Those facts must be affirmatively established by evidence before the court may consider them in determining the plea of privilege. World Co. v. Dow, 116 Tex. 146, 287 S.W. 241; Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Jones (Tex.Civ.App.) 29 S.W.2d 861, 865; First Nat. Bank v. Cage (Tex.Civ.App.) 32 S.W.2d 500. The plea of privilege, being in strict conformity to the requirements of the statute, was impervious to demurrers.

tion is Yates v. State, Tex. Civ. App. 3 S.W.2d 114. Of the decisions following it may be mentioned: Barnum v. Lancaster Hardware Co., Tex. Civ. App. 40 S.W.2d 1103; Thompson v. Pure Oil Co., Tex. Civ. App. 113 S.W.2d 662; Schoellkopf Co. v. Daves, Tex. Civ. App. 71 S.W.2d 340; McCook v. Amerada Pet. Corp., Tex. Civ. App. 73 S.W.2d 914; Universal Credit Co. v. Boling, Tex. Civ. App. 103 S.W.2d 253 (changed on rehearing, Id., Tex. Civ. App. 108 S.W.2d 836); Miller v. Burnet Merc. Co., Tex. Civ. App. 65 S.W.2d 505; Lloyds America v. Lloyds Southwest Insurers, Tex. Civ. App. 56 S.W.2d 477. In principle, these decisions, we think, are in conflict with Duffey v. Cole Pet. Co., 117 Tex. 387, 5 S.W.2d 495; Curlee Clothing Co. v. Wickliffe, 126 Tex. 573, 91 S.W.2d 677; Johnson v. Dallas C. W. Co., 120 Tex. 27, 34 S.W.2d 845; American Fruit Growers v. Sutherland, Tex. Civ. App. 50 S.W.2d 898; Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Jones, Tex. Civ. App. 29 S.W.2d 861; First Nat. Bank v. Cage, Tex. Civ. App. 32 S.W.2d 500, and many other decisions to the same effect. In Universal Credit Co. v. Boling, supra, the Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals in its original opinion gave controlling effect to Yates v. State, supra, and that line of decisions.

It follows that same was not demurrable. Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Jones, supra; Jones v. Hickman, 121 Tex. 405, 48 S.W.2d 982; First Nat. Bank v. Cage (Tex.Civ.App.) 32 S.W.2d 500; Johnson v. First Nat. Bank of Brenham (Tex.Civ.App.) 42 S.W.2d 870; Eckert-Burton Const. Co. v. Board of School Trustees (Tex.Civ.App.) 51 S.W.2d 642; Lloyds America v. Lloyds Southwest Insurers (Tex.Civ.App.) 56 S.W.2d 477; Union Nat. Bank v. Jordan (Tex.Civ.App.) 57 S.W.2d 313. What is stated with regard to the plea of privilege of Angus Spear is equally applicable to the pleas of privilege by the other Gregg county residents.

Eckert-Burton Const. Co. v. Board of School Trustees of City of Corsicana (Tex.Civ.App.) 51 S.W.2d 642, par. 1; Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank (Tex.Civ.App.) 42 S.W.2d 870, par. 1; American Fruit Growers v. Sutherland (Tex.Civ.App.) 50 S.W.2d 898; Murphy v. Dabney (Tex.Civ.App.) 208 S.W. 981, par. 3; First National Bank of Rhome v. Cage (Tex.Civ.App.) 32 S.W.2d 500, par. 4; Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Jones (Tex.Civ.App.) 29 S.W.2d 861, par. 11; Meadows Co. v. Turner (Tex.Civ.App.) 270 S.W. 899; Ficke v. Foley (Tex.Civ.App.) 292 S.W. 624; Robert Nicholson Seed Co. v. Reese (Tex.Civ.App.) 39 S.W.2d 950. These pleas of privilege being in the form as provided by the statute, prima facie rebutted every allegation of fact alleged in plaintiff's petition.

