Opinion
2021-00129JD
12-21-2021
NATOSHA L. FINLEY Plaintiff v. MIAMI UNIVERSITY Defendant
Sent to S.C. Reporter 2/24/2022
ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PATRICK E. SHEERAN Judge
{¶1} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56 and L.C.C.R. 4(D), Defendant's motion for summary judgment is now before the Court for a non-oral hearing. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED.
Standard of Review
{¶2} Motions for summary judgment are reviewed under the standard set forth in Civ.R. 56(C), which states, in part:
Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party's favor.1 "[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record before the trial court which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on a material element of the nonmoving party's claim." Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). To meet this initial burden, the moving party must be able to point to evidentiary materials of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Id. at 292-293.
{¶3} If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party bears a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E), which states, in part:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party.
Factual Background
{¶4} Plaintiff is an African American, female, formerly employed for Defendant as an Assistant Professor. Since Defendant hired her in August 2009, Plaintiff has focused on the field of structural biology. In order to facilitate her studies and write scholarly articles for Defendant, Plaintiff required the use of Defendant's technology and equipment. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against her when it denied her access to the necessary equipment despite allowing other researchers, both inside and outside the university, to utilize the equipment.
{¶5} Because she was not allowed sufficient access, she was unable to write the sufficient amount of scholarly articles necessary for tenure. On November 4, 2016, Plaintiff was denied tenure and given an extension of time to complete the number ofscholarly articles required for tenure. During this time, Plaintiff was able to complete 2 the required scholarly articles; however, her final article had only preliminary approval when Defendant revisited whether to grant Plaintiff tenure.
{¶6} On December 11, 2017, Defendant denied Plaintiff tenure and promotion for failure to write sufficient scholarly articles in lead publications. Plaintiff argues that Defendant discriminated against her when it failed to award her tenure for two reasons. First, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant gave favorable tenure recommendations to her white counterparts who had fewer publications than she did. Second, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant gave credit to her white counterparts for co-authored publications but failed to give her the same credit for her co-authorships.
{¶7} As a result, Plaintiff engaged Defendant's administrative process and argued that Defendant made a procedural error when it failed to recognize her final article when it made its decision to deny Plaintiff tenure and promotion. On June 11, 2018, Defendant's Faculty Rights and Responsibilities Committee found that there was no procedural error made in the decision to deny Plaintiff tenure and promotion. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a claim with Defendant's Office of Equal Opportunity, which rendered a finding of no discrimination on November 21, 2018. On December 6, 2018, Plaintiff filed an appeal to the Vice President of Institutional Diversity and Inclusion after being told she could not appeal to Defendant's Board, which was denied on February 1, 2019. On April 8, 2019, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Office.
Procedural History
{¶8} Due to the alleged wrongful denial of tenure, Plaintiff filed, on November 20, 2019, an original complaint against Defendant in the United States District Court Southern District of Ohio under Case No. 1:19-cv-00984, which set forth federal law claims of discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, and national origin pursuant to41 U.S.C. 2000(e). On January 28, 2020, Plaintiff amended her complaint to add state law claims of discrimination on the basis of gender, race, and national origin 3 pursuant to R.C. 4112. On May 12, 2020, Plaintiff filed a related federal lawsuit against Defendant in the United States District Court Southern District of Ohio under Case No. 1:20-cv-00379. On November 30, 2020, the United States District Court Southern District of Ohio dismissed without prejudice Plaintiffs state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Finley v. Miami Univ., 504 F.Supp.3d 838 (S.D.Ohio 2020). On the same date, Plaintiff's federal law claims of discrimination from Case No. 1:19-cv-00984 were dismissed as untimely. Id.
{¶9} On March 10, 2021, Plaintiff filed her original complaint in this Court, which asserts claims of discrimination based on gender and race, and a claim for retaliation pursuant to R.C. 4112 for Defendant's wrongful denial of tenure and the subsequent denial of her appeals of that decision. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint as untimely. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in which she additionally pleads that these claims are timely under Ohio's savings statute because her claims were originally asserted in her November 20, 2019 federal complaint and in a related May 12, 2020 federal complaint. Plaintiff states that her state law claims were dismissed without prejudice from her federal lawsuits on November 30, 2020.
Despite being able to file her amended complaint as a matter of course pursuant to Civ.R. 15(A), Plaintiff filed a motion requesting leave to file her amended complaint, which the Court granted. See June 7, 2021 Entry.
{¶10} On June 21, 2021, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint on the basis that her claims are untimely. In response, Plaintiff argues that, pursuant to R.C. 2305.19(A) and Civ.R. 15(C), her claims are timely because she filed her original complaint in this Court within one year of her state law claims being dismissed from her federal complaint and her original complaint relates back to the date her original federal complaint was filed. In reply, Defendant argues that Ohio's savings statute does not apply to Plaintiff's claims because she failed to assert her state law claims in her original federal complaint. Defendant further argues that, even though 4 Plaintiff attempted to assert her claims under R.C 4112 against the state by amending her federal complaint, the amendment does not relate back to the date of her original complaint because her federal claims were dismissed as untimely.
{¶11} Because matters outside Plaintiff's operative pleading would have to be considered in order to properly rule on the motion, the Court issued an order, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B), notifying the parties that it converted Defendant's motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, as provided in Civ.R. 56. See August 8, 2021 Entry.
