The principal must cause the third person to reasonably believe the principal has consented to the agent acting on its behalf. See, e.g., First Nat'l, Bank of Omaha v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 12 Neb.App. 353, 675 N.W.2d 689, 702 (2004) ("It would be difficult to see how someone can act upon appearances without relying upon them. . . ."). The operative complaints therefore fail to state a claim under the doctrine of apparent authority.

Intent has traditionally meant not only desire to bring about the consequences of an act, but also knowledge that certain consequences are substantially certain to result from it. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A cmt. b (1965); William L. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 8 at 31-32 (4th ed.1971); see also, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. Acceptance Ins. Cos., 12 Neb.App. 353, 675 N.W.2d 689, 704 (2004); Bradley v. Am. Smelting Ref. Co., 104 Wash.2d 677, 709 P.2d 782, 785-86 (1985). If there was no genuine issue of fact as to whether appellants knew that it was substantially certain that their sales of cable descramblers would result in the unauthorized interception of cable services, the district court's grant of summary judgment should be affirmed. Because it is undisputed that Comcast's subscribers were able to rent a cable descrambler from Comcast for substantially less than the cost to purchase a comparable product from Multivision, there is little reason a paying customer would spend a considerable sum of money to purchase Multivision's product.

03, comment c. See, also, Restatement. supra note 7, § 1.03. See id. See, also, Nebraska Tractor Equipment Co. v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., 156 Neb. 366, 56 N.W.2d 288 (1953); First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Acceptance Ins. Cos., 12 Neb. App. 353, 675 N.W.2d 689 (2004). See Western Fertilizer, supra note 5.

Apparent authority to perform an act exists when a principal's conduct causes a third person to reasonably believe that the principal agreed that the person purporting to act for him or her could do so. See First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Acceptance Ins. Cos., 12 Neb. App. 353, 675 N.W.2d 689 (2004) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 27 (1958)). By drafting the letter, signing it, delivering it to Thieman, and then instructing him to "do what you have to do," Little clothed Thieman with apparent authority.

May 19, 2004. 12 Neb. App. 353 (2004). Petition of appellee for further review overruled on May 19, 2004.

The claims provision in the contract in this case provides that "[w]ritten notice stating the general nature of each Claim, shall be delivered by the claimant to Engineer and the other party to the Contract promptly (but in no event later than 30 days) after the start of the event giving rise thereto." In First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Acceptance Ins. Companies, Inc., 12 Neb. App. 353, 675 N.W.2d 689 (2004), this court was called to determine whether a party to a contract lost its right to present a claim by failing to comply with a provision in the contract requiring notice of claims prior to a particular date. We concluded that the language used in the contract indicated that the parties intended notice of claims to be a condition to the right to seek relief for such claims, and we held that failure to comply with the notice provision resulted in the party losing its right to advance the claim.

Motion of appellee for summary affirmance sustained; judgment affirmed. See, rule 7B(2); First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Acceptance Ins. Cos., 12 Neb. App. 353, 675 N.W.2d 689 (2004); State v. Stuart, 12 Neb. App. 283, 671 N.W.2d 239 (2003).

Motion of appellee for summary affirmance sustained; judgment affirmed. See, rule 7B(2); First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Acceptance Ins. Cos., 12 Neb. App. 353, 675 N.W.2d 689 (2004); State v. Stuart, 12 Neb. App. 283, 671 N.W.2d 239 (2003).

May 19, 2004. 12 Neb. App. 353 (2004). Petition of appellee for further review overruled on May 19, 2004.