Unless a lease ends, the tenant's leasehold gives her a right of possession superior to the landlord. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Evergreen Park v. Chrysler Realty Corp., 522 N.E.2d 1298, 1304 (Ill.App. 1988). Because the leasehold of a tenant like Williams is created by the lease, her right to possession is coterminous to the life of the lease: when the lease ends, her superior right of possession ends. "The common law permitted an individual, who was rightfully entitled to enter upon land, to do so with force and arms and retain possession by force."
Additionally, the Village maintains that the court erred in finding that the Village did not insist upon strict compliance with section 27 of the contract prior to the notice of termination. • 1 For a party to terminate a contract, the nonperformance or breach by the other party must be substantial or material. ( First National Bank v. Chrysler Realty Corp. (1988), 168 Ill. App.3d 784, 793.) The test is whether the breach is so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the objects of the parties in making the agreement, or whether the failure to perform renders performance of the rest of the contract different in substance from the original agreement.
However, the nonperformance or breach must be so substantial or material that it defeats the purpose of having made the agreement, renders performance of the rest of the contract different in substance, or otherwise justifies the injured party regarding "the whole transaction as at an end." First Nat. Bank of Evergreen Park v. Chrysler Realty Corp., 168 Ill. App. 3d 784, 793 (1988). Even assuming that Defendants agreed to pay within fourteen days, failure to do so is not such a material or substantial breach as to justify undoing the entire agreement.
P-D takes the position that even if the record supported the entry of judgment on the question of whether P-D breached its obligations under the Lease via an uncured event of default on the Property, in order to deny it the right to exercise a purchase option, the breach must have been material or substantial. Under Illinois law, where a breach is used to justify premature termination, forfeit a lease agreement, or terminate a right to exercise a purchase option, the breach must have been material or substantial. The Wolfram Partnership, Ltd. v. LaSalle National Bank, 328 Ill.App.3d 207, 222-23, 765 N.E.2d 1012 (1st Dist. 2001), citingFirst National Bank of Evergreen Park v. Chrysler Realty Corp., 168 Ill.App.3d 784, 793, 522 N.E.2d 1298, 1303 (1st Dist. 1988). To be material, a breach must be "one of such importance that the contract would not have been entered into without it."
¶ 36 A substantial or material breach of the contract may terminate the contract. First National Bank of Evergreen Park v. Chrysler Realty Corp., 168 Ill.App.3d 784, 793 (1988).
One direction is the termination of the contract. See Susman v.Cypress Venture, 187 Ill.App.3d 312, 316 (1989); First National Bank of Evergreen Park v.Chrysler Realty Corp., 168 Ill.App.3d 784, 793 (1988); Farnsworth on Contracts § 8.18, at 643 (2d ed. 1990). The other direction is the continuation of the contract.
To justify a premature termination or forfeiture of a lease agreement, the breach must have been material or substantial. First National Bank of Evergreen Park v. Chrysler Realty Corp., 168 Ill. App. 3d 784, 793 (1988); see also Mann v. Mann, 283 Ill. App. 3d 915, 922 (1996) (immaterial breach did not warrant termination of lease agreement);¶ 29 A breach is material where the covenant breached is one of such importance that the contract would not have been entered into without it. Galesburg Clinic Ass'n v. West, 302 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 1019 (1999); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Old Orchard Plaza Limited Partnership, 284 Ill. App. 3d 765, 776 (1996).
Because the act is in derogation of the common law, courts must strictly comply with the procedure outlined in the statute. First National Bank of Evergreen Park v. Chrysler Realty Corp., 168 Ill. App. 3d 784, 791 (1988). ¶ 27 Section 101 of the statute provides, "No person shall make an entry into lands or tenements except in cases where entry is allowed by law, and in such cases he or she shall not enter with force, but in a peaceable manner." 735 ILCS 5/9-101 (West 2012).
See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(g) (eff. July 1, 2008); Ill. S. Ct. R. 6 (eff. Jan. 20, 1993). ¶ 153 We conclude it is a question of fact whether the substandard farming work in 2011 was "so material and important as to justify the injured party in regarding the whole transaction as at an end." First National Bank of Evergreen Park v. Chrysler Realty Corp., 168 Ill. App. 3d 784, 793 (1988); cf. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 8.18, at 643 (2d ed. 1990) ("Whether a material breach has remained uncured for long enough to justify termination is a question of fact, much like the question whether the breach is material in the first place."). According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 242 (1981), a material breach does not automatically justify terminating the contract, or discharging the other party's remaining duties to render performance.
See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(g) (eff. July 1, 2008); Ill. S. Ct. R. 6 (eff. Jan. 20, 1993). ¶ 153 We conclude it is a question of fact whether the substandard farming work in 2011 was "so material and important as to justify the injured party in regarding the whole transaction as at an end." First National Bank of Evergreen Park v. Chrysler Realty Corp., 168 Ill. App. 3d 784, 793 (1988); cf. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 8.18, at 643 (2d ed. 1990) ("Whether a material breach has remained uncured for long enough to justify termination is a question of fact, much like the question whether the breach is material in the first place."). According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 242 (1981), a material breach does not automatically justify terminating the contract, or discharging the other party's remaining duties to render performance.