So.3d at 829.
With these precepts in mind, we begin with the general garnishment provisions pursuant to which the pro confesso judgment was rendered. Under LSA-C.C.P. art. 2411(B)(1), the seizure effected by a garnishment proceeding becomes effective upon service of the petition, citation, and interrogatories. All Star Floor Covering, Inc. v. Stitt, 2000-2049 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/14/01), 804 So.2d 705, 708, writs denied, 2002-0406, 2002-0421 (La. 4/19/02), 813 So.2d 1085, 813 So.2d 1088. Pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 2412, a garnishee is required to file his sworn answers within thirty days from the date of service of the garnishment petition and garnishment interrogatories. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 2412(D). It is the garnishee's duty to answer all proper interrogatories and to make all proper disclosures concerning property of the debtor in its possession. Where the garnishee's answer is not sworn as required by LSA-C.C.P. art. 2412, it will be treated as a failure to answer. All Star , 804 So.2d at 708.
The effects of the garnishee's failure to answer garnishment interrogatories within the appropriate delays are addressed in LSA-C.C.P. art. 2413, which provides:
A. If the garnishee fails to answer within the delay provided by Article 2412, the judgment creditor may proceed by contradictory motion against the garnishee for the amount of the unpaid judgment, with interest and costs. When the garnishee is a state agency or department within the executive branch of state government, the party designated for service of garnishment petitions in Article 2412(B) shall be notified of the intent to file such a motion by certified mail at least fifteen days prior to the filing of the motion. The failure of the garnishee to answer prior to the filing of such a contradictory motion is prima facie proof that he has property of or is indebted to the judgment debtor to the extent of the judgment, interest, and costs.
B. Judgment shall be rendered against the garnishee on trial of the motion unless he proves that he had no property of and was not indebted to the judgment debtor. If on the trial of such motion, the garnishee proves the amount of such property or indebtedness, the judgment against the
garnishee shall be limited to the delivery of the property or payment of the indebtedness, as provided in Article 2415.
C. Regardless of the decision on the contradictory motion, the court shall render judgment against the garnishee for the costs and a reasonable attorney fee for the motion.(Emphasis added). Under this provision, the garnishee's failure to file a sworn answer to garnishment interrogatories creates a rebuttable prima facie case against the garnishee and entitles the seizing creditor to move for a judgment pro confesso, i.e., a judgment against the garnishee for the amount of the judgment, interest, and costs. See Wynnco Construction, LLC v. Bergeron, 2013-0250 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/4/13), 136 So.3d 823, 825-26; Houma Mortgage, 664 So.2d at 1204.
Though a garnishee's failure to file a sworn answer to garnishment interrogatories entitles the judgment creditor to file a motion for judgment pro confesso, said motion is not self-executing. Rather, "until a contradictory motion is filed against the garnishee for the amount of the judgment, the stage is not set for a default judgment against the garnishee." Wynnco, 136 So.3d at 826; Houma Mortgage, 664 So.2d at 1204.
After the judgment creditor files a motion for judgment pro confesso, a contradictory hearing must be conducted on the motion. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 2413; Wynnco, 136 So.3d at 826. The garnishee must be given an opportunity to rebut the prima facie case by presenting evidence of its actual debt or lack thereof, as well as evidence of the employment of the debtor, the character of the employment, and prior garnishments. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 2413; Wynnco, 136 So.3d at 826; Houma Mortgage, 664 So.2d at 1204-05. The garnishee may file answers to garnishment interrogatories up until the time the rule is heard in an attempt to rebut the judgment creditor's prima facie case. Wynnco, 136 So.3d at 826-27, citing All Star, 804 So.2d at 708. After the hearing of the motion for judgment pro confesso, judgment must be rendered against the garnishee unless he proves that he either had no property of, or was not indebted to, the judgment debtor. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 2413; Wynnco, 136 So.3d at 826. If the garnishee does not satisfy this burden, he may still limit his liability by proving the amount of property or indebtedness owed to the debtor, and the judgment against him shall be limited to the delivery of the property or payment of the indebtedness. Wynnco, 136 So.3d at 826.
