From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

First Fed. Savings Loan Assoc., Atlanta v. Jones

Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jan 28, 1985
326 S.E.2d 554 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)

Opinion

69381.

DECIDED JANUARY 28, 1985.

Action on debt. Lamar Superior Court. Before Judge Whitmire.

Albert B. Wallace, for appellant.

Harold E. Martin, Richard L. Collier, for appellees.


First Federal Savings Loan Association of Atlanta (First Federal) brought suit against Richard and Sylvia Jones for a deficiency judgment following the repossession of a mobile home purchased by the Joneses. The jury returned a verdict in favor of First Federal against Richard Jones and First Federal appeals.

1. Appellant contends the trial court erred by permitting appellee Richard Jones to state his opinion of the value of the mobile home. "Under [OCGA § 24-9-66], a non-expert witness can testify as to value if he has a sufficient opportunity for forming a correct opinion. . . . Whether a witness is qualified is within the discretion of the trial court; his credibility is for the jury." Ga. Power Co. v. Bishop, 162 Ga. App. 122, 123 (4) ( 290 S.E.2d 328) (1982). Appellee Richard Jones testified that he was familiar with the value of mobile homes at the time of the repossession and described improvements he had made to the mobile home prior to the repossession. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing this testimony. Id.

2. a. Appellant also enumerates as error the trial court's admission of testimony regarding Richard Jones' reasons for failing to pay the deficiency. Over objection, the trial court permitted Richard Jones to state that he did not pay the deficiency because he felt that the money he had already paid "would cover everything." Appellant argues that appellee's reasons for not paying the deficiency were irrelevant, and by permitting such testimony, prejudicial error was committed. "The scope of examination and cross-examination is not unlimited, but the scope of permissible examination lies within the sound discretion of the court . . . ." Classic Restorations v. Bean, 155 Ga. App. 694 (1) ( 272 S.E.2d 557) (1980). Even assuming error in admitting appellee's testimony, the error was harmless since the trial judge instructed the jury that appellee's reasons for not paying appellant were irrelevant and because the complained of testimony was used to explain Richard Jones' previous testimony elicited on cross-examination that he did not pay the deficiency because he could not afford it. See Camp v. Mapp, 95 Ga. App. 262 ( 97 S.E.2d 623) (1957).

b. Appellant further contends the trial court erred by refusing to allow cross-examination of Jones' financial status. We disagree. Richard Jones' testimony on direct examination regarding his reasons for not paying the deficiency did not open the door to cross-examination of his financial status, which was irrelevant and inadmissible. Although every party has a right to thorough and sifting cross-examination of witnesses called against them, OCGA § 24-9-64, "[t]he general rule is that evidence of the wealth or worldly circumstances of a party litigant is never admissible, except in those cases where position or wealth is necessarily involved." Northwestern Univ. v. Crisp, 211 Ga. 636, 641 (2) ( 88 S.E.2d 26) (1955); Gordon v. Gordon, 133 Ga. App. 520, 522 (1) ( 211 S.E.2d 374) (1974).

3. Appellant's enumerations 2, 3, 11, 12, 13 and 14 relate to Richard Jones' counterclaim against appellant. Because the jury found in favor of appellant on the counterclaim, appellant cannot show harm from any error which might have been committed and we will not consider these enumerations. See McFarland v. Hodge Homebuilders, 168 Ga. App. 733 (2) ( 309 S.E.2d 853) (1983).

4. Appellant further contends the trial judge erred by charging the jury that they might find in favor of appellant against either or both appellees. In support of this enumeration, appellant argues that the evidence did not support the jury's verdict in favor of appellee Sylvia Jones. Where the trial court approves the jury's verdict, our responsibility is to determine if there is any evidence to authorize the verdict, and we will construe the evidence to uphold the verdict and judgment. Reed v. Williams, 160 Ga. App. 254, 255 (1) ( 287 S.E.2d 47) (1981). There was sufficient evidence to authorize a jury finding that appellant did not meet its burden of proving that it had properly notified appellee Sylvia Jones of its intention to pursue a deficiency claim. OCGA § 10-1-36; Doughty v. Associates Commercial Corp., 152 Ga. App. 575 ( 263 S.E.2d 493) (1979). Therefore, we find no error in this enumeration.

5. Appellant's remaining enumerations have not been supported in its brief by argument or citation of authority. Accordingly, they must be deemed abandoned pursuant to this Court's Rule 15 (c) (2). See generally Young v. Southern Bell c. Co., 168 Ga. App. 40, 41 (2) ( 308 S.E.2d 49) (1983).

Judgment affirmed. Deen, P. J., and McMurray, P. J., concur.

DECIDED JANUARY 28, 1985.


Summaries of

First Fed. Savings Loan Assoc., Atlanta v. Jones

Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jan 28, 1985
326 S.E.2d 554 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)
Case details for

First Fed. Savings Loan Assoc., Atlanta v. Jones

Case Details

Full title:FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS LOAN ASSOCIATION OF ATLANTA v. JONES et al

Court:Court of Appeals of Georgia

Date published: Jan 28, 1985

Citations

326 S.E.2d 554 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)
326 S.E.2d 554

Citing Cases

Postell v. Hankla

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) First Fed. Sav., etc. v. Jones, 173 Ga.App. 356, 357(2)(b), 326 S.E.2d…

Calcote v. C S Nat. Bank

In a case such as this one, where both statutes come into play, it has been held to be a question of fact…