Zurich Ins. Co. v. Zerfass, 106 Ga. App. 714, 719 ( 128 S.E.2d 75); Buffalo Cab Co. v. Gurley, 134 Ga. App. 167, 168 ( 213 S.E.2d 545). Compare Security Ins. Group v. Brackett, 132 Ga. App. 415 ( 208 S.E.2d 109). On the other hand, an expert can give an opinion based upon facts which he personally observes. Finley v. Franklin Aluminum Co., 132 Ga. App. 70, 72 (3) ( 207 S.E.2d 543). And where an expert personally observes date collected by another, his opinion is not objectionable merely because it is based, in part, upon the other's findings. Central Container Corp. v. Westbrook, 105 Ga. App. 855, 860 (4) ( 126 S.E.2d 264).
Thereafter, Jones claims that Lopez-Herrera was personally served by the court-appointed process server at 5715 Hammond Drive, Norcross, Georgia 30071 on October 27, 2009, citing an affidavit of service signed by the process server and filed with the trial court. Jones presents no evidence to support this allegation of past willful avoidance, and we did not consider the exhibit attached to her brief in support of same. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 304 Ga. App. 445, 447 n. 10 ( 696 SE2d 346) (2010) (holding that exhibits attached to an appellate brief, but not included in the record transmitted by the trial court, cannot be considered on appeal); see also Jahncke Serv., Inc. v. Dep't of Trans., 134 Ga. App. 106, 107 ( 213 SE2d 150) (1975) ("The brief cannot serve in the place of the record or the transcript for the purpose of demonstrating error or for supporting a claim of error."); Finley v. Franklin Aluminum Co., 132 Ga. App. 70, 71 (1) ( 207 SE2d 543) (1974) (same). Lopez-Herrera denies having been served with a copy of the complaint, and he filed a special answer, reserving all defenses arising from service, process and jurisdiction, and alleging that Jones's complaint should be dismissed for failure of service.
Moreover, any error in the trial court's initial ruling was harmless because evidence of Navy's alleged flight was admitted into evidence during the compensatory damages phase, notwithstanding the trial court's ruling. See Finley v. Franklin Aluminum Co., 132 Ga. App. 70, 74 (10) ( 207 SE2d 543) (1974). On direct examination, Gates' supervisor testified that Navy stopped at the accident scene, learned that Gates had been injured, and "turned around and left" when Gates "picked up the phone [and] showed [Navy] that he'd dialed 911."
As to Dr. Davis' contention that the expert testimony was inadmissible because the deponent's opinion was not elicited through the use of hypothetical questions, this court has held otherwise. See, e.g., Jones v. Ray, 159 Ga. App. 734 ( 285 S.E.2d 42) (1981); Finley v. Franklin Aluminum Co., 132 Ga. App. 70 ( 207 S.E.2d 543) (1974). See also Vaughn v. State, 249 Ga. 803 ( 294 S.E.2d 504) (1982).
2. "A brief cannot be used in lieu of the record or transcript for adding evidence to the record. Lowery v. Horn, 147 Ga. App. 880 ( 251 S.E.2d 840); Finley v. Franklin Aluminum Co., 132 Ga. App. 70, 71 ( 207 S.E.2d 543); Maloy v. Dixon, 127 Ga. App. 151, 154 ( 193 S.E.2d 19). We must take our evidence from the record and not from the brief of either party.
Shepherd v. Shepherd, 225 Ga. 455, 457 ( 169 S.E.2d 314). A brief cannot be used in lieu of the record for adding evidence to the record. Lowery v. Horn, 147 Ga. App. 880 ( 251 S.E.2d 840); Finley v. Franklin Aluminum Co., 132 Ga. App. 70, 71 ( 207 S.E.2d 543); Maloy v. Dixon, 127 Ga. App. 151, 154 ( 193 S.E.2d 19). We are required to take our evidence from the record and not from the brief of either party.
A brief cannot be used in lieu of the record or transcript for adding evidence to the record. Lowery v. Horn, 147 Ga. App. 880 ( 251 S.E.2d 840); Finley v. Franklin Aluminum Co., 132 Ga. App. 70, 71 ( 207 S.E.2d 543); Maloy v. Dixon, 127 Ga. App. 151, 154 ( 193 S.E.2d 19). We must take our evidence from the record and not from the brief of either party.
The trial court properly excluded the bus driver's opinion testimony as to what action, if any, the driver of appellee's truck could have taken to prevent the collision because the witness failed to narrate the facts and circumstances upon which his opinion was based. Cf. Finley v. Franklin Aluminum, 132 Ga. App. 70 (3) ( 207 S.E.2d 543) (1974); Dual S. Enterprises v. Webb, 138 Ga. App. 810 (3) ( 227 S.E.2d 418) (1976); Carpet Shop, Inc. v. Powell, 119 Ga. App. 499, 502 (2) ( 167 S.E.2d 718) (1969); Lankford v. Milhollin, 200 Ga. 512 (3) ( 37 S.E.2d 197) (1946). 3. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict on the issue of liability. "In cases involving rear-end collisions, the liability, degree of liability, or lack of liability on the part of any involved driver depends upon a factual resolution of the issues of diligence, negligence, and proximate cause.
4. Finally, appellants urge that it was error to permit an accident reconstruction expert to testify because he did not visit the scene until several months after the accident, because he relied in part on accident reports, his observations were based on hearsay and not upon his personal first-hand knowledge, and the opinions he gave were not in response to a direct hypothetical question. We held in Finley v. Franklin Aluminum Co., 132 Ga. App. 70, 72 ( 207 S.E.2d 543): "`When an expert testifies to his opinion based upon facts which he has observed it is not necessary that the question propounded be stated hypothetically . . . .'" In American Home Assurance Co. v. Stephens, 121 Ga. App. 306, 307 ( 174 S.E.2d 186), we held that where an expert bases his opinion on facts within the bounds of evidence, as in the case sub judice, the testimony is admissible notwithstanding the fact that the expert never went to the scene at all (a factor not true in this case) and based his opinion on examination of photographs.
However, the fact that the expert witness did relate the basis for his conclusion that the evidence was no more than fourteen hours old — comparison of the results with prior analyses — did not render erroneous the allowance of the expert opinion testimony. Cf. Finley v. Franklin Aluminum Co., 132 Ga. App. 70, 72 (3) ( 207 S.E.2d 543) (1974). "Where the testimony of an expert is competent, he may be permitted to give the details of experiments on which his testimony is based."