¶ 13 “The parties to a forcible entry and detainer action, like other civil litigants, may avail themselves of a motion for summary judgment where the procedural device is appropriate.” First Illinois Bank & Trust v. Galuska, 255 Ill.App.3d 86, 90, 194 Ill.Dec. 209, 627 N.E.2d 325 (1993). The purpose of summary judgment is not to try a question of fact, but to determine if one exists.
f the contract); Carlson v. Galuska, No. 1-95-0126 (1996) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (defendant-counterplaintiff Richard appealed circuit court's dismissal of his counterclaims and denial of his motions to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint; we affirmed, citing Richard's failure to attach his proposed amended counterclaims and finding that filed counterclaim lacked merit); Galuska v. Hinshaw Culbertson, No. 1-96-1666 (1997) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (plaintiff Richard appealed the circuit court's order dismissing his complaint against attorneys representing opposing parties in prior lawsuits for breach of fiduciary duty; we affirmed, again finding that Richard had failed to attach the proposed amendment to his complaint that he argued was wrongfully disallowed and that the allegations contained in Richard's complaint were insufficient to state a cause of action). Defendants were also parties to an earlier case with similar circumstances, namely, First Illinois Bank Trust v. Galuska, 255 Ill. App. 3d 86 (1993). There, plaintiff First Illinois had filed an action to foreclose on defendants' mortgage and later reached an agreement with defendants whereby they would tender the amount owed by an agreed date or be required to deliver a warranty deed to their then residence, located at 204 Brainard in LaGrange, to First Illinois. Defendants conveyed the residence to a land trust pursuant to the agreement, with First Illinois as trustee and Joy Lynn as sole beneficiary, with the deed to be held by an escrow agent.
Milton v. Therra, 2018 IL App (1st) 171392, ¶ 23. As such, "the only factual questions that need to be answered in this type of proceeding are 'which party is entitled to immediate possession and whether a defense which is germane to the distinctive purpose of the action defeats [the] plaintiff's asserted right to possession.'" Id. (quoting First Illinois Bank &Trust v. Galuska, 255 Ill.App.3d 86, 90 (1993)). Consequently, where the plaintiff has already regained possession of the property, our courts have regularly found that a challenge to an eviction order is rendered moot, as it is impossible to render effective relief to the appealing party.
The purpose of an eviction claim is to determine "which party is entitled to immediate possession and whether a defense which is germane to the distinctive purpose of the action defeats plaintiff's asserted right to possession." First Illinois Bank &Trust v. Galuska, 255 Ill.App.3d 86, 90 (1993). The court will enter an eviction order in favor of the plaintiff if the plaintiff proves its allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.
¶ 16 The purpose of an eviction claim is to determine "which party is entitled to immediate possession and whether a defense which is germane to the distinctive purpose of the action defeats plaintiff's asserted right to possession." First Illinois Bank &Trust v. Galuska, 255 Ill.App.3d 86, 90 (1993). When a defendant no longer lives at the property, the issue of possession is moot.
¶ 24 The purpose of an eviction claim is to determine "which party is entitled to immediate possession and whether a defense which is germane to the distinctive purpose of the action defeats plaintiff's asserted right to possession." First Illinois Bank &Trust v. Galuska, 255 Ill.App.3d 86, 90 (1993). The eviction order granted plaintiff possession of the Troy residence and required defendant to relinquish possession by March 9, 2023.
The only factual questions that need be answered in an eviction action are" 'which party is entitled to immediate possession and whether a defense which is germane to the distinctive purpose of the action defeats plaintiff's asserted right to possession.'" Milton v. Therra, 2018 IL App (1st) 171392, ¶ 23 (quoting First Illinois Bank &Trust v. Galuska, 255 Ill.App.3d 86, 90 (1993)).
¶ 15 The purpose of an eviction claim is to determine "which party is entitled to immediate possession and whether a defense which is germane to the distinctive purpose of the action defeats plaintiff's asserted right to possession." First Illinois Bank &Trust v. Galuska, 255 Ill.App.3d 86, 90 (1993). The eviction order granted plaintiff possession of the unit and required defendant to relinquish possession by October 6, 2022.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Watson, 2012 IL App (3d) 110930, ¶ 14. ¶ 34 The only factual questions that need to be answered in an eviction action are" 'which party is entitled to immediate possession and whether a defense which is germane to the distinctive purpose of the action defeats plaintiff's asserted right to possession. '" Milton v. Therra, 2018 IL App (1st) 171392, ¶ 23 (quoting First Illinois Bank & Trust v. Galuska, 255 Ill.App.3d 86, 90 (1993)). In relation to the Eviction Act, our supreme court has defined "germane" to mean closely allied, related, or connected.
In an eviction action, "the only factual questions which need be answered in such a proceeding are which party is entitled to immediate possession and whether a defense which is germane to the distinctive purpose of the action defeats plaintiff's asserted right to possession." First Illinois Bank & Trust v. Galuska, 255 Ill.App.3d 86, 90 (1993). Before this court is an apparently valid Trust naming Roth the successor trustee in the event of Mrs. Hechter's inability, and there is no evidence contradicting either the language of the Trust or Mrs. Hechter's alleged inability to serve as trustee.