Finally, Count VI asserted a claim against all defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a conspiracy to interfere with the plaintiffs' civil rights. (Id. at ¶ 232 p. 60–¶ 240 p. 62.) As a result, one or both plaintiffs suffered damages including injury to their reputation, jeopardy to their business, emotional injury and lost business and investments due to damaged business reputations.

These false accusations constituted extreme cruelty. Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164, 240 P. 62. It also appears that he had demanded that plaintiff procure a divorce from him, insisting upon a division of the property which was unsatisfactory to her. We have carefully examined the record and are of opinion that the finding of the trial court that the defendant had been guilty of such cruelty as to destroy the legal ends and purposes of matrimony, and that the parties could never live together again, was not clearly against the weight of evidence.

The contention of plaintiff relative to the judgment of division of property being an inequitable one rests largely upon the fact that all of the property had been acquired by the parties during coverture, and therefore plaintiff was entitled to a fair and equitable division thereof irrespective of whether the divorce was granted to the plaintiff or the defendant, and upon the fact that plaintiff's father was largely instrumental in assisting the plaintiff and defendant in acquiring all of the property involved. Our attention is directed to Van Horn v. Van Horn, 189 Okla. 624, 119 P.2d 825; Owen v. Owen, 183 Okla. 200, 80 P.2d 628; Colvin v. Colvin, 183 Okla. 267, 81 P.2d 305; Carter v. Carter, 181 Okla. 204, 73 P.2d 404; Stocker v. Stocker, 173 Okla. 64, 47 P.2d 107; Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164, 240 P. 62, in support of the contention so made. An examination of the cited cases will reveal that while they are authority for the rule that jointly acquired property is to be equitably and fairly divided between the parties irrespective of the fault of either, that they do not sustain the interpretation which plaintiff would have us place thereon by giving her an equal division of the property involved. The trial court found from the evidence that substantially all of the property had been acquired by the parties since 1936 as the result of the advancement of money made by plaintiff's father and the management of the defendant, and that while all of the property should be treated and disposed of as jointly acquired property, an equitable division thereof would not require an equal division.

Hink v. Hink, 131 Okla. 164, 268 P. 282. In the case of Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164, 240 P. 62, this court said: "Extreme cruelty does not mean that the defendant should strike or maim the plaintiff, but any conduct on the part of the defendant that would destroy the happiness and health of the plaintiff and defeat the very purpose of matrimony, would be extreme cruelty.

In support of this contention the plaintiff insists that it was necessary that the proof show either "(1) that the conduct of the wife, plaintiff in error, had been such that the life or health of the defendant in error was endangered; or (2) that the plaintiff in error had been guilty of such conduct that the mental feelings of defendant in error were unjustifiably wounded; or (3) that the conduct of the plaintiff in error had so destroyed the peace of mind of defendant in error that his health had been seriously impaired and life endangered, or was such as utterly to destroy the legitimate objects and aims of matrimony." Cited in support thereof are Feyerherm v. Feyerherm, 128 Okla. 147, 262 P. 199; Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164, 240 P. 62; 9 R. C. L. 118; Reed v. Reed, 119 Okla. 5, 246 P. 413. We gather from plaintiff's argument that it is her contention that, since the evidence fails to reveal any specific act of violence on her part or any other particular thing which could be pointed to as inflicting any injury above mentioned, therefore the finding of extreme cruelty cannot be supported.

"Where a divorce is granted the husband because of the fault of the wife, the court should make a fair and equitable division of the property acquired by the joint industry of the parties during marriage, but in such case no division should be made of the separate property of the husband acquired prior to the marriage." See, also, Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164, 240 P. 62, and Stocker v. Stocker, 173, Okla. 64, 47 P.2d 107. In the judgment of the trial court the defendant was given her $800, with interest thereon, and she has taken this $800 according to the certificate of the court clerk filed in a former motion to dismiss.

The evidence is conflicting as to the essential facts. Each party by pleading and evidence charges the other with conduct sufficient to constitute extreme cruelty as defined by this court in Stocker v. Stocker, 173 Okla. 64, 47 P.2d 107; Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164, 240 P. 62: Hink v. Hink, 131 Okla. 164. 268 P. 282, and Horner v. Horner, 166 Okla. 103, 26 P.2d 929. We deem it neither necessary nor proper to further note the details of the testimony concerning the difficulties and intimate relations of the parties.

But is conduct or treatment which renders cohabitation intolerable, which destroys the concord, harmony, happiness, and affection of the parties, and the legitimate aims, objects, purposes, and end of matrimony, or grievously wounds the mental feelings or so destroys the peace of mind as seriously to impair the health or endanger the life of the other. Finnell v. Finnell (1925) 113 Okla. 164, 240 P. 62; McCurdy v. McCurdy (1926) 123 Okla. 295, 253 P. 295; Hink v. Hink (1928) 131 Okla. 164, 268 P. 282; Hornor v. Hornor (1933) 166 Okla. 103, 26 P.2d 929. Where, in an action for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty, the evidence is conflicting as to the facts and the fault, but there is sufficient evidence to sustain the judgment of the trial court, the same will not be disturbed on appeal. Stovall v. Stovall (1911) 29 Okla. 125, 116 P. 791; Faughn v. Faughn (1925) 111 Okla. 227, 239 P. 134; Bruce v. Bruce (1930) 141 Okla. 160, 285 P. 30; Bussey v. Bussey (1931) 148 Okla. 10, 296 P. 401.

"In a divorce action, where the evidence is conflicting as to the facts and the fault, but there is sufficient evidence to sustain the decree of the trial court, the same will not be disturbed on appeal." Panther v. Panther, 147 Okla. 131, 295 P. 219; Bussey v. Bussey, 148 Okla. 10, 296 P. 401; Barker v. Barker, 99 Okla. 103, 218 P. 812; Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164, 240 P. 62. The judgment and decree of the trial court, including the alimony as allowed, should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.

"The conduct of either spouse which grievously wounds the mental feelings of the other, or so utterly destroys the peace of mind of the other as to seriously impair the bodily health, or such as utterly destroys the legitimate end of matrimony, constitutes extreme cruelty, within the meaning of section 4962, R. L. 1910 (sec. 665, O. S. 1931.)" 1931.)" See, also, Lyon v. Lyon, 39 Okla. 111, 134 P. 650; McCurdy v. McCurdy, 123 Okla. 295, 253 P. 295; Finnell v. Finnell, 113 Okla. 164, 240 P. 62; and Morris v. Morris, 132 Okla. 291, 270 P. 833. The rule is also well settled in this jurisdiction that an action for divorce is of equitable cognizance and the judgment of the trial court will not be set aside unless the same is clearly against the weight of the evidence.