Opinion
CV16600941S
10-21-2019
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Nada K. Sizemore, Judge
This decision arises out of the Defendants Adele Eberhart, Harry Eberhart and Vincent McManus Jr.’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement dated October 4, 2019 (Entry #167) and the Plaintiff’s Objection to such dated October 7, 2019 (Entry #168).
After a hearing on October 9, 2019, the court hereby DENIES the Defendant’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and SUSTAINS the Plaintiff’s Objection to such.
The court bases its decision on the following analysis.
Procedural Backdrop
Plaintiffs Michael J. Fiondella Jr., trustee of the Jo-An Carabetta 1983 Irrevocable Trust and The Meriden Homestead, LLC have brought suit against the Defendants Adele G. Eberhart, Harry S. Eberhart and Vincent T. McManus Jr. seeking declaratory judgment relief regarding certain parcels of real estate in the Shaker Court subdivision in Meriden, Connecticut.
This matter has been pending since 2016, and most recently was remanded back to the Superior Court after the issuance of the Connecticut Appellate Court decision on December 11, 2018 in Fiondella et al. v. City of Meriden, 186 Conn.App. 552, 200 A.3d 196 (2018). For purposes of this limited motion, the court will not summarize the longer procedural history of this matters as it is not relevant to the issue at hand.
On May 7, 2019, counsel for parties reported for a status conference before this court, at which they reported a settlement agreement had been reached between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants Eberharts and McManus. Specifically, counsel for the parties represented in chambers that an agreement had been reached, but the specific settlement terms were to be worked out. Nothing was ready to be placed on the record, and the parties did not discuss any specific terms of the agreement with the court. The court therefore issued an order dated May 7, 2019 staying the proceedings for 110 days allowing for the parties to work out settlement terms.
Thereafter, Plaintiffs’ counsel drafted a proposed Settlement Agreement and a proposed Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement and circulated such to counsel for the defense for edit and input. Defense counsel provided such edit and input and the documents were revised accordingly. The Defendants Eberhart signed both agreements, and returned such to the plaintiffs for finalization. The potential settlement involved two documents: (1) execution of a written Settlement Agreement and (2) execution and performance of a Real Estate Purchase and Sales Agreement involving the Plaintiffs’ potential purchase of four parcels at a cost of $380,000 subject the conditions listed in the draft written document.
In the proposed written Settlement Agreement dated May 7, 2019, the proposed signatories to said agreement were listed as Adele G. Eberhart, Harry S. Eberhart and Michael J. Fiondella, Jr. in his capacity as trustee for The Meriden Homestead, LLC. In this proposed agreement, the parties contemplated and articulated that part of the consideration for the agreement would be the execution of the Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement with all its terms and conditions incorporated into the settlement. See Paragraph 1 of Settlement Agreement. In that proposed Real Estate and Sale Agreement, the Sellers are listed as Adele G. Eberhart and Harry S. Eberhart and the Buyer is listed as The Meriden Homestead, LLC or its assignee(s). Among the many conditions in that written document, at paragraph 6, there is an "Inspection Contingency." Specifically that contingency provided as follows at section 6(b):
SELLER agrees to permit BUYER and/or its designee(s) to inspect the Real Property during the period set forth in subparagraph (a) above. If BUYER is not satisfied with the physical condition of the Real Property and so notifies SELLER in writing prior to the time and date specified in (a) above, then BUYER may, at BUYER’S option, terminate this agreement. BUYER may give SELLER the option to correct the conditions that are unsatisfactory to the BUYER. Should BUYER elect to terminate this Agreement or SELLER is unwilling to correct any unsatisfactory conditions, the BUYER shall notify SELLER of BUYER’S election to terminate this Agreement and if terminated, this Agreement shall be null and void and the Deposit monies paid hereunder shall be returned immediately to BUYER.
An inspection occurred on May 20, 2019, and by letter dated May 22, 2019, Plaintiff informed counsel for the Defendants Eberhart that "the physical condition of the property is unsatisfactory and unacceptable." And, "my client therefore decided not to proceed with the contemplated transaction and has elected to terminate the transaction."
The Defendants Eberhart now by Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement are asking this court to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement between the above parties.
Standard of Review for Audubon Parking Motions to Enforce Settlements
Pursuant to the holding of the Connecticut Supreme Court in Audubon Parking Associates Limited Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 626 A.2d 729 (1993), the court laid out the process when parties seek to enforce settlement agreements in civil litigation.
