First Nat'l Bk. v. McBride Chevrolet

61 Citing cases

  1. Klem v. First National Bank of Chicago

    655 N.E.2d 1211 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 16 times
    In Klem v. First National Bank, 275 Ill. App.3d 64, 67-68, 655 N.E.2d 1211, 1213 (1995), quoting, in part, section 2 of the Act (815 ILCS 160/2 (West 1994)), the second district agreed with the analysis in First National Bank and held that "[t]he broad language of the Act [citations] bars — without express exception — actions `on or in any way related to' unwritten credit agreements," including the long-recognized common-law exceptions to the Frauds Act.

    Count I of the complaint alleged misrepresentation against defendant First Chicago Corporation; count II alleged misrepresentation against Hesterman individually; and count III alleged promissory estoppel against all defendants. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing, inter alia, that section 2 of the Act ( 815 ILCS 160/2 (West 1994)) barred any action relating to an oral promise to extend credit. Relying on the opinion of the Appellate Court, Fourth District, in First National Bank v. McBride Chevrolet, Inc. (1994), 267 Ill. App.3d 367, the trial court granted the defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff timely appealed.

  2. Hubbard Street Lofts LLC v. Inland Bank

    2011 Ill. App. 102640 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011)   Cited 9 times
    Affirming dismissal in favor of bank and finding no ambiguity where 365/360 method was stated in payment paragraph of note and “per annum” was stated in interest paragraph of note

    The trial court reasoned that the Credit Agreements Act was designed to protect against actions where plaintiffs contend that they had an oral agreement with the defendant, and that the memorialization of the contract does not reflect what they agreed to. Thus, the trial court found Hubbard Street Lofts' second, fifth and sixth counts in the complaint were the prototype of claims that are barred by the Credit Agreements Act. ¶ 24 Inland Bank cites First National Bank in Staunton v. McBride Chevrolet, Inc., 267 Ill.App.3d 367, 373, 204 Ill.Dec. 676, 642 N.E.2d 138, 142 (1994), which states that “[t]here is no justifiable reliance on an oral credit agreement as a matter of law in Illinois.” In McBride, a bank officer promised orally to hold a check that caused an overdraft in a corporation's account until the Monday after a weekend; however, the bank officer in fact did not hold the check and the corporation suffered losses.

  3. Bank One v. Roscetti

    309 Ill. App. 3d 1048 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)   Cited 68 times
    Holding that personal guaranty of floor plan financing agreement is a credit agreement under the ICAA, and any alleged oral promise to not enforce or to modify the terms is barred by the ICAA

    To date, six Illinois cases have construed the Act. InFirst National Bank v. McBride Chevrolet, Inc., 267 Ill. App.3d 367, 642 N.E.2d 138 (1994), a lender foreclosed upon certain mortgages and guaranties. The defendants raised various affirmative defenses and counterclaims, all predicated upon an oral promise by the bank's officer to hold an overdraft check until sufficient funds could be deposited.

  4. McAloon v. Northwest Bancorp, Inc.

    274 Ill. App. 3d 758 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 34 times
    Holding that the plaintiffs could not maintain a breach of contract claim based on a written loan proposal initialed by the defendants in the absence of an allegation that the plaintiffs also had signed the proposal

    The language bars all actions by a debtor based on or related to an oral credit agreement. ( First National Bank v. McBride Chevrolet (1994), 267 Ill. App.3d 367, 372.) As stated in their complaint and acknowledged in their brief, plaintiffs' action for breach of contract and fraud was founded upon alleged oral misrepresentations by defendants. Plaintiffs alleged that on two separate occasions Charter had orally agreed to lend monies and then had failed to disburse the funds.

  5. Whirlpool Financial Corp. v. Sevaux

    96 F.3d 216 (7th Cir. 1996)   Cited 49 times
    Holding that party waived conflicts of law issue because it failed to fulfill its obligation under Rule 44.1 "to provide the district court with `reasonable notice' of his intention to raise an issue of foreign law"

    The Illinois courts have interpreted this provision to proscribe "[a]ll actions which depend for their existence upon an oral credit agreement." Klem v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 655 N.E.2d 1211, 1213 (Ill.App.Ct. 1995) (quoting First Nat'l Bank in Staunton v. McBride Chevrolet, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 138, 142 (Ill.App.Ct. 1994), appeal denied, 647 N.E.2d 1008 (Ill. 1995)). Indeed, "there is no limitation as to the type of actions by a debtor which are barred by the Act, so long as the action is in any way related to a credit agreement."

