Opinion
No. COA14–420.
2014-12-16
Mary H. FINNEY, Plaintiff v. Richard H. FINNEY, Defendant.
Hyler & Lopez, P.A., by Stephen P. Agan and George B. Hyler, Jr., for Plaintiff.Mary Elizabeth Arrowood for Defendant.
Appeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 31 December 2013 by Judge Monica H. Leslie in Haywood County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 September 2014. Hyler & Lopez, P.A., by Stephen P. Agan and George B. Hyler, Jr., for Plaintiff. Mary Elizabeth Arrowood for Defendant.
ERVIN, Judge.
Plaintiff Mary Finney appeals from a judgment unequally distributing the parties' marital and divisible assets in favor of Defendant Richard Finney. On appeal, Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by failing to follow this Court's instruction requiring the correction of an erroneous finding of fact contained in its initial equitable distribution judgment and by concluding that an equitable distribution of the parties' property would involve the distribution of 60% of the parties' marital and divisible assets to Defendant and 40% of the parties' marital and divisible assets to Plaintiff. After careful consideration of Plaintiff's challenges to the trial court's judgment in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court's judgment should be affirmed.
I. Factual Background
On 29 May 1993, Plaintiff and Defendant were married. The parties separated on 4 January 2006 and were subsequently divorced. On 9 January 2006, Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting claims for divorce, post-separation support, permanent alimony, and equitable distribution. In her complaint, Plaintiff requested that the court approve an unequal division of the parties' marital and divisible property in her favor. On 15 February 2006, Defendant filed a responsive pleading in which he requested, among other things, that an unequal distribution of the parties' marital and divisible assets be made in his favor. On 15 March 2006, Plaintiff filed a reply to the counterclaims asserted in Defendant's responsive pleading.
On or about 23 February 2006, Plaintiff filed an affidavit in support of her spousal support claim. On 5 April 2006, Defendant filed an affidavit in support of his position with respect to the spousal support issue. On 2 May 2006, the trial court entered an order awarding Plaintiff $1,500 per month in post-separation support.
On 23 May 2006, Plaintiff filed an equitable distribution affidavit. Plaintiff filed an amended equitable distribution affidavit on 13 November 2007. Defendant filed an equitable distribution affidavit on 3 January 2007. On 30 May 2008, the trial court entered a pre-trial order setting forth the parties' stipulations and position with respect to the valuation and distribution of various assets and debts.
The parties' equitable distribution claims were heard before the trial court in August and September of 2010. On 15 July 2011, the trial court entered an equitable distribution order in which it found, among other things, that Plaintiff believed that the 14 acres of land that she owned separately from Defendant to be worth $123,000, with this amount being also set forth in an exhibit that accompanied the judgment in which Plaintiff's separate property was listed. Based on its findings of fact, the trial court concluded that an unequal distribution of the parties' marital and divisible property in favor of Defendant would be equitable and divided the parties' marital and divisible property so that Plaintiff received 40% of the parties' property, which was valued at $98,855.23, and Defendant received 60% of the parties' property, which was valued at $148,283.00. Plaintiff noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court's equitable distribution judgment.
On 15 January 2013, this Court filed an opinion in Finney v. Finney, ––– N.C.App. ––––, 736 S.E.2d 639 (2013), in which we concluded that “the record contains no testimony that [Plaintiff] believed the 14 acres were valued at $123,000.00.” Instead, we stated that “[i]t appears that the trial court confused this acreage with [Plaintiff's] condominium—an entirely different asset—which she indeed purchased for $123,000.00.” Id. at –––, 736 S.E.2d at 644. As a result of this and other determinations, this Court reversed the trial court's equitable distribution order and remanded this case to the trial court with instructions to enter a new equitable distribution order that, among other things, contained proper findings of fact addressing the value of Plaintiff's separate property and other issues. Id. at –––, 736 S.E.2d at 646.
The trial court held a hearing on remand in this case on 6 August 2013. On 31 December 2013, the trial court entered a new equitable distribution order in which it found, among other things, that Plaintiff believed that the 14 acre tract of real property that she owned separately from Defendant had a value of $50,000. However, the exhibit delineating Plaintiff's separate property that accompanied the trial court's new equitable distribution judgment continued to state that the value of Plaintiff's 14 acre tract of real property was $123,000. Based upon the findings of fact contained in its order on remand, the trial court divided the parties' property by awarding 60%, which was valued at $148,283, to Defendant and 40%, which was valued at $98,855.23, to Plaintiff. Plaintiff noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court's remand order.