Central to the dispute before us is the statutory interpretation of LSA-R.S. 13:3923, one of the specialized provisions governing garnishment of the debtor's wages. Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3923 provides that the trial court retains jurisdiction to reopen a wage garnishment proceeding on the motion of any party. See Zurich Insurance Co. v. Harmon, 95-0297 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/6/95), 671 So.2d 383, 385. See LSA-R.S. 13:3923(A). Linder the previous version of LSA-R.S. 13:3923, which was in effect prior to July 31, 2022, wage garnishment proceedings were subject to being reopened, "even though the garnishee failed to timely answer the garnishment interrogatories and a default judgment was rendered against him." Houma Mortgage, 664 So.2d at 1206. However, Act 265 amended LSA-R.S. 13:3923 prior to the institution of the garnishment proceeding at issue herein. In part, Act 265 made non-substantive changes to the language contained in the previous version of LSA-R.S. 13:3923; said historical language, as amended, is identified in the present version of the statute as LSA-R.S. 13:3923(A). See Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Lofton, 55,630 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/22/24), 386 So.3d 1263, 1268. More significant to our case, Act 265 concurrently enacted a second paragraph, identified as LSA-R.S. 13:3923(B), which bars the application of paragraph (A) to judgments pro confesso rendered pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 2413. Specifically, the present version of Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3923 provides in full:
The previous version of LSA-R.S. 13:3923, which was in effect until July 31, 2022, provided, in full:
It shall not be necessary that more than one writ of garnishment or one set of interrogatories be served in such cases, but the court shall render judgment for the monthly, semimonthly, weekly or daily payments to be made to the seizing creditor according to the manner best suited to the circumstances, until the indebtedness is paid. The garnisher shall serve upon the garnishee the citation, the petition, the garnishment interrogatories, the notice of seizure, and a statement of sums due under the garnishment, such statement to include, but not be limited to, the principal, interest, court costs incurred to date, and attorney's fee due under the judgment. The court, in its discretion, may reopen the case upon the motion of any party concerned for evidence affecting the proper continuance of such judgment, and the court shall retain jurisdiction to amend or set aside its judgment at any time in its discretion; however, all effects of the seizure by garnishment shall cease upon the termination of employment of the debtor with the garnishee, unless the debtor is reinstated or reemployed within one hundred eighty days after the termination. Should judgment by default be taken against any party garnishee, he may obtain a reopening of the case upon proper showing and within the discretion of the court.
A. It shall not be necessary that more than one writ of garnishment or one set of interrogatories be served in a garnishment proceeding, but the court shall render judgment for the monthly, semimonthly, weekly, or daily payments to be made to the seizing creditor according to the manner best
suited to the circumstances, until the indebtedness is paid. The garnisher shall serve upon the garnishee the citation, the petition, the garnishment interrogatories, the notice of seizure, and a statement of sums due under the garnishment, such statement to include but not be limited to the principal, interest, court costs incurred to date, and attorney fees due under the judgment. The court, in its discretion, may reopen the case upon the motion of any party concerned for evidence affecting the proper continuance of the garnishment judgment, and the court shall retain jurisdiction to amend or set aside its garnishment judgment at any time in its discretion; however, all effects of the seizure by garnishment shall cease upon the termination of employment of the debtor with the garnishee, unless the debtor is reinstated or reemployed within one hundred eighty days after the termination. Should judgment by default be taken against any party garnishee, he may obtain a reopening of the case upon proper showing and within the discretion of the court.
B. Nothing in this Section is meant to affect judgments rendered pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Article 2413.
(Emphasis added).
With the law of garnishment and the principles of statutory interpretation in mind, we consider the matter before us. In this case, Quantix initially failed to timely answer the garnishment interrogatories. Therefore, after Mr. Bankston filed his motion for judgment pro confesso pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 2413, "the stage [was] set for a default judgment against [Quantix]." See Wynnco, 136 So.3d at 826; Houma Mortgage, 664 So.2d at 1204. Quantix also failed to file answers to the garnishment interrogatories into the record before the hearing of Mr. Bankston's motion for judgment pro confesso, and failed to appear at the hearing of Mr. Bankston's motion for judgment pro confesso, resulting in the city court's ruling that granted Mr. Bankston's motion for judgment pro confesso under the general garnishment provision LSA-C.C.P. art. 2413. Quantix then filed a motion seeking to reopen the garnishment proceedings and vacate the April 12, 2023 pro confesso judgment.
As set forth above, the present version of LSA-R.S. 13:3923 became effective on August 1,2022, before Mr. Bankston sought and obtained the April 12,2023 pro-confesso judgment against Quantix under LSA-C.C.P. art. 2413. Thus, the present version of LSA-R.S. 13:3923 applied to Quantix's motion to reopen the garnishment proceedings. As the plain language of LSA-R.S. 13:3923(B) explicitly states that the statute is not meant to affect judgments rendered pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 2413, the April 12, 2023 proconfesso judgment rendered pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 2413 was not subject to being amended or vacated by the city court pursuant to paragraph (A) of LSA-R.S. 13:3923. The city court erred in finding otherwise. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the city court granting Quantix's motion to reopen the garnishment proceedings and vacating the judgment pro confesso pursuant to LSA-R.S. 13:3923.
