Summary
holding courts are authorized to ascertain a maker's intent in the construction of wills and trust deeds
Summary of this case from All Saints v. Protestant EpiscopalOpinion
13760
January 22, 1934.
Before STOLL, J., Lee, October, 1932. Affirmed.
Suit by the First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank against Zelene Gray Deschamps and another, minors, by their guardian ad litem. Decree for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.
The decree and judgment of Judge Stoll in the Court below is as follows:
This case comes before me upon the pleadings, the report of the special referee, and the testimony taken by him. The order of reference provided only for the taking of the testimony by the referee.
I find that the infant defendants were properly served and answered the complaint by their duly appointed guardian ad litem.
The controversy in this case centers around the construction of a trust deed executed by W.W. Deschamps the 10th day of January, 1899, and recorded in Sumter County in Book MMM, page 266. There is no dispute as to the facts involved. It appears, and I so find, that W.W. Deschamps, after the execution of the above-mentioned trust deed, departed this life in the year 1921, leaving of force his last will and testament probated in Lee County, and which will be referred to later. He left surviving him the following children: Edgar G. Deschamps, William G. Deschamps, Carroll G. Deschamps, Sue D. McLeod, Lidie D. Calhoun, and Blanche G. Deschamps. His daughter Lottie predeceased him without children. All of these children have children living except Blanche G. Deschamps.
In the division of the real estate of W.W. Deschamps after his death, the real estate covered by the above-mentioned trust deed was allotted unto Carroll G. Deschamps, Lidie D. Calhoun, and Sue D. McLeod. Subsequently Carroll G. Deschamps mortgaged the tract of land allotted to him and covered by the above-mentioned trust deed, to the First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank. This mortgage was later foreclosed and the land conveyed by proper officer of the Court to the said bank. A contention having arisen as to the estate of Carroll G. Deschamps in the property mortgaged, it being contended that Carroll G. Deschamps only had a life estate in said property with remainder to his children, the plaintiff brought this suit against the children of Carroll G. Deschamps for the purpose of removing the alleged cloud from the title. The property in question being a part of the land described in said trust deed, it is necessary to construe the same in order to determine what title, if any, the children of Carroll G. Deschamps received under the provisions of the same.
The grantor states in said deed that the same is executed for the purpose of providing for his children and grandchildren, the clause being as follows: "In consideration of the sum of ten dollars to me in hand paid by William B. McLeod as trustee (the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged), and in consideration of the desire on my part to provide for my children and grandchildren, have granted, bargained, etc."
After providing that the trustee is to permit W.W. Deschamps' grantor to occupy and use the premises for life, or until an attempt should be made to subject the premises or the income and profits therefrom to the payment of any debt of W.W. Deschamps, the trust deed provides that upon the death of W.W. Deschamps or upon the attempt to subject the premises to his debts, the trustee should stand seized and possessed of the same: "To and for the use and benefit for life, of Edgar Green Deschamps, Alice Blanche Deschamps, Lottie M. Deschamps, William G. Deschamps, Lidie Lee Deschamps, Sue Brown Deschamps, and Carroll Deschamps, my children now living with remainder upon the death of any or either of them to the issue of his, her or their body or bodies and their heirs and assigns forever; and in the event of the death of any of my children above named without issue alive then the share of such child or children so dying without issue to immediately vest in the survivor or survivors of my said children hereinbefore named."
The plaintiffs contend that the rule in Shelley's case applies the word "issue" being used in the sense of all future generations, and that Carroll G. Deschamps took a fee conditional under the limitations of this deed, and that inasmuch as he had children living at the time he executed the mortgage to the plaintiff, he could convey a fee-simple title, and that therefore the defendants have no interest. The defendants contend that the rule does not apply.
It appears to be certain that the grantor intended to give to Carroll G. Deschamps only a life estate. To hold otherwise would defeat practically every provision in the deed. To begin with, the grantor states explicitly, that the deed is executed for the purpose of providing for his children and grandchildren. This will not be done by giving the children a fee conditional, because upon the birth of children the land could immediately be mortgaged or aliened, and the grandchildren deprived of any protection. That is what happened in this case.
To show that the grantor did not mean all future generations by the word "issue," one of the provisions of the deed is as follows: "And upon the Further Trust, that upon the written direction of myself, the said W.W. Deschamps, to set off to any of my children hereinbefore named or to any of their said issue such part or parts of the above described premises as I wish alloted to them under the terms of this deed; and upon The Further Trust, to make such allotment as I may direct by my last Will duly executed, should I fail to make such written direction during my lifetime."
