Opinion
No. 33397.
November 21, 1938
1. GUARDIAN AND WARD.
Under statute requiring that certain provisions of the law on the subject of executors and administrators be observed in guardianships, a statute requiring that an action against an executor or administrator be brought within four years after qualification applies to claims against guardians for liability of their wards (Code 1930, secs. 1902, 2295).
2. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
Statutes of limitation being remedial are to be construed liberally.
3. STATUTES.
Statutes are to be construed together, their meaning to be determined from all statutes in pari materia.
4. GUARDIAN AND WARD.
Statute requiring that applicable statutory provisions relating to executors and administrators be observed in guardianships, construed with statute requiring actions against administrators to be brought within four years after qualification, requires that actions against guardians be brought within four years after qualification of guardian, allowing an additional six months within which suit may not be instituted against administrators (Code 1930, secs. 1902, 2295).
APPEAL from the chancery court of Warren county; HON. J.L. WILLIAMS, Chancellor.
Brunini Hirsch, of Vicksburg, for appellant.
The only question before this honorable court is whether or not the accounts probated against this estate were barred by the statute of limitations, if any. It is the position of the appellant, First National Bank Trust Company of Vicksburg, that the statute of limitations has run against these claims.
Section 1902, Code of 1930.
There is no statute specifically stating that the statute of limitations will run against claims probated against the estate of this type of ward, but under Chapter 45 entitled "Limitations of Actions," Code of 1930, Section 2295 reads as follows: "Action against executor or administrator. — An action or scire facias may not be brought against any executor or administrator upon any judgment or other cause of action against his testator or intestate, but within four years after the qualification of such executor or administrator."
It would, therefore, appear unquestionably that Section 2295 read in the light of Section 1902 bars the claim of the appellee. The learned chancellor took the position, in the lower court, that since the statute of limitations is unknown to common law that it must be expressly alluded to in Section 1902.
It would be a curious anomaly in the law, in our opinion, if claims would be barred against every estate except against the person of an unsound mind. We do not think the Legislature intended such and we think it is the evident intention and purpose of Section 1902 that all statutes relating to executors and administrators shall be applied and Section 2295 is the statute applicable to executors or administrators.
Dent, Robinson Ward, of Vicksburg, for appellee.
Statutes of limitation are in derogation of common law and hence must be strictly construed.
Hollman v. Bennett, 44 Miss. 322; Tepper Bros. v. Buttross, 174 So. 556.
Section 1672 provides how claims may be probated and allowed, and further provides that if they are not probated within six months' period they are barred. The next succeeding Section, 1673, provides as follows: "Registration Stops Limitation. The presentation of a claim, and having it probated and registered as required by law, shall stop the running of the general statute of limitations as to such claim, whether the estate be solvent or insolvent."
This last section by specific reference applies to guardians as well as to executors and administrators. Therefore, if actions against a guardian of a non compos mentis would be governed by Section 2295 of the Mississippi Code of 1930, then the account does not become barred by the statute of limitation and the guardian in the case at bar can legally pay the claim here in question. We have been unable to find any cases decided directly upon this point in the State of Mississippi. There are cases, however, in other states where a similar state of facts exists in which it has been held that the account would not be barred by the statute of limitations.
Lawton v. Newell, 261 N.W. 730, 100 A.L.R. 238.
The law wisely provides for the winding up and closing of an estate of a deceased person as early as possible. For that reason the legislature has passed Section 2295 requiring that suit shall be brought within a limited time against an executor or administrator, thus forcing an early closing of the estate. There is no such condition, however, with a guardian and ward where the ward is a non compos mentis, as in the case at bar. The guardian must continue to handle the estate so long as its ward is unable to take care of its own estate, or until the ward dies. Therefore, there is no reason for requiring suit to be brought against the guardian within any definite length of time and in many cases if such a requirement was made it would work a great hardship on the ward just as it would have in this particular case. The Legislature in its wisdom has seen fit not to pass any statutes of limitations in regard to suits against guardians and this case shows the wisdom of this action.
