This is the third time that the above-named parties have come before this court. (See First Arlington National Bank v. Stathis (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 802, 413 N.E.2d 1288; First Arlington National Bank v. Stathis (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 403, 450 N.E.2d 833.) The underlying dispute dates back almost 20 years and, if it continues without compromise, it may rival the 100 Years War in duration.

When the matter was initially before this court, we found that the affidavit was "technically false" but remanded for a determination of whether the trial court had "relied on the false representation that the actual records of the Recorder of Deeds had been searched" and whether the tax deed would not have been issued with the knowledge that only CTIC's records had been searched. Capitol argues that the trial court, and this court, thereafter became bound by the law of the case doctrine, citing First Arlington National Bank v. Stathis (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 403, 450 N.E.2d 833. According to Capitol's interpretation, our hands are bound by our prior, unpublished order and once the trial court clarified that it had not relied on the false affidavit, we could only affirm its denial of relief to NYG. • 3 We do not take so narrow a view. If this court cannot correct an inequitable and erroneous result, especially if it may have been caused in part by our prior ruling, we then abdicate our responsibilities as a reviewing court.

Harfield, Uniform Commercial Code Symposium: Code Treatment of Letters of Credit, 48 Cornell L.Q. 92, 93 (1963). The same argument raised by the Plaintiffs was raised in First Arlington National Bank v. Stathis, 115 Ill. App.3d 403, 71 Ill.Dec. 145, 450 N.E.2d 833 (1983). There the court stated that "[t]he obvious flaw in plaintiff's position is that, if adopted, it would convert the letter of credit into a contract of guaranty or suretyship, for it destroys the sole distinguishing feature between them."

Among the scant authorities, several hold that under section 5.111(a) a beneficiary warrants that the documents presented by the beneficiary comply in form, that is, facially, with the requirements of the letter of credit. See Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Central Bank, 717 F.2d 230, 238 (5th Cir. 1983); Delta Brands, Inc. v. MBank Dallas, 719 S.W.2d 355, 359 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); First Arlington Nat'l Bank v. Stathis, 115 Ill. App.3d 403, 71 Ill. Dec. 145, 151-52, 450 N.E.2d 833, 839-40 (1983); L. WEERAMANTRY W. SCHLICHTING, IX BANKING LAW § 234.08, at 234-54 to 234-55 (1990) ["WEERAMANTRY"]. But see Dolan, Letters of Credit, Article 5 Warranties, Fraud, and the Beneficiary's Certificate, 41 BUS.LAW. 347, 350-51 (1986) ["DOLAN"] (section 5.111(a) warranty should not extend to patent defects in documents presented).

This conclusion is in conformance with the vast weight of Illinois case law on the subject of letters of credit. See Professional Modular Surface, Inc. v. Uniroyal, Inc. (1982), 108 Ill. App.3d 1046 (the trial court erred in granting an injunction restraining payment on an unconditional letter of credit on the basis of an alleged breach of the underlying contract); Stringer, 102 Ill. App.3d 919 (absent fraud, the bank may not look to the underlying contract when demand is made on a letter of credit); Mount Prospect State Bank v. Marine Midland Bank (1983), 121 Ill. App.3d 295 (the obligation of the bank issuing a letter of credit is independent of the underlying contract between the customer and the beneficiary); Newcastle Properties, Inc. v. Shalowitz (1991), 221 Ill. App.3d 716 (a standby letter of credit requires the issuer to pay the beneficiary a sum certain upon presentation of the specified documents demonstrating that the customer has defaulted); First Arlington National Bank v. Stathis (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 403 (the issuer of a letter of credit is not authorized to assert any defenses which the customer may have to the underlying contract when presented with a proper demand for payment); Pioneer Bank Trust Co. v. Seiko Sporting Goods, U.S.A. Co. (1989), 184 Ill. App.3d 783 (the letter of credit is independent of the underlying contract, and when the documents presented comply with the conditions specified in the letter of credit, the issuer is authorized and obligated to pay). We next turn to the defendants' contention that the award of prejudgment interest was error and "manifestly inappropriate."