This shows that the grantor had in mind that some of his children might die before he did leaving children, and that in such case when he divided the land, either by written instrument during his lifetime or by his will, he intended to allot to such issue of any deceased child that portion of the premises that he intended them to have after his death as the representatives of their parent. W.W. Deschamps having reserved the use of the premises as long as he lived, it was a very natural desire to reserve the right to determine the manner in which it should be divided. This provision shows conclusively how he intended to provide for his grandchildren and would be absolutely defeated by holding that his children took a fee-conditional estate under the deed. If they took such an estate, the grantor could allot nothing to their issue. How, then, can it be contended he used "issue" in a technical sense? If the grantor instead of saying, as he did, that in order to provide for his children and grandchildren, he was giving a life estate to his children with remainder to their issue, had said that in order to provide for his children and their issue, he was giving a life estate to his children with remainder to his grandchildren, no one would say that "issue" was used in a technical sense. But the meaning is just as clear expressed as it is.
The purpose of the grantor being clear, it is now necessary to determine whether or not there is any principle of law that would defeat this intention.
The limitation to the children with remainder to their issue standing alone without reference to other parts of the deed certainly would convey a fee conditional to the children under the rule in Shelley's case. Austin v. Payne, 8 Rich. Eq., 10; McIntyre v. McIntyre, 16 S.C. 292. But the word "issue" was certainly not used in a strictly technical sense. Other parts of the deed show this conclusively, and the Court will look to the entire deed to obtain the intention as to the meaning of the words used.
Before citing authorities, it might be well to dispose of the point that the rule in Shelley's case is a rule of law and will be applied even where it defeats the intention. That is true only in a restricted sense. For example, if a grantor should limit an estate to A for life with remainder to the heirs of the body of A, the rule would apply and A would have a fee-conditional estate, because apt words were used to create such an estate and even though the grantor went so far as to state elsewhere in the instrument granting the estate that he did not intend for the rule to apply in any construction of the will. But if, after using such words to limit an estate, the grantor should say that wherever the words "heirs of the body" were used in the instrument he meant "children," then the Court would carry out the intention and substitute "children" for "heirs of the body," and the rule would not apply because apt words had not been used to bring about the application of it, and of course if the intention is clear from the wording of the entire instrument that the grantor used the words in a sense different from the technical meaning even though he does not say so, the technical words will be construed to mean what the testator intended for them to mean and the rule is not applied.
In Duckett v. Butler, 67 S.C. 130, 45 S.E., 137, the limitation in the trust deed was as follows: "In trust for the sole, separate and exclusive benefit and behoof of Sarah Eliza Butler, daughter of the said William Moses Butler, for and during the term of her natural life, and at her death to such heir or heirs as she hereafter may have. But in the event of the death of the said Sarah Eliza Butler, and in the event of her leaving no lawful issue, then and in that case the said land to be legally distributed between the lawful heirs of the said William Moses Butler." The Court held: "The use of the word `hereafter' was natural and proper to show that by `heir or heirs' the grantor intended child or children. * * * And so, in reference to the use of the words `lawful issue' and the words `lawful heirs' in the next clause, the grantor evidently intended children in each instance. * * * According to our decisions, it is always open to inquiry whether the grantor or testator used the word `heirs' according to its strict and proper acceptation, or in a more inaccurate sense to denote `children.' In Bailey v. Patterson, 3 Rich. Eq., 158; McCown v. King, 23 S.C. 238, and in numerous cases in this State, `heirs has been construed to mean children.' Moone v. Henderson, 4 Desaus., 459; McCown v. King, supra; Hayne v. Irvine, 25 S.C. 289; Lott v. Thompson, 36 S.C. 38, 15 S.E., 278; Shaw v. Robinson, 42 S.C. 342, 20 S.E., 161. * * * The rule in Shelley's case is not a rule of construction, but a rule of law. Therefore, it is not properly a matter to be considered until the meaning of the instrument has been ascertained under the rules of construction. When the intention of the grantor or divisor has been ascertained under the ordinary rules of construction, then the question properly arises, does that intention violate the rule of law in Shelley's case?"
See, also, the following cases: McWhite v. Roseman, 114 S.C. 177, 103 S.E., 586; Rowe v. Moore, 89 S.C. 561, 72 S.E., 468. The last case is especially clear on this point.