In the process of reaching this determination, we carefully considered Quantix's argument that the reopening of the garnishment proceedings was proper in light of the Louisiana Supreme Court's per curiam in Tower Credit, Inc. v. Williams, 2022-01556 (La. 2/7/23), 354 So.3d 659, 660, which vacated in part this court's decision in Tower Credit, Inc. v. Williams, 2022-0106, 2021-1509 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/16/22), 352 So.3d 1029, 1031. However, we find Tower Credit inapplicable to, and significantly distinguishable from, this case. The pro confesso judgment in Tower Credit was executed on October 6, 2020, and the motion to reopen the garnishment proceedings was filed on October 22, 2021, prior to the effective date of the present version of LSA-R.S. 13:3923. Tower Credit, 352 So.3d at 1032. Thus, the motion to reopen in Tower Credit was subject to the prior version of LSA-R.S. 13:3923. Accordingly, we do not find Tower Credit to be controlling.
Likewise, and for the same reasons, the motion to reopen in Dads BR1, 352 So.3d at 1012, was subject to the previous version of LSA-R.S. 13:3923.
Because Act 265 became effective before the petition for garnishment was filed in the matter before us, and given both the brevity of the supreme court's per curiam in Tower Credit, 354 So.3d 659, and its reference to the "particular facts" of the case without identifying same, we decline to speculate as to the significance of the reference to LSA-R.S. 13:3923(A) therein. We do note, however, that in Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Lofton, 55,630 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/22/24), 386 So.3d 1263, 1268, our brethren at the second circuit surmised that the Tower Credit per curiam"ho\6s implicitly" that LSA-R.S. 13:3923(6) is not retroactive, i.e., does not apply to judgments pro confesso rendered prior to August of 2022. The second circuit wrote, "[i]nstead, [Tower Credit] explicitly applied [LSA-]R.S. 13:3923(A) to the judgment pro confesso[.]''
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the September 27, 2023 judgment of the city court reopening the garnishment proceedings and vacating the April 12, 2023 judgment of the city court. The April 12, 2023 judgment of the city court is hereby reinstated. Costs of the appeal are assessed to Quantix SCS, LLC.
REVERSED.
HESTER, J., concurs and assigns reasons. HESTER, J., concurring.
I respectfully concur with the majority that La. R.S. 13:3923(B) applies and agree that the provisions of La. R.S. 13:3923(A) could not affect the April 12, 2023 judgment pro confesso rendered against Quantix SCS, LLC ("Quantix") pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 2413. Accordingly, the trial court was precluded from reopening the case to amend or vacate the April 12, 2023 judgment pro confesso.
I find that the Supreme Court's decision in Tower Credit, Inc. v. Williams, 2022-01556 (La. 2/7/23), 354 So.3d 659, 660 (per curiam) is distinguishable from the facts of this case because judgment pro confesso rendered against Quantix was entered on April 12, 2023 after the effective date of Act No. 265 of 2022, which added Subsection B to La. R.S. 13:3923. As observed by the Second Circuit in Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lofton, 55,630 (La.App. 2d Cir. 5/22/24), 386 So.3d 1263, 1269, the Supreme Court's decision in Williams, 354 So.3d at 660, implies that the rendition of the judgment pro confesso is the point at which the garnishee's cause of action accrues under La. R.S. 13:3923(A).
I also write separately to point out that the facts of this case are different from those cases in which the garnishee fails to file sworn answers prior to the filing of the motion for judgment pro confesso such that the prima facie case is established against him, appears at the hearing in defense of the motion for judgment pro confesso, and fails to put forth evidence sufficient to satisfy its burden of proof. A judgment entered against a garnishee in that situation cannot be considered a default judgment, and, in my view, that garnishee would not have been able to reopen the case under the version of La. R.S. 13:3923 in effect prior to the effective date of Act No. 265 of 2022. But see Tower Credit, Inc. v. McGee, 2023-0787 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/6/24),___So.3d___, 2024 WL 4096623.
MILLER, J., dissenting.
I am unable to conclude that the judgment pro confesso at issue is a judgment which is immune from "reopening" as contemplated by La. R.S. 13:3923. I do not believe this judgment pro confesso is a judgment entered pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure sep arate and ap art from the statutory wage garnishment pro visions, which grant the courts discretion to reopen a case after a judgment is taken by default against a garnishee. Finally, I do not believe that as a matter of statutoiy interpretation, the amendment to La. R.S. 13:3923 supports a conclusion that reverses longstanding jurisprudence allowing the reopening of a default pro confesso judgment taken against a garnishee.