II. Substantive Legal Analysis
A. Standard of Review
“The standard of review on appeal from a judgment entered after a non-jury trial is whether there is competent evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings support the conclusions of law and ensuing judgment.” Pegg v. Jones, 187 N.C.App. 355, 358, 653 S.E.2d 229, 231 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted), aff'd per curiam, 362 N.C. 343, 661 S.E.2d 732 (2008). “Mere formal defects in findings ordinarily will be ignored if the substance of the judgment is sufficient;” for that reason, an error must affect a party's substantial rights in order to justify an award of appellate relief. Andrews v. Andrews, 79 N.C.App. 228, 232, 338 S.E.2d 809, 812, disc. review denied, 316 N.C. 730, 345 S.E.2d 385 (1986), disapproved of on other grounds in Armstrong v. Armstrong, 322 N.C. 396, 403, 368 S.E.2d 595, 599 (1988). Thus, this Court “will not remand a judgment for obviously insignificant errors” in cases involving “the complex litigation of equitable distribution.” Mishler v. Mishler, 90 N.C.App. 72, 74, 367 S.E.2d 385, 387, disc. review denied, 323 N.C. 174, 373 S.E.2d 111 (1988). “[W]here matters are left to the discretion of the trial court, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether there was a clear abuse of discretion.” White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 820, 833 (1985). Under the abuse of discretion standard, the trial court's judgment will be upheld unless it is “so arbitrary that [it] could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” Lawing v. Lawing, 81 N.C.App. 159, 162, 344 S.E.2d 100, 104 (1986).
B. Applicable Legal Principles
According to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50–20, “[u]pon application of a party, the court shall determine what is the marital property and divisible property and shall provide for an equitable distribution of the marital property and divisible property between the parties[.]” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50–20(c) provides that “[t]here shall be an equal division by using net value of marital property and net value of divisible property unless the court determines that an equal division is not equitable.” In determining how to equitably divide the parties' property, the court must consider the following factors:
(1) The income, property, and liabilities of each party at the time the division of property is to become effective.
(2) Any obligation for support arising out of a prior marriage.
(3) The duration of the marriage and the age and physical and mental health of both parties.
(4) The need of a parent with custody of a child or children of the marriage to occupy or own the marital residence and to use or own its household effects.
(5) The expectation of pension, retirement, or other deferred compensation rights that are not marital property.
(6) Any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services, or lack thereof, as a spouse, parent, wage earner or homemaker.
(7) Any direct or indirect contribution made by one spouse to help educate or develop the career potential of the other spouse.
(8) Any direct contribution to an increase in value of separate property which occurs during the course of the marriage.
(9) The liquid or nonliquid character of all marital property and divisible property.
(10) The difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of retaining such asset or interest, intact and free from any claim or interference by the other party.
(11) The tax consequences of each party, including those federal and State tax consequences that would have been incurred if the marital and divisible property had been sold or liquidated on the date of valuation. The trial court may, however, in its discretion, consider whether or when such tax consequences are reasonably likely to occur in determining the equitable value deemed appropriate for this factor.
(11a) Acts of either party to maintain, preserve, develop, or expand; or to waste, neglect, devalue or convert the marital property or divisible property, or both, during the period after separation of the parties and before the time of distribution.
...
(12) Any other factor which the court finds to be just and proper.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50–20(c). According to well-established principles of North Carolina law, “an equal division is mandatory absent a determination that it would not be equitable.” Hendricks v. Hendricks, 96 N.C.App. 462, 464, 386 S.E.2d 84, 85 (1989) (citing Bradley v. Bradley, 78 N.C.App. 150, 151, 336 S.E.2d 658, 659 (1985)), cert. denied, 326 N.C. 264, 389 S.E.2d 113 (1990). “[A] party desiring an unequal division of marital property bear[s] the burden of producing evidence concerning one or more of the twelve factors [enumerated] in [N.C. Gen.Stat. § 50–20(c) ] and the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that an equal distribution would not be equitable.” White, 312 N.C. at 776, 324 S.E.2d at 832. In addressing a party's request for an unequal distribution of marital and divisible property, the trial court must make written findings of fact addressing the relevant statutory and nonstatutory factors to support its conclusion concerning the ultimate distribution decision. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 322 N.C. 396, 403, 368 S.E.2d 595, 599 (1988). “The weight to be assigned to any factor in a given case is within the discretion of the trial court.” Patton v. Patton, 78 N.C.App. 247, 257, 337 S.E.2d 607, 613 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, 318 N.C. 404, 348 S.E.2d 593 (1986). For that reason, a decision that an unequal distribution of the parties' property may, if the trial court's decision is supported by the record evidence, be based upon the application of a single factor. Hendricks, 96 N.C.App. at 464, 386 S.E.2d at 85.
C. Analysis of Plaintiff's Challenges to the Trial Court's Order
1. Valuation of Plaintiff's Separate Property
In her first assignment of error, Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by failing to comply with the instructions contained in our earlier opinion in this case. More specifically, Plaintiff contends that the trial court failed to properly value her separate property. We do not believe that Plaintiff is entitled to relief from the trial court's order on the basis of this argument.