  6. Rref II BHB-Il MPP, LLC v. Edrei

    2016 Ill. App. 151793 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    There is no justifiable reliance on an oral credit agreement as a matter of law in Illinois." First National Bank in Staunton v. McBride Chevrolet, Inc., 267 Ill. App. 3d 367, 373 (1994). An allegedly fraudulent misrepresentation has been held to be within the scope of what is barred by the Credit Act. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. McLean, 938 F.Supp. 487, 492 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (cited with approval in Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass'n of America v. LaSalle National Bank, 295 Ill. App. 3d 61, 69-70 (1998)).

  7. Madan v. BMO Harris Bank Nat'l Ass'n

    2015 Ill. App. 142856 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)

    ¶ 23 Illinois courts have relied on the broad language of the Act in determining whether a credit agreement was entered into by the parties. First National Bank in Staunton v. McBride Chevrolet, Inc., 267 Ill. App. 3d 367, 372 (1994). There is no limitation as to the type of actions by a debtor which are barred by the Act, so long as the action in any way related to a credit agreement.

  8. Household Commercial Financial Services v. Suddarth

    01 C 4355 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 5, 2002)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that the ICAA prohibited the borrower's argument that the bank "breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by falsely promising that [the bank] would not withhold credit and then withdrawing credit and declaring ANHM in default"

    The ICAA bars all actions that are in any way related to an alleged credit agreement, whether those actions sound in contract or tort. See Nordstrom v. Wauconda Nat'l Bank, 668 N.E.2d 586, 588 (Ill.App.Ct. 1996); McAloon, 654 N.E.2d at 1095; First Nat'l Bank v. McBride Chevrolet, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 138, 142 (Ill.App.Ct. 1994). It also bars traditional exceptions to the statute of frauds, such as fraud, part performance, and equitable estoppel.

  9. VR Holdings v. Lasalle Business Credit

    No. 01 C 3012 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2002)   Cited 4 times

    ts have uniformly barred the claims and defenses of debtors which have relied on the existence of oral credit agreements. See Resolution Trust Corporation v. Thompson, 989 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1993) (court barred claims and defenses of debtor based on alleged oral promise of creditor to forgive unpaid balance of loan); Whirlpool Financial Corporation v. Sevaux, 874 F. Supp. 181 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (hereinafter "Whirlpool II") (court barred all claims and defenses relying on alleged oral promise to finance a loan); General Electric Capital Corporation, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17690, No. 93 C 5614, 1993 WL 524814 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15 1993) (court barred all claims and defenses related to an alleged oral agreement to extend or modify existing written credit agreements);McAloon v. Northwest Bancorp, Inc. 274 Ill. App.3d 758, 654 N.E.2d 1091, 211 Ill. Dec. 281 (2d Dist. 1995) (court barred all claims and defenses founded on alleged oral representations by bank to lend money); First National Bank in Staunton v. McBride Chevrolet, Inc., 267 Ill. App.3d 367, 642 N.E.2d 138, 204 Ill. Dec. 676, (4th Dist. 1994) (court barred all claims and defenses relying on oral promise of bank to hold a check overnight).

  10. Westinghouse Elec. v. McLean

    938 F. Supp. 487 (N.D. Ill. 1996)   Cited 19 times
    Granting summary judgment, concluding that ICAA barred all guarantors' counterclaims and affirmative defenses, including fraud and good faith claims, whether sounding in contract or tort

    Courts have uniformly barred the claims and defenses of debtors which have relied on the existence of oral credit agreements. See Resolution Trust Corporation v. Thompson, 989 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1993) (court barred claims and defenses of debtor based on alleged oral promise of creditor to forgive unpaid balance of loan); Whirlpool Financial Corporation v. Sevaux, 874 F. Supp. 181 (N.D.Ill. 1994) (hereinafter "Whirlpool II") (court barred all claims and defenses relying on alleged oral promise to, finance a loan); General Electric Capital Corporation v. Donogh Homes, No. 93 C 5614, 1993 WL 524814 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 15, 1993) (court barred all claims and defenses related to an alleged oral agreement to extend or modify existing written credit agreements); McAloon v. Northwest Bancorp, Inc., 274 Ill. App.3d 758, 211 Ill.Dec. 281, 654 N.E.2d 1091, (2d Dist. 1995) (court barred all claims and defenses founded on alleged oral representations by bank to lend money); First National Bank in Staunton v. McBride Chevrolet, Inc., 267 Ill. App.3d 367, 204 Ill.Dec. 676, 642 N.E.2d 138 (4th Dist. 1994) (court barred all claims and defenses relying on oral promise of bank to hold a check overnight). The Credit Act bars all claims, whether sounding in contract or tort. First National Bank in Staunton v. McBride Chevrolet, Inc., 267 Ill.App.3d at 372, 204 Ill.Dec. at 680, 642 N.E.2d at 142.