On this basis, a legal obligation of good faith and fair dealing also has been extended to employers dealing with employees in Gates v. Life of Montana [ 205 Mont. 304,] (Mont. 1983), 668 P.2d 213, 40 St.Rep. 1287, and Dare v. Montana Petroleum Marketing Company (Mont. 1984), [ 212 Mont. 274,] 687 P.2d 1015, 41 St.Rep. 1735; to fee arrangements between a lawyer and his client, Morse v. Espeland (Mont. 1985), [ 215 Mont. 148,] 696 P.2d 428, 42 St.Rep. 251; and to banks dealing with customers, First National Bank of Libby v. Twombly (Mont. 1984), [ 213 Mont. 66,] 689 P.2d 1226, 41 St.Rep. 1948 and Tribby v. Northwestern Bank of Great Falls (Mont. 1985), 704 P.2d 409, 42 St.Rep. 1133. California law implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing into every contract, commercial, insurance, employment, or otherwise.

We therefore will detail the facts and, as we must, in a light favorable to respondent. First National Bank in Libby v. Twombly (Mont. 1984), [ 213 Mont. 66,] 689 P.2d 1226, 1230, 41 St.Rep. 1948, 1952; Jacques v. Montana National Guard (Mont. 1982), 199 Mont. 493, 503, 649 P.2d 1319, 1325. Following commencement of her employment, respondent worked as a teller for approximately 14 years, performing in a satisfactory fashion.

Kussler v. Burlington Northern, Inc. (1980), 186 Mont. 82, 606 P.2d 520. Nothing in the record indicates either a release or a non-release of Norwest. At the time Norwest first argued against extending bad faith tort principles to this commercial area, this Court had not decided First National Bank in Libby v. Twombly (Mont. 1984), [ 213 Mont. 66,] 689 P.2d 1226, 41 St.Rep. 1948. In that case, the bank customer alleged that the bank acted in bad faith when it accelerated an indebtedness and offset the amount against their checking account.

Under Montana law, a person is liable in a tort action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing at least where the parties bargain from unequal positions. Darko v. United States, et. al., 646 F. Supp. 223, 224-225 (D.Mont. 1986); Weber v. BlueCross, 196 Mont. 454, 643 P.2d 198 (1982); First National Bank in Libby v. Twombly, 213 Mont. 66, 689 P.2d 1226 (1984); Tribby v. Northwestern Bank of GF, 217 Mont. 196, 704 P.2d 409 (1985); Nicholson v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 219 Mont. 32, 710 P.2d 1342 (1985). The LaPlants allege that after entering into a loan agreement, the FmHA breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by pressuring them into selling their land at a loss and failing to inform them of their right to debt rescheduling.

The court instructed that the apparent danger to the prospect of payment or performance by NLL or the existence of good reason to believe such danger existed was sufficient to show that the Bank acted reasonably and in good faith; and that the nature and extent of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was measured in a particular contract by the justifiable expectations of the parties; that the obligation of good faith and fair dealing was mutual so that if the defendant breached the implied covenant, the jury must also determine whether the plaintiff had breached the implied covenant of good faith in dealing with the Bank In First National Bank In Libby v. Twombly (1984), 213 Mont. 66, 689 P.2d 1226, the bank accelerated the payment due on a promissory note without notice to the borrower and set off $2,865.00 in Twombly's checking account against the indebtedness The issue of good faith for the set off was submitted to the jury under § 30-1-208, MCA, as to whether the bank in good faith believed that the prospect of payment or performance by the borrower was impaired. This Court approved the decision of the jury that the obligation of good faith was breached and remanded the case for determination of the jury question whether the borrower was entitled to punitive damages