As we have previously stated, “an inferior court must follow the mandate of an appellate court in a case without variation or departure.” In re R.A.H., 182 N.C.App. 52, 57, 641 S.E.2d 404, 407 (2007) (quoting Condellone v. Condellone, 137 N.C.App. 547, 551, 528 S.E.2d 639, 642, disc. review denied, 352 N.C. 672, 545 S.E.2d 420 (2000)); see also Lea Co. v. N.C. Bd. of Transp., 323 N.C. 697, 699, 374 S.E.2d 866, 868 (1989) (stating that “[a] decision of this Court on a prior appeal constitutes the law of the case, both in subsequent proceedings in the trial court and on a subsequent appeal”). A trial court judgment that is inconsistent with, is contrary to, or modifies, corrects, alters or reverses the prior mandate of an appellate court is unauthorized and void. Collins v. Simms, 257 N.C. 1, 8, 125 S.E.2d 298, 303 (1962).
A careful review of the record precludes us from accepting Plaintiff's contention that the trial court failed to comply with our earlier decision in this case in such a manner as to prejudice Plaintiff. At the equitable distribution hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Plaintiff, who estimated the value of the 14–acre tract of real property to be $50,000. In light of Plaintiff's testimony, the trial court found as a fact in its order on remand that “Plaintiff owned the 14 acres of separate real property which she believed to be valued at $50,000.00.” Although the trial court did fail to amend Exhibit A to reflect the updated value for Plaintiff's separate tract of real property in its order on remand, we cannot say that this error, which may well have been an oversight, prejudiced Plaintiff given that the trial court changed the valuation of the tract of real property in question in its findings of fact. In other words, the trial court's failure to amend Exhibit A to render it consistent with the findings of fact contained in the body of the remand order amounts to an “obviously insignificant error[ ]” since the findings of fact, on which the court is presumed to rely in reaching its conclusions of law, were supported by competent evidence. Mishler, 90 N.C.App. at 74, 367 S.E.2d at 387. As a result, we conclude that Plaintiff's initial challenge to the trial court's remand order lacks merit.
When asked, “do you have an opinion of the fair market value of that land, that [14 acres] that you owned, that you inherited, today?” Plaintiff responded, “I would have to go with the 50,000.”
2. Unequal Distribution of Marital Assets
Secondly, Plaintiff argues that, even if the trial court correctly valued her separate tract of real property, the trial court's conclusion that a division of the parties' property such that Plaintiff received 40% and Defendant received 60% would be equitable is manifestly unsupported by reason. More specifically, Plaintiff argues that the trial court's findings, considered as a whole, called for an unequal distribution of the marital estate in her favor and that the trial court acted unreasonably in reaching a contrary conclusion. We disagree.
As a result of the fact that Plaintiff has failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's factual findings, those findings are binding for purposes of appellate review. O'Connor v. Zelinske, 193 N.C.App. 683, 687, 668 S.E.2d 615, 617 (2008) (stating that, where a party “fails to argue that the trial court's findings of fact are not supported by sufficient evidence, any such argument is deemed abandoned, and the trial court's findings of fact are binding on appeal”). In seeking to persuade us that the trial court's judgment was manifestly unsupported by reason, Plaintiff points to the trial court's findings of fact that her monthly income was $1,049 less than Defendant's; that the value of her separate property was $16,188.07 less than Defendant's; that Plaintiff is 15 years younger than Defendant and has a longer life expectancy; that Plaintiff supported Defendant in his ministerial work, including having driven Defendant to events outside the county in which they resided; and that Plaintiff earned more wages than Defendant between 1997 and 2001, necessitating the conclusion that she had contributed more to the development of the marital estate than he did. Although the trial court did, in fact, make the factual findings upon which Plaintiff's argument relies, the trial court made a number of findings of fact that cut the other way. For example, the trial court found that Defendant requires recurring treatment for cancer and incurs significant out-of-pocket expenditures for medical care when such recurrences occur; that Defendant earned more wages than Plaintiff in 2002, 2003, and 2005; that Defendant made a substantial down payment on the marital home using his separate funds; that Defendant paid off the mortgage due on the marital home and certain maintenance-related expenses and property tax obligations associated with the marital home after the date of separation; that Defendant paid most of the household expenses during the marriage, using his separate funds for this purpose on occasion; that Defendant purchased a vehicle for the parties' use during the marriage using his separate funds; and that Defendant established an IRA account using his separate funds for the purpose of supplementing Plaintiff's retirement income. Although Plaintiff challenges the weight that the trial court gave to various factors that are reflected in its factual findings in the course of concluding that an unequal distribution of the parties' property in Defendant's favor would be equitable, the mere fact that a party disagrees with the weight that the trial court decided to give the evidence concerning various distributional facts does not suffice to establish that the trial court's distributional decision rests upon an abuse of discretion. As we read the challenged order, the trial court's findings of fact reflect that at least one distributional factor supports the trial court's distribution decision and that the trial court made a reasoned decision in adopting the 60/40 distributional split deemed appropriate in its order on remand. As a result, Plaintiff's second challenge to the trial court's judgment lacks merit as well.
III. Conclusion
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the trial court followed the mandate of this Court on remand and committed no error in reaching its equitable distribution judgment. As a result, the trial court's judgment should be, and hereby is, affirmed.
AFFIRMED. Judges BRYANT and ELMORE, concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).