Under numerous decisions of the courts this has been held sufficient, and is so declared by the express language of the statute itself. Article 2007; Oakland Co. v. Jones (Tex.Civ.App.) 29 S.W.2d 801; First Natl. Bank v. Cage (Tex.Civ.App.) 32 S.W.2d 500; Johnson v. Bank (Tex.Civ.App.) 42 S.W.2d 870, 871; American Fruit Growers v. Sutherland (Tex.Civ.App.) 50 S.W.2d 898; Eckert-Burton Const. Co. v. School Board (Tex.Civ.App.) 51 S.W.2d 642; Brown v. Cox (Tex.Civ.App.) 53 S.W.2d 848. And when such plea is filed, under the general rules applicable to such cases, unless plaintiff shows by pleading and proof that he is entitled to retain venue of the suit where filed under some exception to the statute, the case should be transferred.

) 42 S.W.2d 870, par. 1; Murphy v. Dabney (Tex.Civ.App.) 208 S.W. 981, par. 3; First National Bank of Rhome v. Cage (Tex.Civ.App.) 32 S.W.2d 500, par. 4; Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Jones (Tex.Civ.App.) 29 S.W.2d 861, par. 11; Meadows Co. v. Turner (Tex.Civ.App.) 270 S.W. 899; Ficke v. Foley (Tex.Civ.App.) 292 S.W. 624. It has been held in numerous decisions that a plea of privilege in statutory form prima facie rebuts every allegation of fact contained in plaintiff's petition, and that plaintiff cannot rely on the allegations of fact in his petition nor introduce evidence showing that the case comes within one of the exceptions to exclusive venue in the county of one's residence unless he files a controverting affidavit setting up the facts bringing the case within the exception.

We are further sustained in our holding by the following cases: Foresyth v. Pike Kramer (Tex.Civ.App.) 46 S.W.2d 733; Johnson v. First National Bank (Tex.Civ.App.) 42 S.W.2d 870; First National Bank of Rhome v. Cage (Tex.Civ.App.) 32 S.W.2d 500, 501; Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Jones (Tex.Civ.App.) 29 S.W.2d 861, 865; Green v. Brown (Tex.Civ.App.) 271 S.W. 394; Murphy v. Dabney (Tex.Civ.App.) 208 S.W. 981; Robert Nicholson Seed Co. v. Reese (Tex.Civ.App.) 39 S.W.2d 950; Johnson v. Dallas Cooperage Woodenware Co. (Tex.Com.App.) 34 S.W.2d 845.

All such matters of fact must be proven by affirmative evidence upon a hearing of the plea of privilege, and the allegations in neither the petition nor the controverting affidavit can be considered as evidence of the truth thereof. World Co. v. Dow, 116 Tex. 146, 287 S.W. 241; Coalson v. Holmes, 111 Tex. 502, 240 S.W. 896; Duffy v. Cole Pet. Co., 117 Tex. 387, 5 S.W.2d 495; First Nat. Bank v. Cage (Tex.Civ.App.) 32 S.W.2d 500; Thompson v. Duncan (Tex.Civ.App.) 44 S.W.2d 508; Dees v. McDonald (Tex.Civ.App.) 36 S.W.2d 301; Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Jones, supra; Edmonds v. White (Tex.Civ.App.) 226 S.W. 819; Waxahachie Nat. Bank v. Sigmond Rothschild Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 235 S.W. 633; Meadows Co. v. Turner (Tex.Civ.App.) 270 S.W. 899; Hood v. Askey (Tex.Civ.App.) 270 S.W. 1047; Caughan v. Urquhart (Tex.Civ.App.) 265 S.W. 1097; Dallas R. Co. v. Kimberly (Tex.Civ.App.) 268 S.W. 1054; Jones Co. v. M. K. Towns Prod. Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 283 S.W. 246; Eggameyer v. Machine Supply Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 299 S.W. 518; Jaffee v. Walkup (Tex.Civ.App.) 2 S.W.2d 480.

Murphy v. Dabney (Tex.Civ.App.) 208 S.W. 981; First National Bank of Rhome v. Cage (Tex.Civ.App.) 32 S.W.2d 500, par. 4; Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Jones (Tex.Civ.App.) 29 S.W.2d 861, par. 11. The appellant complains of the action of the court in splitting up the cause of action by retaining the suit of plaintiff against Manhart and wife, and transferring the suit as to the mill to Erath county and by transferring the suit as to the bank to Washington county.