In this matter, Richard D. Bankston, Attorney at Law, Inc., hereinafter "Garnishor," as the successor in interest of First Pay, Inc., argues that the current amended version of La. R.S. 13:3923, in particular, La. R.S. 13:3923(B), does not authorize the reopening or reconsideration of a pro confesso judgment rendered pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 2413. The majority's opinion seems to accept the initial premise that the garnishment proceedings were brought, and the pro confesso rendered, exclusively under the code of civil procedure. I believe this conclusion is incorrect both factually and legally.
The p etition for garnishment herein makes no reference to codal p revisions or the statutory scheme. The accomp anying order, however, contains a citation to La. R.S. 13:3927. The notice, issued by the Clerk of Court and served upon the garnishee, refers to La. R.S. 13:3881. Garnishor also included for service a statement of sums due and notice of seizure, which is required by La. R.S. 13:3923, but not mentioned in La. C.C.P. art. 2411, et seq. Thus, the filing carefully tracks the statutory scheme for wage garnishment.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2411, et seq. and La. R.S. 13:3921, et seq. do not operate independently from each other. Theprovisions must be read in para materia and must be considered supportive of each other. Otherwise, the wage garnishment proceedings could be ignored by obtaining judgment under codal provisions thereby precluding the garnishee from seeking relief under the statutory provisions creating his liability in the first instance. See Tower Credit, Inc, v. McGee, 2023-0787 (La.App. 1st Cir.___/___/___),___So. 3d___; see also Beneficial Finance Company of Louisiana v. Haviland, 411 So.2d 1102, 1105 (La.App. 4thCir.), writ denied, 415 So.2d 942 (La. 1982) (where the court explained, "We recognize that there is a difference existing under the general garnishment proceedings set out in the Civil Code as compared to the wage garnishment provisions set out in Revised Statute Title 13. However, taken together, these two bodies of garnishment law constitute the general garnishment procedures, together with the special provisions applicable to wage garnishment because of the special problems inherent therein."). The structure of the schemes suggests a symbiotic relationship. The code articles illustrate this point.
The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, Book IV - "Execution of Judgments" contains "Title II - Money Judgments," which in turn contains Chapter 4 -"Garnishment Under A Writ of Fieri Facias." This chapter contains the codal articles relied upon by Garnishor and referenced above. Therein, La. C.C.P. art. 2411 (BX2) references "wage garnishments subject to the provisions of [La.] R.S. 13:3921 [,] A seq. Moreover, La. C.C.P. art. 2411(C) provides that "[o]ther than as provided in [La.] R.S. 13:3 921 [Jet seq. applicable to garnishments of wages, a garnishment shall not be continuing in nature." The Editor's Notes to La. C.C.P. art. 2411 further emphasize that "a garnishment is not continuing in nature, except against wages. See also R.S. 13:3913, to same effect." Thus, Code of Civil Procedure articles 2411 through 2417 govern general garnishment proceedings under a writ of fieri facias while garnishment of a debtor's wages is a procedure specifically governed by La. R. S. 13:3 921, et seq., while incorp orating the general p rovisions found in the Code of Civil Procedure. Dads BR1, L.L.C. v. Conner, 2022-0141 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/16/22), 352 So.3d 1012, 1014.
One last distinction between the articles, which is helpful to this analysis, is found in La. C.C.P. art. 2415. This article, in Section A, directs garnishees to deliver propertyto the sheriff with the caveat in Section B that "[t]his Article does not apply to garnishment ofwages, salaries, tips reported to the employer, or commissions. "
Moving on to the interpretation of La. R.S. 13:3923, the basic tenants of statutory construction must be emp loyed. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. La. C.C. art. 9. On the other hand, when the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of the law as a whole. La. C.C. art. 12. Words andphrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. Technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a p eculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning. The word "shall" is mandatory and the word "may" is permissive. La. R.S. 1:3. Importantly, when two statutes deal with the same subject matter, and if there is a conflict between them, then the statute specifically directed to the matter at issue prevails over the more general statute. Battaglia v. LeBlanc, 2021-0011 (La.App. 1st Cir. 6/17/21), 328 So.3d 467, 470, writ denied, 2021-01025 (La. 11/3/21), 326 So.3d 886.
Here, the relevant statute is La. R.S. 13:3923(A), which provides in part:
The court, in its discretion, may reopen the case upon the motion of any party concerned for evidence affecting the proper continuance of the garnishment judgment, and the court shall retain jurisdiction to amend or set aside its garnishment judgment at any time in its discretion; however, all effects of the seizure by garnishment shall cease upon the termination of emp loyment of the debtor with the garnishee, unless the debtor is reinstated or reemployed within one hundred eighty days after the termination. Should judgment by default be taken against any party garnishee, he may obtain a reopening of the case upon proper showing and within the discretion of the court.