The effect of the grantor's statement, in the Deschamps trust deed in question, that the reason for executing the deed was to provide for his children and grandchildren as being of vital importance in the construction of the deed, is clearly shown by the case of Rembert v. Evans, 86 S.C. 445, 68 S.E., 659. The trust deed construed in that case declared, in the granting clause, that the land and negroes were conveyed "in trust and for the use, behoof and sole benefit of the said Mary D. Fair and Elizabeth A. Marshall and the children now born of the body of the said Elizabeth A. Marshall and the children hereafter to be born of the bodies of the said Mary D. Fair and the said Elizabeth A. Marshall." After the clause of warranty, the trust further provided that the said property should be held by the trustees for the sole use and behoof of the said Mary D. Fair and the children to be born of her body and for the sole benefit, use, and behoof of the said Elizabeth A. Marshall, of her children now born or to be hereafter born of her body. The deed further provided that in case Mary D. Fair should die without a child or children, the property given to her should be held by her husband, Sam Fair, for life, "and after his death to revert to the said Elizabeth A. Marshall and the heirs born of her body." The Court had under consideration the construction of the above limitation to Elizabeth A. Marshall and the heirs of her body. The Circuit Judge held that heirs of the body as used in the provision meant the children. The Supreme Court said: "The Circuit Court held, however, that the words `heirs born of her body' meant the children of Mrs. Marshall; that they took in fee simple; and that in acquiring the interests of all who could claim under them J.Q. Marshall acquired a complete fee-simple title. We think this is the correct construction. The deed taken as a whole shows by the words we have italicized that the grantor meant to provide for his daughters and their children. The first general and comprehensive expression of the scope of the trust is that it is to be for the benefit of his daughters and their children. Then when in the deed the terms and conditions of the trust are to be more specifically stated, the same purpose and scheme is expressed."
The Deschamps deed expressly says what was implied in the above deed. See, also, the following cases: McWhite v. Roseman, 114 S.C. 177, 103 S.E., 586; Rowe v. Moore, 89 S.C. 561, 72 S.E., 468. The last case is especially clear on this point.
The effect of another clause in the deed that indicates that the word "issue" was not used in the sense of all future generations will now be considered. After the grant of the life estate to his children, the grantor provides in said deed, "with remainder upon the death of any or either of them to the issue of his, her or their body or bodies and their heirs and assigns forever." The effect of the superadded words, "to them and their heirs and assigns forever," after the gift to the issue, has been discussed in connection with similar limitations in many cases in this State from the earliest history of the Court. The first case after the beginning of the new series of reports is McIntyre v. McIntyre, 16 S.C. 294. The devise in that case was to A for life and after her death to be equally divided between her children to be held by them for life, and after their death to the issue of them and their heirs forever. The Court held: "The terms are to the children for life, and, at their decease, `to the issue of them and their heirs forever.' So that the precise question in this case is, whether the words italicized in the preceding sentence are sufficient to take the case out of the operation of the rule in Shelley's case. It is not to be denied that there is no little conflict in the English cases upon this question; but we think the authorities in this State conclusively show that where the word `issue' is so qualified by additional words as to evince an intention that it is not to be taken as descriptive of an indefinite line of descent, but is used to indicate a new stock of inheritance, the rule does not apply."
The McIntyre case cited with approval, Myers v. Anderson, 1 Strob. Eq., 344, 47 Am. Dec., 537, and McLure v. Young, 3 Rich. Eq., 576. The case of Dott v. Willson, 1 Bay, 457, is an earlier case than these, being found in the first book of the reports. The language of the Court in that case is as follows: "In this case, the Court were unanimously of opinion, that the operation of law was very different from what it was in the foregoing case against Cunnington; and that in this will there were words sufficiently explanatory of the testatrix's intention, so as to qualify the generality of the words `heirs of the body,' and to make her grandchildren take as purchasers. That she did not mean or intend a perpetuity, is obvious from her adding immediately after the words `heirs of her body,' and their heirs and assigns for ever.'"
In Myers v. Anderson, the devise was to the testator's son "so long as he may or does live" and after his death to be equally divided between his two daughters "during their natural lives" and after their death "to be the absolute property of the issue of their bodies forever." The Court held: "All the authorities agree, that if the limitation be to the heirs of the body, or issue, and to their heirs, this constitutes them purchasers: as it shows an intention to give them an estate, not inheritable from the first taker, but an original estate, inheritable from themselves as a new stock of descent. (4 Kent's Com., 221.)"