Generally, a trial court has the inherent power to enforce summarily a settlement agreement as a matter of law when the terms of the agreement are clear and unambiguous. Gatz v. Southwest Bank of Omaha, 836 F.2d 1089, 1095 (8th Cir. 1988); see also J. Fischer, "Enforcement of Settlements: A Survey," 27 Tort & Ins. L.J. 82, 92 (1991). "Agreements that end lawsuits are contracts, sometimes enforceable in a subsequent suit, but in many situations by entry of a judgment in the original suit. A court’s authority to enforce a settlement by entry of judgment in the underlying action is especially clear where the settlement is reported to the court during the course of a trial or other significant courtroom proceedings." (Citations and Internal Quotations Omitted.) Audubon Parking, 255 Conn. at 812; Reiner v. Reiner, 190 Conn.App. 268, 210 A.3d 668 (2019).
"Summary enforcement is not only essential to the efficient use of judicial resources, but also preserves the integrity of settlement as a meaningful way to resolve legal disputes. When parties agree to settle a case, they are effectively contracting for the right to avoid a trial. "The asserted right not to go to trial can appropriately be based on a contract between the parties ... To hold that a jury trial is a necessary predicate to enforcement of a settlement agreement would undermine the very purpose of the agreement. We hold that a trial court may summarily enforce a settlement agreement within the framework of the original lawsuit as a matter of law when the parties do not dispute the terms of the agreement." Internal quotations omitted- Audubon Parking, id. at 813.
In the twenty-six (26) years since that Supreme Court decision, the Connecticut appellate and trial courts have had many occasions to be faced with similar motions to enforce alleged settlement agreements. See Reiner v. Reiner, 190 Conn.App. 268, 210 A.3d 668 (2019) (No enforcement- estate litigation); Commissioner of Transportation v. Lagosz, 189 Conn.App. 828 (2019) [Court enforced settlement agreement]; Matos v. Ortiz, 166 Conn.App. 775, 144 A.3d 425 (2016) [No enforcement- teacher versus school dispute); Waldman v. Beck, 101 Conn.App. 669, 922 A.2d 340 (2007) [No enforcement- legal malpractice claim]; Shawn Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Tai, 82 Conn.App. 148, 842 A.2d 1140 (2004) [no enforcement legal malpractice claim]; Brycki v. Brycki, 91 Conn.App. 579, 881 A.2d 1065 (2005) [Divorce- no enforcement]; Paley v. PMC Design Builders, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, CV 04 0491201 (J. Jones- May 15, 2008) [No enforcement- defective construction litigation]; compare Westphal v. Heon, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, CV 166059378 (Wilson, J.- Jan. 11, 2017) [settlement agreement enforced- motor vehicle accident case].
In most instances, the Connecticut appellate courts have generally denied motions to enforce said agreements, as the standards articulated by the court in the Audubon Parking case are very high.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
In applying the above standards articulated by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Audubon Parking, this court cannot conclude that the Defendants Eberhart have NOT met the burden required to enforce the settlement agreement.
In this instance, the court finds the arguments submitted by the Plaintiff more persuasive than the position of the Defendants on this issue. In addition, the cases provided by the Defendants to enforce this agreement are not supportive of the relief that they request. In Amica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Welch Enterprises, 114 Conn.App. 290 (2009), the court actually refused to enforce a settlement agreement on the grounds that it was not clear and unambiguous. And the Keller v. Beckenstein, 117 Conn.App. 550, 979 A.2d 1005 (2009) did not address enforcement of settlement agreements at all.
The court, in this case, cannot find that there was a clear, unambiguous contract between the parties to be enforced, as described by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Audubon Parking and by the appellate and trial courts and its progeny.
First, the terms of the settlement agreement were never articulated to the court, or placed on the record. And, this alleged settlement agreement did not occur during trial or at any other pretrial proceedings, where other trial and appellate courts have found more compelling reasons to enforce agreements. This case, in May 2019, had just been remanded back to the Meriden Superior Court from the Appellate Court to begin proceedings anew, after the Appellate Court reversed a previous Motion to Dismiss.
Second, even though the parties appeared to be on the road to execution of a potential written settlement with a companion Purchase and Sale Agreement, the contract terms between them contained a contingency allowing the Buyer to terminate the Purchase and Sale Agreement, which was made part of the overall Settlement Agreement. These facts do not provide a basis for summary enforcement.
CONCLUSION AND COURT ORDERS
Therefore, as a matter of law, this court DENIES the Defendants Motion to enforce a settlement and SUSTAINS the Plaintiff’s Objection to such.
The court further orders the parties to submit a proposed Scheduling Order within 30 days of this court’s ruling by November 21, 2019, outlining the next pleadings, discovery and other litigation steps necessary to get this matter progressing forward to a trial.