Opinion
H047713
03-08-2022
SERGEY FIRSOV, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. YEVGENIY BABICHEV et al., Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 19CV345499
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Grover, Acting P. J.
We resolve this case by memorandum opinion under California Standards of Judicial Administration, Title 8, Standard 8.1. (See also People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 853-855.)
Sergey Firsov is the plaintiff in a lawsuit against Yevgeniy Babichev and several other defendants. The record does not detail the facts of the underlying case, but they are not necessary to resolving this appeal.
Firsov, representing himself here as he did in the trial court, appeals the order denying his "motions to void" anti-SLAPP motions filed by two of the defendants. Defendants Yevgeniy Babichev and Luba Chernov each moved under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 to strike plaintiff's complaint as strategic litigation against public participation. Firsov responded with two pleadings styled motions to void the defendants' anti-SLAPP motions, asking the trial court to deem the anti-SLAPP motions 1 void and to require the defendants to refile them. The court denied Firsov's motions in a single order. Firsov filed a notice of appeal from that ruling 12 days later.
This appeal must be dismissed because it is not from a final judgment nor from an appealable order. Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1 lists the judgments and orders from which an appeal may be taken. No judgment appears in the record. And the order Firsov appeals from-essentially, an order denying a motion to strike a filed pleading-is not on the list of appealable orders. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 904.1.) Firsov asserts the order denying his motions is appealable either as an order granting a new trial (Code Civ. Proc. § 904.1, subd. (a)(4)) or an order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc. § 904.1, subd. (a)(13)). But it is neither of those things. It is a procedural order denying a request to strike the anti-SLAPP motions from the docket, regardless of their merits. The right to appeal in a civil case is statutory; reviewing courts have no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal except as provided for by the legislature. (In re Marriage of Griffin (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 685, 688.) Since we have no jurisdiction to decide this appeal, it must be dismissed.
We note that even if we had jurisdiction to resolve the appeal on its merits, we would find no basis to reverse the trial court's decision. The sole argument asserted by Firsov both here and in the trial court for why the anti-SLAPP motions should not proceed is that the attorney for one of the defendants contacted the superior court clerk to schedule a date for the hearing on both defendants' anti-SLAPP motions. Firsov believes it violates the local rules of court for "one defendant [to] schedule the hearing of an anti-SLAPP motion for another defendant." Even assuming, solely for the sake of argument, that the scheduling of the hearing did not conform to local rules, Firsov has not shown that the remedy for such a violation would be to strike an otherwise properly filed motion. (See, e.g., Estate of Meeker (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1104 [a party should not be penalized for an attorney's noncompliance with local rules].) If we had jurisdiction to decide the merits of this appeal, we would affirm the trial court's decision. 2
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed. Costs are awarded to respondents by operation of rule 8.278, subdivision (a)(1) of the California Rules of Court. 3
WE CONCUR: Lie, J. Wilson, J. 4