In McLure v. Young, 3 Rich. Eq., 559, the testator devised real property to his daughter C for and during the term of her natural life; "and at her death, I give, bequeath and devise the same, absolutely and forever, to her lineal descendants; and in case she should die without lineal descendants one or more living at the time of her death, then over." The Court approved the decision in the case of Myers v. Anderson and held: "The principles, on which the distinction was placed, are well established principles in relation to real estates, and constitute well recognized exceptions to the rule in Shelley's case. The language of this will is, if possible, more emphatic. It is not merely to be `their absolute property,' but it is given in the words of the statute, to them absolutely and forever. This Court is of opinion, in the terms of Myers v. Anderson, that this is equivalent to a devise to them and their heirs, that the daughter of the testator took only a life estate, and that the defendant, the only child of his deceased mother, was a purchaser under the will of his grand-father, and that it should have been so declared. * * * It must not, therefore, be understood, says Mr. Jarman, that even the technical expression, `heirs of the body,' is `incapable of control or explanation by the effect of superadded expressions, clearly demonstrating that the testator used those words in some other than their ordinary acceptation, and as descriptive of another class of objects.' — (2 Jarm. on Wills, 300.) Although a difference of opinion exists among Judges as to the word issue, yet, it seems now settled, that unless restricted by the context, this expression cannot be satisfied by applying it to descendants at a particular period. But if, from superadded expressions, or from the context, or from other parts of the will, it is manifest that the testator used the term as synonymous with `children,' or intended to describe a class of persons to take at a particular time, issue will be construed as a word of purchase, and not of limitation. And this rule is equally applicable to every other expression used as synonymous with heirs of the body. Whenever the words `heirs of the body' would be explained to mean some other class of persons, the same construction is given to the synonyms, and the rule in Shelley's case does not apply — (2 Jarm., 281.)"
The reasoning of the Court in McIntyre v. McIntyre; McLure v. Young, and Myers v. Anderson, is approved by the Court in the case of Simms v. Buist, 52 S.C. 554, 30 S.E., 400, 403, although that case was distinguished from them. The language of the Court is as follows: "The next case relied on is McIntyre v. McIntyre, 16 S.C. 290. In that case lands were devised to A. for life, and after her death to be equally divided among testator's children nominatim, to be held by them for life, and after their death `to the issue of them and their heirs forever.' Held, that the children of A. took life estates only, with remainder in fee to their issue, as purchasers. That conclusion was based upon the authority of Myers v. Anderson, supra, and McLure v. Young, supra, and other cases therein cited, holding that, where there were any words in the limitation over indicating that the intention was to create a new stock of inheritance in the issue, such words would take the case out of the operation of the rule in Shelley's case, and the issue would take as purchasers. In the case of McIntyre v. McIntyre, the words superadded to the limitation to the issue — to them `and their heirs forever' — conclusively showed an intention to create a new stock of inheritance, and thence, under the rule laid down in Myers v. Anderson, and followed in McLure v. Young, took the case out of the operation of the rule in Shelley's case."
The above cases have not only not been overruled, but have been approved, by the latest decisions of the Supreme Court. In the case of Thomson v. Russell, 131 S.C. 529, 128 S.E., 421, 422, the Court uses the following language: "Plaintiff contends, and we believe, defendants concede that when the words `share and share alike' and the words `to them and their heirs forever,' following a gift to a person and his `issue' or `heirs of the body', are used, that the words `issue' and `heirs of the body,' are changed from words of limitation, their ordinary meaning, and become words of purchase. This doctrine is supported by numerous authorities: McIntyre v. McIntyre, 16 S.C. 290; Hay v. Hay, 4 Rich. Eq., 387; Simons v. Bryce, 10 S.C. 366; Henry v. Stewart, 2 Hill, 330; Simms v. Buist, 52 S.C. 562, 30 S.E., 400; Rembert v. Vetoe, 89 S.C. 212, 71 S.E., 959, 2 A.L.R., 918; Myers v. Anderson, 1 Strob. Eq., 344, 47 Am. Dec., 537; McLure v. Young, 3 Rich. Eq., 576; Dukes v. Faulk, 37 S.C. 265, 16 S.E., 122, 34 Am. St. Rep., 745."
In what appears to be the latest decision of the Court on the subject, Davis v. Dalrymple, 163 S.C. 490, 161 S.E., 738, 740, the above case is specifically approved in the following language: "If the testator, after devising the land to his wife for life and after her death `to her heirs by me, equal,' had added the words `to them and their heirs forever,' there would be no doubt that Mrs. Dalrymple acquired only a life estate, and the plaintiffs' claim to an interest in remainder in fee would prevail. Thomson v. Russell et al., 131 S.C. 529, 128 S.E., 421."