, Jack M. Finley, Inc. v. Longview Bank Trust, 705 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App. 1985); his position — whether secured or unsecured, e.g., McKay v. Farmers Stockmens Bank of Clayton, 92 N.M. 181, 585 P.2d 325 (1978); any deceit or outrageous conduct in the course of the whole transaction, including repossession, e.g., Farmers Merchant Bank of Centre v. Hancock, 506 So.2d 305 (Ala. 1987); Mitchell v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 688 P.2d 42 (Okla. 1984); an abrupt departure from an established course of dealing, e.g., Reid v. Key Bank of Southern Maine, 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987); such circumstances relating only to the creditor as audits or personnel conflicts, e.g., Farmers Merchant Bank of Centre, supra; erroneous assertion of default on some other ground, e.g., Kupka v. Morey, 541 P.2d 740 (Alaska 1975); the course of dealing between the parties, e.g., Farmers Merchant Bank of Centre, supra; Reid v. Key Bank, supra; any oppressive use of his superior position, e.g., Reid v. Key Bank, supra; Libby v. Twombley, 213 Mont. 66, 689 P.2d 1226 (1984); any commercial advantage unrelated to the security of the debt, e.g., State National Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App. 1984); gross negligence in record keeping, e.g., Mitchell v. Ford Motor Credit, supra; see also McConnico v. Third National Bank, 499 S.W.2d 874, 881 (Tenn. 1973); prior assurances causing the other party to change position, e.g., Libby v. Twombley, supra; and a creditor's own conduct that contributes to the insecurity, e.g., Kupka v. Morey, supra. Recent decisions rendered by the courts of other states illustrate the foregoing summary.

Woell asserts that our decision in Production Credit Ass'n v. Halverson, 386 N.W.2d 905 (N.D. 1986), "indicates" that we have recognized a tort cause of action based upon a breach of the good faith obligation. Although First National Bank in Libby v. Twombly, 213 Mont. 66, 689 P.2d 1226 (1984), in which the Montana Supreme Court recognized such a tort, was cited in that case, we merely held that Halverson had raised a genuine issue of material fact with regard to "breach of PCA's contractual obligation of good faith." Production Credit Ass'n v. Halverson, supra, 386 N.W.2d at 908.

or of the lender); Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain State Bank, Mo. App., 715 S.W.2d 944 (1986); Yankton Production Credit Ass'n v. Larsen, 219 Neb. 610, 365 N.W.2d 430, 434 (1985) (genuine issues of material fact as to whether the PCA acted in good faith when it refused to loan the amount of the budgeted loan); and Pecos Const. Co. v. Mortgage Inv. Co. of El Paso, 80 N.M. 680, 459 P.2d 842 (1969) (business compulsion as economic duress is actionable). See likewise Bank of Fairbanks v. Kaye, 16 Alaska 23, 227 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1955) (the bank should not accept a new arrangement if not intending to comply with its basic promise as novation by further assurance from third-party payment promise which abrogates any denied right to immediate foreclosure); Stirling v. Chemical Bank, 382 F. Supp. 1146, 1153 (S.D.N Y 1974), aff'd 516 F.2d 1396 (2nd Cir. 1975) (common law fraud from false representations that outstanding loans would not be called and further loans would be made); First Nat. Bank in Libby v. Twombly, Mont., 689 P.2d 1226 (1984) (jury issue of breach of statutory obligations to act in good faith); and Nevada Nat. Bank v. Huff, 94 Nev. 506, 582 P.2d 364 (1978) (course of conduct between parties as jury issue to impose duty on lender). Compare Northwestern Nat. Bank of Great Falls v. Weaver-Maxwell, Inc., Mont., 729 P.2d 1258, 1262 (1986) (where on reversal of jury verdict, appellate court said that the trial court did not leave fact finding to the jury, as it should leave the factual determinations of the nature of the agreement to the jury).

In light of the foregoing discussion, we must also conclude that the District Court erred in striking Cooper's claim for punitive damages during trial. First Nat. Bank of Libby v. Twombly (Mont. 1984), [ 213 Mont. 66,] 689 P.2d 1226, 1229, 41 St.Rep. 1948, 1953. The evidence in this case presented the jury with numerous questions of malicious, willful, wanton or reckless conduct which may have warranted an award of punitive damages.

We have also held that the legal obligation of good faith and fair dealing has been extended to Bank's dealing with customers. Nicholson, supra; Tribby v. Northwestern Bank of Great Falls (Mont. 1985), [ 217 Mont. 196,] 704 P.2d 409, 42 St.Rep. 1133; First National Bank of Libby v. Twombly (Mont. 1984), [ 213 Mont. 66,] 689 P.2d 1226, 41 St.Rep. 1948. In Deist v. Wachholz (Mont. 1984), [ 208 Mont. 207,] 678 P.2d 188, 41 St.Rep. 286, this Court recognized that there is a fiduciary obligation owed by a bank to its customer where a customer and officer of the Bank have entered into a confidential relationship.