Law and Analysis
{¶12} Generally, "civil actions against the state * * * shall be commenced no later than two years after the date of the accrual of the cause of action or within any shorter period that is applicable to similar suits between private parties." R.C. 2743.16(A). Plaintiff's claims of employment discrimination under R.C. 4112 are subject to the two-year statute of limitations period set forth in R.C. 2743.16(A). McCoy v. Toledo Correctional Institution, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-1098, 2005-Ohio-1848. In the absence of a factual dispute as to when a plaintiff's cause of action accrues, the application of the statute of limitations is a question of law. Bell v. Ohio State Bd. of Trustees, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-1174, 2007-Ohio-2790, ¶ 21.
{¶13} It is not disputed that the violations of R.C. 4112 that Plaintiff pleads occurred more than two years prior to Plaintiff's filing her March 10, 2021 original complaint. It is also undisputed that the statute of limitations began to run on December 11, 2017 when Defendant denied Plaintiff tenure. Instead, Plaintiff argues that R.C. 2305.19 and Civ.R. 15(C) 5 operate to save her claims. R.C. 2305.19 provides, in pertinent part:
The Court notes that, as pleaded in the amended complaint, Plaintiff appears to hint that each of her denied appeals was a new act of discrimination. However, absent any demonstration of how Plaintiff was further discriminated against with each adverse decision, the subsequent denials are merely adverse consequences resulting from the December 11, 2017 denial of tenure. See Lennox Indus. v. State Civ. Rights Commn., 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 99AP-352, 99AP-354, 99AP355, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 6491, 10-11 (Dec. 28, 1999), citing Poindexter v. Northrop Corp., 728 F.Supp.1365 (1990) ("If the only events within the period were the delayed but inevitable consequences of acts committed prior to the limitations period, the claim is time-barred."). Nevertheless, Plaintiff neither makes this argument, pleads any facts of further discrimination, nor provides any Civ.R. 56 evidence that would suggest a dispute of material fact.
In an action commenced, or attempted to be commenced, if in due time * * * the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff * * * may commence a new action within one year after such date of * * * the plaintiffs failure otherwise than upon the merits.
Additionally, Civ.R. 15(C), in relevant part, states that "[whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading."
{¶14} Although it is true that Plaintiff filed her original complaint in the Court of Claims within one year of her state law claims being dismissed otherwise than upon the merits by the federal court, it does not necessarily follow that the savings statute applies to an action against the state that was filed in a court without jurisdiction after expiration of the statute of limitations period. See, e.g., Hall v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 93AP-784, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 416 (Feb. 3, 1994) (The Court declined to apply the savings statute when plaintiffs original Court of Claims complaint was filed after the expiration of the statute of limitations and could not relate back to the original complaint filed in the court of common pleas because plaintiff did not attempt to file an amended complaint to add the state as a defendant until after the statute of limitations had already expired and the court of common pleas could not exercise jurisdiction over an action against the state). When Plaintiff filed her first original complaint in federal court, she did not include her state law claims against Defendant. Though Plaintiff may have attempted to assert her state law claims in her federal lawsuit 6 by filing her January 28, 2020 amended complaint to include violations of R.C. 4112, the statute of limitations period on these claims had already expired.
{¶15} While Plaintiff relied on the amended complaint relating back to the date of the original complaint, Civ.R. 15(C) does not apply to relate back claims over which a court does not have jurisdiction. See id. at 8-9 (Since the common pleas court "was without original jurisdiction over the action against the state, * * * [t]he amendment would not relate back to the original filing date * * *."). Here, Plaintiffs claims were not properly added to her federal lawsuit because the federal court lacked jurisdiction over civil claims brought against the state. See Finley v. Miami Univ., 504 F.Supp.3d 838, 842-843 (S.D.Ohio 2020) ("States cannot be sued in federal court without their consent unless Congress has validly abrogated their sovereign immunity. Finley's state-law claims are 'pendent' claims, meaning that they are only in federal court because they attach to Finley's federal Title VII cause of action. But that does not matter here because '[t]his constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.'"). Consequently, the Court finds that Civ.R. 15(C) does not apply to relate back the state law claims in Plaintiff's January 28, 2020 amended complaint to her November 20, 2019 original complaint brought in federal court. Because Plaintiff's amended complaint does not relate back, Plaintiff "cannot use the language of the savings clause 'attempted to be commenced' to extend the limitation period since the attempt was not made until [more than a month] after the limitation period had run." Id. at 9.
{¶16} Even if Defendant had waived its state immunity and the federal court could have properly exercised pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims against the state, Civ.R. 15(C) does not apply to relate back an amended complaint to an original complaint that was dismissed. See Stevens v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-1015, 2013-Ohio-3014, ¶ 17 (The Court declines "to apply Civ.R. 15(C) to relate appellant's amended complaint back to the dismissed complaint in federal court" after appellant voluntarily dismissed his federal complaint and refiled his 7 claims in the Court of Claims after the statute of limitations had expired.). To be timely, Plaintiff had to file her claims under R.C. 4112 on or before December 11, 2019. Plaintiff did not assert her claims under R.C. 4112 against the state until filing her January 28, 2020 amended federal complaint. Moreover, the federal court dismissed as untimely Plaintiffs federal law claims to which the state law claims would have attached. Therefore, the Court cannot apply Civ.R. 15(C) to relate back Plaintiffs claims to the date of her original federal complaint. Additionally, any alleged violations of R.C. 4112 for the December 11, 2017 denial of tenure asserted against Defendant in Plaintiffs related federal complaint filed on May 12, 2020 would also be untimely. Even construing the evidence most strongly in favor of Plaintiff, the only reasonable conclusion is that neither R.C. 2305.19 nor Civ.R. 15(C) operate to save her untimely filed claims in this Court. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Conclusion
{¶17} A non-oral hearing was conducted in this case. For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Judgment is rendered in favor of Defendant. Court costs are assessed against Plaintiff. The clerk shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. 8