(Emphasis added.)
Clearly, La. R.S. 13:3923(A) speaks to garnishment judgments as distinct from a judgment by default. In the context of garnishment, a judgment by default is referred to as a judgment pro confesso. When the jurisprudence refers to a judgment pro confesso, it generally cites La. C.C.P. art. 2413. See Wynnco Construction, LLC v. Bergeron, 2013-0250 (La.App. 1st Cir. 11/4/13), 136 So.3d 823, 826; Tower Credit, Inc, v. Carpenter, 2001-2875 (La. 9/4/02), 825 So.2d 1125, 1128.
Courts have used the terms "default judgment" and "judgment pro confesso" interchangeably. See Tower Credit, Inc, v. Carpenter, 2001-2875 (La. 9/4/02), 825 So.2d 1125, 1128; Tower Credit v. Williams, 2022-0106 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/16/22), 352 So.3d 1029, writ granted, judgment vacated in part, 2022-01556 (La. 2/7/23), 354 So.3d 659; Wynnco Construction, LLC, 136 So.3d at 826; Houma Mortgage & Loan. Inc, v. Marshall, 94-0728 (La.App. 1st Cir. 11/9/95), 664 So.2d 1199. While a judgment pro confesso is often referred to as a default judgment under Louisiana law, there are certain characteristics that distinguish it from the ordinary default judgment provided for in La. C.C.P. art. 1702, et seq. Under article 1702, not only must a plaintiff establish a prima facie case by competent and admissible evidence, the required evidence varies based upon the type of demand or cause of action before the court. However, as to the judgment pro confesso, the plaintiff need only show that the garnishee failed to answer interrogatories and the amount of someone else's unpaid judgment. The failure to answer itself provides the prima facie proof that the garnishee holds property of the debtor and the plaintiff is not required to prove that the garnishee owes anything. Proof that the garnishee has any connection to the debtor or his property is also not required.
Thus, when La. R.S. 13:3923(A) refers to reopening a default judgment against any party garnishee, it thereby permits the reopening of a judgment pro confesso entered in conjunction with La. C.C.P. art. 2413. This conclusion is well established in the jurisprudence. See Beneficial Finance Company of Louisiana, 411 So.2d at 1105; Tower Credit. Inc, v. Williams, 2022-0106 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/16/22), 352 So.3d 1029,1037, writ granted, judgment vacated in part. 2022-01556 (La. 2/7/23), 354 So.3d 659; Dad's BR1, L.L.C., 352 So.3d at 1012; Houma Mortgage & Loan. Inc, v. Marshall, 94-0728 (La.App. 1st Cir. 11/9/95), 664 So.2d 1199,1206-1207; Zurich Insurance Company v. Harmon, 95-0297 (La.App. 1st Cir. 10/6/95), 671 So.2d 383, 384-385.
The phrase "pro confesso" is not found in the text of the codal articles.
While La. R.S. 13:3923(A) allows a judgment pro confesso to be reopened, La. R.S. 13:3923(B) declares that "[n]othing in this section is meant to affect judgments rendered pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Article 2413." In my view, Section B, when read together with Section A, is unclear, incompatible, and completely irreconcilable. All judgments entered pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 2413 are not necessarily default judgments pro confesso. Article 2413 allows for the entry of a garnishment judgment after a contradictory motion. For example, a garnishee, who failed to timely answer, may yet prove that it has in its possession limited amount of property of the debtor and may be ordered to deliver only that property. Louisiana Revised Statute 13:3923(A) allows the court to reopen a garnishment judgment and a default judgment.
In my view, a conclusion that Section B somehowprevents a garnishee from reopening the garnishment following a judgment of default would lead to absurd results. First, this conclusion directly conflicts with Section A. Also, I believe that the goal of a garnishment proceeding is to seize a debtor's property in the hands of a third-party employer - not to force Louisiana employers/garnishees to turn over property they do not possess, nor to make employers/gamishees the guarantors of their employees'debt. See Tower Credit, Inc, v. McGee,___So 3d at___.Moreover, should the debtor make payments or pay off the judgment completely, the employer/garnishee appears to have no legal recourse to seek credit for those payments, resulting in a windfall for the creditor.
In this case, a judgment of default was taken against a garnishee and the trial court exercised its discretion and granted the garnishee's motion to reop en the case as authorized by La. R.S. 13:3923(A). This action by the trial court is not precluded by La. R.S. 13:3923(B). I would find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in reopening this case.