" (See Searles v. Gonzalez, 191 Cal. 426 [ 216 P. 1003, 28 A.L.R. 78]; Curtis v. Holee, 184 Cal. 726 [ 195 P. 395, 18 A.L.R. 1024]; Foster v. Bowles, 138 Cal. 346 [ 71 P. 494, 649]; Concannon v. Smith, 134 Cal. 14 [ 66 P. 40]; Sterling v. Title Ins. Trust Co., 53 Cal.App.2d 736, 739-740 [ 128 P.2d 31]; VanCauteren v. Forger, 45 Cal.App.2d 388, 392 [ 114 P.2d 6]; Heiser v. McAlpine, 20 Cal.App.2d 467, 471 [ 67 P.2d 141]; Maurer v. Bernardo, 118 Cal.App. 290 [ 5 P.2d 36]; Foristiere v. Alonge, 98 Cal.App. 563 [ 277 P. 367]; Armstrong v. Maupas, 97 Cal.App. 710, 712 [ 276 P. 148]; First Nat. Bk. of Parks Rapids v. Pray, 86 Cal.App. 484, 489 [ 260 P. 933]; Shirley v. Shirley, 83 Cal.App. 386, 390 [ 256 P. 823]; Hayes v. O'Marr, 81 Cal.App. 210, 212 [ 253 P. 749]; Wilson v. Walters, 66 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 151 P.2d 685]; Outwaters v. Brownlee, 22 Cal.App. 535, 538 [ 135 P. 300]; Rest. Contracts, § 86 (2) (a).) [4] In applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, there is no doubt that the acknowledgment was sufficient.

Taken as a whole they were at least as definite and expressive as the acknowledgment held to be sufficient in Southern Pacific Co. v. Prosser, supra. Writings of similar import were held sufficient as acknowledgments and effective to start anew the running of the statute of limitations in Bank of America etc. Assn. v. Hunter (1937), 8 Cal. (2d) 592 [ 67 P.2d 99]; Searles v. Gonzalez, supra, (1923), 191 Cal. 426; Concannon v. Smith (1901), 134 Cal. 14 [ 66 P. 40]; Weatherwax v. Hills (1931), 113 Cal.App. 557 [ 298 P. 853]; and First Nat. Bk. of Park Rapids v. Pray (1927), 86 Cal.App. 484 [ 260 P. 933]. Respondent, in arguing the second and third questions above stated, singles out the fourth letter, written after the statute had run, and contends that it contained a promise conditioned upon the debtor's ability to sell certain real property which she owned.

The two cases cited and relied upon by respondent are materially different in their facts from the present case. In First Nat. Bank of Park Rapids v. Pray, 86 Cal.App. 484 [ 260 P. 933], the acknowledgment was made up of a series of correspondence between the parties, running over a number of years, wherein the debtor at all times treated the obligation as subsisting, and one which he was liable and willing to pay. It was held, therefore, that the law implied a promise to pay according to the tenor and terms of the obligation. The case of Southern Pac. Co. v. Prosser, 122 Cal. 413 [52 P. 836, 55 P. 145], is closer to the point at issue.

[2] It is true that, in either case, there need be no express promise to pay, and if the written acknowledgment is sufficient within the contemplation of section 360 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to take the case out of the operation of the statute of limitations, the law implies a promise to pay from such acknowledgment. ( Foster v. Bowles, 138 Cal. 346 [ 71 P. 494, 649]; Searles v. Gonzalez, supra; Concannon v. Smith, 134 Cal. 14 [ 66 P. 40]; First Nat. Bank, etc., v. Pray, 86 Cal.App. 484 [ 260 P. 933]; Foristiere v. Alonge, supra.) [3] But the rule is well established that the written acknowledgment, whether made before or after the statute has run on the original indebtedness, must be a distinct, unqualified, unconditional recognition of the obligation for which the person making such admission is liable.

The only distinction between an acknowledgment of a debt before and one after the statute has run, say the courts, is that an acknowledgment or promise made before the statute has run vitalizes the old debt for another statutory period dating from the time of the acknowledgment or promise, while an acknowledgment made after the statute has run gives a new cause of action, for which the old debt is a consideration. ( Southern Pacific Co. v. Prosser, supra; Rodgers v. Byers, 127 Cal. 528 [ 60 P. 42].) In either case there need be no express promise to pay, it being held sufficient if the writing shows that the debtor treats the indebtedness as subsisting and as one which he is liable and willing to pay; and from such acknowledgment the law implies a promise to pay ( Foster v. Bowles, 138 Cal. 346 [ 71 P. 494, 649]; Searles v. Gonzalez, 191 Cal. 426 [28 A.L.R. 78, 216 P. 1003]; Concannon v. Smith, 134 Cal. 14 [ 66 P. 40]; First National Bank of Park Rapids v. Pray, 86 Cal.App. 484 [ 260 P. 933]). In the case of Commercial Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brett, 44 Barb. (N.Y.) 489, some of the earlier decisions bearing upon the essential element of a willingness to pay are summarized as follows: "In Van Keuren v. Parmelee, (2 Comst. (N.Y.) 523 [51 Am. Dec. 322]), the same rule was recognized.

If the writer treats the indebtedness as subsisting and one for which he is liable a promise to pay will be implied. Yankwich on California Pleading and Procedure, 1926, Sec. 148, pp. 262-264; First National Bank of Park Rapids v. Pray, 1927, 86 Cal.App. 484, 488-490, 260 P. 933; Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Jones, 1946, 27 Cal.2d 819, 822-825, 167 P.2d 719, 164 A.L.R. 685. While the older cases laid down rather rigid requirements as to the certainty of the promise, the higher courts of California, beginning with the leading case of Southern Pacific Company v. Prosser, 1898, 122 Cal. 413, 52 P. 836, 55 P. 145, have held the most informal language which identifies the obligation and recognizes its existence sufficient compliance with the statute.

Based on the record provided by the Commission, this Court determines that any claims held by Burns and Liscom are subject to a bona fide dispute. It is not clear that the Consent Judgment was an acknowledgment of a debt owed by the alleged debtor to Burns and Liscom. An acknowledgment must be an admission of a debt existing to the creditor in question. First Nat. Bk. of Park Rapids v. Pray, 86 Cal.App. 484 (1927). The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel characterized the Consent Judgment as follows:

Based on the record provided by the Commission, this Court determines that any claims held by Burns and Liscom are subject to a bona fide dispute. It is not clear that the Consent Judgment was an acknowledgment of a debt owed by the alleged debtor to Burns and Liscom. An acknowledgment must be an admission of a debt existing to the creditor in question. First Nat. Bk. of Park Rapids v. Pray, 86 Cal.App. 484 (1927). The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel characterized the Consent Judgment as follows:

Based on the record provided by the Commission, this Court determines that any claims held by Burns and Liscom are subject to a bona fide dispute. It is not clear that the Consent Judgment was an acknowledgment of a debt owed by the alleged debtor to Burns and Liscom. An acknowledgment must be an admission of a debt existing to the creditor in question. First Nat. Bk. of Park Rapids v. Pray, 86 Cal.App. 484 (1927). The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel characterized the Consent Judgment as follows:

Based on the record provided by the Commission, this Court determines that any claims held by Burns and Liscom are subject to a bona fide dispute. It is not clear that the Consent Judgment was an acknowledgment of a debt owed by the alleged debtor to Burns and Liscom. An acknowledgment must be an admission of a debt existing to the creditor in question. First Nat. Bk. of Park Rapids v. Pray, 86 Cal.App. 484 (1927). The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel characterized the Consent Judgment as follows: