First Nat'l Bank Trust Co. v. Sidwell Corp.

17 Citing cases

  1. Amoco Production Co. v. Wilson, Inc.

    266 Kan. 1084 (Kan. 1999)   Cited 23 times

    Wilson distinguishes Drilling, Inc. v. Warren, 185 Kan. 29, 340 P.2d 919 (1959), relied on by Amoco and the trial court, as factually different because it relates to whether a later oil and gas lease is burdened by an overriding royalty interest, while the issue here is simply the extent of the present agreement and the construction that should be given to "all rights." Wilson cites First Nat'l Bank Trust Co. v. Sidwell Corp., 234 Kan. 867, 678 P.2d 118 (1984), as a case helpful to its position. Sidwell is an "area of mutual interest" case which did not require any provision concerning later-acquired leases in order for such leases to be covered by the agreement. It is interesting to note that our opinion in Sidwell specifically stated in Syllabus ¶ 5:

  2. Rucker v. Delay

    44 Kan. App. 2 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 2 times

    CRA later obtained a lease on the property and contended the second lease was not a renewal or extension of the first leases and the initial assignment violated the rule against perpetuities as to extensions or renewals. Our Supreme Court did not rely on the apparent agreement between the parties as occurred some 30 years later in First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Sidwell Corp., 234 Kan. 867, 678 P.2d 118 (1984). Rather, it held the interest, under which no production had been obtained, vested upon the delivery of the first assignment, " and in such case the rule against perpetuities has no application."

  3. Jason Oil Co. v. Littler

    446 P.3d 1058 (Kan. 2019)   Cited 2 times

    which isolate the property and exclude it from commerce and development for long periods of time, thus working an indirect restraint upon alienation, which is regarded at common law as a public evil.’ First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Sidwell Corp., 234 Kan. 867, Syl. ¶ 8, 678 P.2d 118 (1984)."The rule was first developed ‘to prevent the practice of tying up family property for generations and thereby creating unreasonable restraints upon the alienation of property.’

  4. Gore v. Beren

    254 Kan. 418 (Kan. 1994)   Cited 62 times
    Holding USRAP did not apply to property interest created in 1962

    The underlying reason for and purpose of the rule is to avoid fettering real property with future interests dependent upon contingencies unduly remote which isolate the property and exclude it from commerce and development for long periods of time, thus working an indirect restraint upon alienation, which is regarded at common law as a public evil." First Nat'l Bank Trust Co. v. Sidwell Corp., 234 Kan. 867, Syl. ¶ 8, 678 P.2d 118 (1984). The rule was first developed "to prevent the practice of tying up family property for generations and thereby creating unreasonable restraints upon the alienation of property."

  5. Terra Venture, Inc. v. JDN Real Estate-Overland Park, L.P.

    443 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 2006)   Cited 44 times
    Finding that the third factor weighed against the existence of a joint venture where one party was without veto or approval power

    We note that "[u]nder Kansas law, in general, a `fiduciary duty' exists among joint venturers." In re Klippel, 183 B.R. 252, 259 (Bankr.D.Kan. 1995) (citing First Nat'l Bank Trust v. Sidwell Corp., 234 Kan. 867, 678 P.2d 118 (1984)). We do not believe the record supports a finding that Plaintiffs and Defendants had, in fact, formed a joint venture at all.

  6. Maxwell v. St. Francis Health Ctr.

    Case No. 17-4014-SAC-KGS (D. Kan. Sep. 13, 2017)   Cited 1 times

    As mentioned earlier, plaintiff alleges in the first amended complaint that the Hollins defendants were the agents of defendants St. Francis and City of Topeka. An agent may be an employee or an independent contractor. See McCarthy v. Recordex Service, Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 853 (3rd Cir. 1996); First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Sidwell Corp., 678 P.2d 118, 124 (Kan. 1984). Because plaintiff does not allege an employer/employee relationship or facts supporting such an allegation, the court shall focus upon whether plaintiff has alleged facts which would support a plausible claim of vicarious liability of a principal for the acts of an independent contractor/attorney.

  7. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp. v. Premium Beef Feeders, LLC

    168 F. Supp. 3d 1334 (D. Kan. 2016)   Cited 21 times

    Scholastic Book Clubs , 260 Kan. at 533-34, 920 P.2d at 951.Woolsey v. Petroleum Prod. Mgmt., Inc. , 1990 WL 66591, at *7 (D.Kan. Apr. 4, 1990) (citing First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Sidwell Corp. , 234 Kan. 867, 872, 678 P.2d 118, 124 (1984) ).Ritchie Enters. , 730 F.Supp. at 1053.

  8. Gasconade Oil Co. v. Ultra Res., Inc. (In re Ultra Petroleum Corp.)

    CASE NO: 16-32202 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2018)

    However, pursuant to American common law, as discussed within the Restatement (First) of Property, the Rule does not apply to transactions that are exclusively contractual. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 401 (1944); see, e.g., Temple Hoyne Buell Found. v. Holland & Hart, 851 P.2d 192, 196 (Colo. App. 1992) (finding that the option contract did not create an enforceable interest nor fetter a specific parcel of land); First Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. of Okla. City v. Sidwell Corp., 678 P.2d 118, 126 (1984) ("The contract here did not involve the vesting of future interests in real property and did not constitute a restraint upon the alienation of that property."); Courseview, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 258 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (finding the Rule to be inapplicable to the contract because it created no real property interests, only contingent interests). Such a transaction does not fetter any property and thus does not bring the transaction within the purview of the Rule.

  9. In re Klippel

    183 B.R. 252 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995)   Cited 18 times

    Under Kansas law, in general, a "fiduciary duty" exists among joint venturers. See First National Bank Trust v. Sidwell Corp., 234 Kan. 867, 678 P.2d 118 (1984). The scope of this fiduciary relationship is defined by "the same standards of good conduct and square dealing as are required by partners."

  10. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Whiting Oil & Gas Corp.

    320 P.3d 1179 (Colo. 2014)   Cited 10 times   1 Legal Analyses

    The rule served to “avoid fettering real property with future interests dependent upon contingencies unduly remote which isolate the property and exclude it from commerce and development for long periods of time, thus working an indirect restraint upon alienation.” First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Sidwell Corp., 234 Kan. 867, 678 P.2d 118, 127 (1984) (quoting Weber v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 807, 808 (5th Cir.1936)). Like rules against unreasonable restraints on alienation, the rule against perpetuities stems from a general policy against withdrawal of property from commerce, and accordingly aims to keep property freely transferable. SeeAtchison v. City of Englewood, 170 Colo. 295, 305, 463 P.2d 297, 302 (1969); see also W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 Harv. L.Rev. 638, 640 (1938).