The plaintiff contended that the cases cited above applied to wills and have no reference to deeds and produced quite a number of cases in which different rules of construction were apparently applied to common-law deeds. It is true that very different and technical rules have been developed in connection with the construction of common-law deeds, and if the deed in question were not a trust deed, what is said would be correct, as to some of the cases cited.
The reason for the rules with reference to the construction of common-law deeds lies in the fact that the word "heirs" is necessary to convey a fee-simple estate in such instruments. Such being the case, the intention of the grantor is often defeated in the construction of a deed because of the failure to use the proper word for creating a fee-simple estate. And oftentimes if the Court should undertake to give effect to the intention in one part of the instrument, this rule would intrude itself and defeat the real intention in the end. Therefore to give effect to intention in such an instrument would often cause more hardships and injustice than the most technical rules would entail. This has caused a tendency on the part of the Court when an estate larger than a life estate is once granted in a common-law deed not to allow it to be cut down or limited by subsequent provisions. This is not true as to trust deeds, and it has always been possible to follow the intention in the construction of such instruments.
The following language is used by the Court in Buist v. Williams, 88 S.C. 252, 70 S.E., 817, 818: "We affirm this construction. This is a trust deed. A Court of equity in its jurisdiction over trusts is not bound by the technical rules of the common law, and will seek the intention of the grantor from the whole instrument."
The later case of Duncan v. Clarke, 106 S.C. 17, 90 S.E., 180, 181, makes this distinction equally clear: "The appellant frankly concedes: `The language used by the Chief Justice * * * (in the Rembert case) is broad enough, perhaps, to cover our case.' But he undertakes to differentiate the instant case from the Rembert case in two features, to wit: (1) In the Rembert case the instrument construed was a will, while in the instant case the instrument construed is a trust deed; and (2) in the Rembert case the life estate ended with the life of the life tenant, while in the instant case the life estate fell in at the death of another than the life tenant. As the Circuit Court, we think rightly, concluded, trust deeds are not bound in their interpretation by the rigid rules which control in the construction of law deeds; nor have they ever been. And while it is not reasonably apparent why judges may wander afield to ascertain a maker's intent in the construction of wills and trust deeds, and may not do the same thing in the construction of any sort of deed, yet such is the history of the development of the law through long years."
The plaintiff contended that even if different rules of construction are followed with reference to trust deeds, this is not the case where the trust is executed. And the plaintiff contends further that since in the trust deed under discussion, the estate limited to Carroll G. Deschamps became a legal estate upon the death of W.W. Deschamps, the trust having become executed at that time, the rules applicable to executed trusts should apply and the limitation construed as if it were contained in a common-law deed.
The rules of construction appear to be different where a trust is a dry one and executed in all particulars upon the taking effect of the instrument limiting the estate. Clark v. Neves, 76 S.C. 484, 57 S.E., 614, 12 L.R.A. (N.S.), 298. However, in the Deschamps' deed the trust was not only not executed until the death of the life tenant, but in fact might not have been executed until long afterwards. This is true because the trust deed not only provides for the sale of the land by the trustee, but provides for the mortgaging of the land by the trustee upon the request of the life tenant, and provides that the trustee shall retain possession and use the income and profits of the land for the payment of the mortgage debt even after the death of the life tenant. That being the case, the remaindermen may never have had a legal estate in the land. Even if the trust in this deed was executed upon the death of the life tenant, that does not affect its construction as a trust deed. Such a deed takes effect when it is made, and the construction that would be given to it at that time holds true throughout the life of the instrument. The Court might have been called upon for the construction of this deed before the death of the life tenant and before the trust became executed. Can it be contended that the construction now asked to be put upon the deed should be different from the construction that would have been put on it if it had come before the Court prior to the death of the life tenant? The deed cannot be construed as meaning one thing one day and something else the next.
In view of the foregoing provisions of the trust deed and of the decisions cited, I am convinced that in the clause of the trust deed limiting a life estate to his children with remainder to their issue and their heirs and assigns forever, the grantor did not use the word "issue" in the technical sense of all future generations, that the rule in Shelley's case does not apply, and that the issue takes as purchasers after the death of the life tenants. This construction gives full effect to the intention as expressed in every part of the deed.