Because section 5.111(a) expressly provides that the warranties made by the beneficiary of a letter of credit are made to "all interested parties," courts in other jurisdictions, under different factual situations, have stated that the payor under a letter of credit may recover from the beneficiary when payment was unauthorized. See First Arlington National Bank v. Stathis, 115 Ill. App.3d 403, 71 Ill. Dec. 145, 151, 450 N.E.2d 833, 839 (1 Dist. 1983); Werner v. Grootemaat Sons, Inc., 80 Wis.2d 513, 259 N.W.2d 310, 315 n. 22 (1977). See also Squillante, Letter of Credit: A Discourse (pt. 6), 85 Com.L.J. 145 (1980).

An instrument of writing is one which "creates an indebtedness and is similar in effect to a bond, bill or promissory note." First Arlington National Bank v. Stathis, 115 Ill.App.3d 403, 71 Ill.Dec. 145, 155, 450 N.E.2d 833, 843 (1983), citing Hamilton v. American Gage Machine Corp., 35 Ill. App.3d 845, 342 N.E.2d 758 (1976). Notwithstanding Pierson's position throughout the trial, and on appeal, that its claim for money damages was based on an oral contract, it maintains that the following passage from a "contract report" it wrote on October 7, 1985, should have been considered by the district court as an "instrument of writing":

In addition to its attorneys' fees, PNC is entitled to receive prejudgment interest under Section 3-416(b) at the statutory rate of 5% from the date of its loss (October 23, 2012), through the entry of judgment. See 810 ILCS 5/3-416(b); 815 ILCS 205/2 ("[c]reditors shall be allowed to receive at the rate of five (5) per centum per annum for all moneys after they become due on any bond, bill, promissory note, or other instrument of writing; ... on money received to the use of another and retained without the owner's knowledge..."); See also Mutual Service Cas. Ins. Co. v. Elizabeth State Bank, 265 F.3d 601, 628-30 (7th Cir. 2001) (insurer was entitled to prejudgment interest from date it compensated insured for losses caused by insured's employee who misappropriated proceeds of insured's checks until the date insurer obtained judgment against employee); First Arlington Nat. Bank v. Stathis, 115 Ill.App.3d 403, 415-17 (1st Dist. 1983) (prejudgment interest allowed in case for wrongful dishonor of letter of credit). 15. Prejudgment interest under the Illinois Interest Act is also available in cases alleging fraud.

Actual fraud is the only affirmative defense that can obviate the requirement implied by the independence principle that the issuer must pay the beneficiary on the letter of credit without recourse to other agreements or courses of conduct. See Village of Long Grove, 205 Ill.Dec. 900, 644 N.E.2d at 460 (noting fraud as “the one recognized exception to the [issuer's] otherwise absolute duty to pay,” and holding that an alleged impossibility of performance on the part of the beneficiary, or an alleged inequity, does not provide a reason for the issuer to reject the beneficiary's claim for payment) (citing Newcastle Properties, Inc. v. Shalowitz, 221 Ill.App.3d 716, 164 Ill.Dec. 221, 582 N.E.2d 1165 (1991); Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 132 Ill.Dec. 886, 540 N.E.2d 808;Mount Prospect State Bank v. Marine Midland Bank, 121 Ill.App.3d 295, 76 Ill.Dec. 844, 459 N.E.2d 979 (1983); First Arlington Nat. Bank v. Stathis, 115 Ill.App.3d 403, 71 Ill.Dec. 145, 450 N.E.2d 833 (1983);Professional Modular Surface, Inc. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 108 Ill.App.3d 1046, 64 Ill.Dec. 625, 440 N.E.2d 177 (1982); Stringer, 58 Ill.Dec. 59, 430 N.E.2d at 1). All other affirmative defenses fail as a matter of law.

[T]he existence of a good faith dispute as to liability does not affect the operation of the statute [ 815 ILCS § 205/2] under these circumstances." Tomaso v. Plum Grove Bank, 130 Ill. App. 3d 18, 29 (1st Dist. 1985) (citing First Arlington Nat'l Bank v. Stathis, 115 Ill. App. 3d 403, 416 (1st Dist. 1983)); see also Canal Barge Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 2002 WL 31356455, at *1 n. 1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2002) (noting that while a good faith dispute could preclude an award for prejudgment interest in a claim brought for an unreasonable refusal to pay under the Illinois Interest Act, such a dispute does not preclude the recovery of prejudgment interest on money due under an instrument of writing). As noted above, in order to state a claim for statutory interest based upon an "instrument in writing," the writing itself must establish a creditor/debtor relationship and contain a specific due date for the amount outstanding.