We must place ourselves as nearly as possible in the position occupied by the parties when the instrument was executed and then read the provisions within the four corners of the agreement. First National Bank v. Gillam, 134 Okl. 237, 273 P. 261, 265. The contract may be explained by reference to the circumstances under which it was made and the matter to which it relates.

The only rule that is of much assistance is that we must place ourselves as nearly as possible in the position of the parties at the time of the execution of the contract, and then take it by the four corners and read it. The plaintiff, on page 11 of its brief, states its position in the following language: "It seems that the honorable district court, mistaking the import of the case of First National Bank of Ardmore v. Gillam [ 134 Okla. 237], 273 P. 261, was of the opinion that that clause in plaintiff's mortgage referring to future indebtedness, was unenforceable." The error of this position is that there was no allegation of the creation of or default in payment of any future advances, and the question of the validity of mortgages to secure the repayment of future advances is not involved in this case.

hese clauses. Examples include: United States v. Fahrenkamp, 312 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1963); Feldman v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 408 F. Supp. 24 (E.D.Pa. 1976); Marine Nat. Bank v. Airco, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 231 (W.D.Pa. 1975); National Bank of Eastern Ark. v. Blankenship, 177 F. Supp. 667 (E.D.Ark. 1959), aff'd, 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1960); Lundgren, 756 P.2d 270; Security Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 263 Ark. 525, 565 S.W.2d 623 (1978); First Nat. Bank of Corning v. Corning Bank Trust Co., 168 Ark. 17, 268 S.W. 606 (1925); Kamaole Resort Twenty-One v. Ficke Hawaiian Investments, Inc., 60 Haw. 413, 591 P.2d 104 (1979); Akamine and Sons, Limited v. American Sec. Bank, 50 Haw. 304, 50 Haw. 368, 440 P.2d 262 (1968); Ruidoso State Bank v. Castle, 105 N.M. 158, 730 P.2d 461 (1986); Clovis Nat. Bank v. Harmon, 102 N.M. 166, 692 P.2d 1315 (1984); New Mexico Bank Trust Co. v. Lucas Bros., 92 N.M. 2, 582 P.2d 379 (1978); Farmers Nat. Bank of Cherokee v. De Fever, 177 Okla. 561, 61 P.2d 245 (1936); First Nat. Bank of Ardmore v. Gillam, 134 Okla. 237, 273 P. 261 (1927); and In re Grizaffi, 23 B.R. 137 (Colo. 1982).

In the absence of such extraordinary cause (which does not appear in the instant case) as would make it the duty of this court to review them, neither the soundness of the reasoning by which they were reached, nor the question of what its decision would be if the matter were res integra, will be examined, and, in the circumstances, the existence of diverse opinion in other jurisdictions, of which we are aware, is now without persuasiveness here. Lasiter, Adm'r, v. Ferguson, 79 Okla. 200, 192 P. 197. In First National Bank of Ardmore v. Gillam, 134 Okla. 237, 273 P. 261, decided November 8, 1927, this court held, upon facts which, in so far as they bear upon the question now presented, are without difference distinguishing them from those in the instant case, that a chattel mortgage, executed on a printed form in which was inserted, in one of several blank spaces provided therein for the insertion of a description of the obligations to be secured, a specific description, including the amount, of the note executed at the same time, did not secure, by force of a further printed provision in the mortgage that it was to stand as security for all other indebtedness and liaabilities of the mortgagor to the mortgagee, another existing note not identified in the mortgage. Again, in American National Bank v. Hensley, 170 Okla. 109, 39 P.2d 34, decided December 18, 1934, upon a record similarly parallel to that in the instant case, this court reached and rendered the same opinion upon the law, saying:

" Toye, at *4 (interpreting a contract under Oklahoma law). See also First Nat. Bank of Ardmore v. Gillam, 134 Okla. 237, 264 (Okla. 1927). The Policy is unambiguous in its coverage of only DCI's work as a remodeler or handyman.

The Oklahoma cases cited by the appellants in support of the proposition that the mortgage lacked essential terms are inapposite. In both Farmers National Bank of Cherokee v. De Fever, 177 Okl. 561, 61 P.2d 245 (1936) and First National Bank of Ardmore v. Gillam, 134 Okl. 237, 273 P. 261 (1927) the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held only that the handwritten or typewritten portions of a mortgage that specify the debt secured control over printed language stating that a mortgage secures all the mortgagor's debts. Neither case states that the insertion of the amount and due date of a mortgage after it has been signed renders it invalid.

The Court is also guided by the principles of narrow construction given dragnet clauses, and that their coverage of future debts should be carefully scrutinized and "any doubt or uncertainty as to the obligation secured operates against the mortgagee." Rozell, 493 F.2d at 1201; First National Bank v. Gillam, 134 Okla. 237, 273 P. 261, 265; Ballarino, 180 B.R. at 346.

See also Oklahoma's adoption of the specific-identification rule. First Nat. Bank of Ardmore v. Gillam, 134 Okla. 237, 273 P. 261 (1927); Farmers Nat. Bank of Cherokee v. De Fever, 177 Okla. 561, 61 P.2d 245, 247 (1936): "* * * [A] chattel mortgage, executed on a printed form in which was inserted, in one of several blank spaces provided therein for the insertion of a description of the obligations to be secured, a specific description, including the amount, of a note executed at the same time, did not secure, by force of a further printed provision in the mortgage that it was to stand as security for all other indebtedness and liabilities of the mortgagor to the mortgagee, another existing note not identified in the mortgage."

Decisions to this effect may be found in Arkansas, Oklahoma and Kansas. First National Bank v. Rozelle, 493 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1974); National Bank of Eastern Arkansas v. Blankenship, 177 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Ark. 1959), aff'd sub nom, National Bank of Eastern Arkansas v. General Mills, 283 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1960); Hendrickson v. Farmers' Bank Trust Co., 189 Ark. 423, 73 S.W.2d 725 (1934); Sowder v. Lawrence, 129 Kan. 135, 281 P. 921 (1929); First National Bank v. Gillam, 134 Okla. 237, 273 P. 261 (1927). We need not examine the rationale of these decisions, as the question is disposed of by prior rulings of this court.

Irrespective of stereotyped or general printed provisions appearing in a contract, the literal or sweeping terms of a contract may never prevail over what appears to the court to be the rational and general intent of the parties thereto. First National Bank v. Gillam, 134 Okla. 237, 273 P. 261 (1929). We find the intention of the parties was not to include driveways and parking lots within the restriction prohibiting building of a "structure" without approval of the grantee.