The point was made before me, but not pressed in the argument, that the trust deed in question gave the grantor the power to change the estates granted in said deed, and that the grantor in fact did this by his last will and testament granting a fee-simple estate to his children in said land. And as shown by the partition deeds introduced in evidence, this was the construction placed upon the trust deed and will when this land was divided among certain children of W.W. Deschamps, including Carroll G. Deschamps. The point, however, can be disposed of with little difficulty. The provision of the trust deed referred to is as follows: "And upon the further trust, that upon the written direction of myself, the said W.W. Deschamps, to set off to any of my children hereinbefore named or to any of their said issue such part or parts of the above described premises as I wish allotted to them under the terms of this deed; and upon the further trust, to make such allotment as I may direct by my last will duly executed, should I fail to make such written direction during my lifetime."
From this it will be seen that W.W. Deschamps merely reserved the right to "allot" or "set off" the land to his children or their issue under the terms of the trust deed. He uses the words "allot" and "set off" synonymously, and it is clear that he only reserved the right to divide the land.
Even if the grantor had reserved the power to devise the land covered by the trust deed, there is no execution of the power in the will. W.W. Deschamps after making several devises which have no reference to this land, devised: "All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate including any reverson or remainder real, personal, mixed money and credits, I give, devise and bequeath unto my children in equal proportions, and should any of my children predecease me leaving a child or children, the share to which such child would have been entitled had he or she survived me, I give in equal proportions to the child or children of such predeceased child, and should my wife predecease me, all of my estate of every kind, shall be disposed of as is directed in this paragraph."
A residuary clause of this nature does not show an intention to execute a power. Thomson v. Ehrlich, 148 S.C. 330, 146 S.E., 149. The remainder of the will shows that the testator did not intend to devise the land covered by the trust deed. After stating in the will that he owned a valuable tract of land at Wisacky, near the land that his children would come into possession of at his death, he suggests that the tract of land owned by him be taken into consideration in the division of the trust property.
Furthermore the testator specifically disavows any intention to devise the trust land by saying: "In making this statement, I am mindful of the fact that I cannot change the status as to the lands to which they will be entitled."
It is therefore adjudged and decreed that the plaintiffs are entitled only to the life estate of Carroll G. Deschamps in the premises covered by the trust deed and that the relief asked for in the complaint in this action be denied. Let the plaintiffs pay the costs of this action.
Messrs. Melton Belser, Thomas, Lumpkin Cain and Harold Lee, for appellant, cite: Fee-simple estate: 67 S.C. 134; 3 Hill, 194; 1 Rich. Eq., 404; 67 S.C. 307; 83 S.C. 265. Rule in Shelley's case: 67 S.C. 132; 69 S.C. 292; 47 S.C. 288; 1 Brev., 331; 94 S.C. 308; 48 S.C. 443; 2 Strob. Eq., 190; 28 S.C. 446. Issue defined: 102 S.C. 15; 91 S.C. 300; 16 S.C. 290; 28 S.C. 495; 25 S.C. 35. Fee conditional: 131 S.C. 375; 83 S.C. 365; 90 S.C. 12; 86 S.C. 237; 67 S.C. 307; 10 S.C. 414; 3 Hill, 193; 67 S.C. 487.
Mr. R.E. Dennis, for respondent, cites: Intention of testator must govern where possible: 67 S.C. 130; 1 Rich. Eq., 404; 48 S.C. 440; 52 S.C. 554; 72 S.E., 468; 103 S.E., 586; 86 S.C. 445. As to super-added words: 128 S.E., 421; 16 S.C. 290; 4 Rich. Eq., 387; 10 S.C. 366; 2 Hill L., 330; 30 S.E., 400; 89 S.C. 212; 71 S.E., 959; 2 A.L.R., 918; 1 Strob. Eq., 344; 47 Am. Dec., 537; 37 S.C. 265; 16 S.E., 122; 34 A.S.R., 745; 161 S.E., 738; 131 S.C. 28; 88 S.C. 252.
January 22, 1934. The opinion of the Court was delivered by
An analysis of the deed of trust from W.W. Deschamps to W.B. McLeod, a review of the applicable authorities, and a study of the well-considered decree of the Circuit Judge, convince the Court that Judge Stoll has correctly decided the issues involved in the case. Therefore, the exceptions are overruled, and the judgment of the lower Court is affirmed and is made the judgment of this Court. Let it be reported.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BLEASE and MR. JUSTICE STABLER and MR. ACTING ASSOCIATE JUSTICE W.C. COTHRAN concur.
MR. JUSTICE CARTER disqualified.