This is an appeal from the chancery court on the question of whether or not the statute of limitations, section 2295, Code of 1930, bars a claim probated against the estate of Esther Sinai, who was legally declared non compos mentis by a jury in Warren county, Mississippi, and the First National Bank Trust Company of Vicksburg, Mississippi, qualified as the legal guardian of her estate on October 7th, 1930. The first publication of notice was made in a newspaper in Vicksburg in its issue of October 29th, 1930, and three subsequent publications were made, one each week for three consecutive weeks, in the same paper. Among others, Edith M. Landau probated an account for $537.15, this account being probated within the six months period allowed for the probation of claims from the date of the first publication of the above notice. The case was tried on an agreed statement of facts, in which this fact was admitted, and it was also admitted that the chancery court of Warren county had jurisdiction over the estate of Esther Sinai at the time of appointment of the bank as guardian. It is also admitted that the probation of accounts of several creditors named in the agreed statement of facts, was for the amounts then owing, and that the said probation of their claims was in proper form; but that no suits for payment thereof had been filed, the only question submitted to the court for decision being whether or not the claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The agreement was dated Jan. 11th, 1938.
The chancellor held that the claim was not barred, and authorized the guardian to pay the claims specified in the agreed statement of facts; from which decree the bank appealed here. The bank was willing to pay if it was authorized to do so, but desired to have the question of whether or not the claims were barred adjudicated for its protection.
Section 1902, Code of 1930, provides: "The guardian of a person of unsound mind, convict of felony, habitual drunkard, habitual user of cocaine, or morphine or opium, shall make a true and perfect inventory of the estate and return the same, and account with the court as often and in the same manner as executors and administrators; and in the same manner shall give bond with sureties, and take the oath to discharge the duties; and the court shall have the same power and control over such guardians as it has over executors and administrators; and the guardian shall also be liable, on his bond, in the same way, and the court shall have the same power over the estate of such wards as it has over the estates of decedents, and all the provisions of law on the subject of executors and administrators, relating to inventories, appraisements, settlements or disposition of property, notice to creditors, registration of claims, accounts, proceedings to insolvency and distribution of assets of insolvent estates, shall, as far as applicable, and not otherwise provided, be observed and enforced in all such guardianships. But the court may order the sale or lease of the ward's lands under the same conditions and in the same manner as is provided for the sale of the lands of a minor."
It will be noted from the provision in the above statute that "all the provisions of law on the subject of executors and administrators, relating to inventories, appraisements, settlements or disposition of property, notice to creditors, registration of claims, accounts, proceedings to insolvency and distribution of assets of insolvent estates, shall, as far as applicable, and not otherwise provided, be observed and enforced in all such guardianships." The language is broad enough to include the limitation of time within which an action must be brought under the above statute.
In our opinion it was intended that the same rule would apply to guardianships as to executors and administrators, and that the statute of limitations, section 2295, Code of 1930, providing that, "An action or scire facias may not be brought against any executor or administrator upon any judgment or other cause of action against his testator or intestate, but within four years after the qualification of such executor or administrator," applies to claims against guardians for liability of their wards as well.
It is said in the argument that the statute is in derogation of the common law, and must be strictly construed; and that as guardians are not named therein the statute cannot apply to them, because there was no limitation of right of action at the common law. Statutes of limitation are for the security of society, designed to require that parties having causes of action shall pursue them within such time as may be deemed reasonable, to the end that such matters may be heard and decided while reliable evidence is procurable, rather than to have the uncertainty resulting from long delay, during which there may be failure of memory on the part of witnesses, or loss of papers and documents through accidents, etc. Such statutes are therefore remedial in their nature, rather than otherwise, and remedial statutes are to be construed liberally; but whether liberally or strictly construed, statutes are to be given fair interpretation; and it is evident that the legislature had in mind, without duplicating the statute in regard to executors and administrators, to make such statutes applicable also to guardianships, or to actions against guardians. Statutes are to be construed together, their meaning to be determined from all statutes in pari materia; and we think the provisions of sections 1902 and 2295, construed together, mean that actions against guardians must be brought within a period of four years after the qualification of the guardian, allowing an additional six months within which suit may not be instituted against executors and administrators. It is certainly important as to persons non compos mentis, and incapable of looking after their own interests, that claims against them shall be presented while all the evidence is procurable, and the truth may be determined by the court and guardian.
It is agreed that no proceedings were instituted within the statutory period of limitation, — consequently there is no right of action.
We are of the opinion that the court below erred in the construction of this statute. The judgment is therefore reversed, and judgment rendered here barring the claim.
Reversed and rendered.